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Abstract 
 
The 1998 Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (GFA), a political agreement in Northern 
Ireland which offered the chance to end the thirty years of conflict known as ‘the Troubles,’ 
has attracted substantial interest from many scholars interested in political processes. Few, 
however, have focused on what the Agreement meant to non-political actors, especially 
‘victims’ of the Troubles. The GFA not only attempted to confine violence to the past. It 
shaped the ways in which victims, journalists and the ‘public’ could reflect on the fresh start 
the Agreement promised. This thesis examines the extent to which the GFA facilitated a 
shift in Northern Ireland’s public discourse away from established loyalties and paramilitary 
divisions to focus instead on the experience and rights of victims and the navigation of 
concepts of peace, justice and reconciliation. Three case studies of responses to post-GFA 
violence serve to chart the ways in which the frameworks of public debate shaped new 
identities which both marked a clear point of departure from past trauma, while also revealing 
the ambivalent and unequal ways in which still divided communities found a voice. The 
consequences of this shift were multifaceted, rearranging silences surrounding paramilitary 
violence rather than displacing them entirely. I argue that attention to this public discourse 
is a vital complement to any assessment of the political and social outcomes of the GFA. 
 
 
  
v 
 
Abbreviations 
 
32CSM  32 County Sovereignty Movement 
AP   Associated Press 
CAIN   Conflict Archive on the Internet 
CIRA   Continuity Irish Republican Army 
CLMC   Combined Loyalist Military Command 
COTT   Cost of the Troubles 
CRF   Catholic Reaction Force 
CRUA   Concerned Residents of Upper Ardoyne 
DUP   Democratic Unionist Party 
EU   European Union 
FAIR   Families Acting for Innocent Relatives 
GFA   Good Friday Agreement 
HET   Historical Enquiries Team 
IICD    Independent International Commission on Decommissioning 
INLA   Irish National Liberation Army 
IRSP   Irish Republican Socialist Party 
ITN   Independent Television News 
ITV   Independent Television 
LVF   Loyalist Volunteer Force 
MLA   Member of the Legislative Assembly 
MEP   Member of the European Parliament 
MP   Member of Parliament 
OIRA   Official Irish Republican Army 
OSSHG  Omagh Support and Self Help Group 
vi 
 
PIRA   Provisional Irish Republican Army 
PSNI   Police Service of Northern Ireland 
PUP   Progressive Unionist Party 
RHD   Red Hand Defenders 
RIR   Royal Irish Regiment 
RIRA   Real Irish Republican Army 
RTE   Right to Education 
RTÉ   Raidió Teilifís Éireann 
RUC   Royal Ulster Constabulary 
RSF   Republican Sinn Féin 
SAA   Saint Andrews Agreement 
SDLP   Social and Democratic Labour Party 
UDA   Ulster Defence Association 
UDR   Ulster Defence Regiment 
UDP   Ulster Democratic Party 
UFF   Ulster Freedom Fighters 
UKUP   United Kingdom Unionist Party 
UTV   Ulster Television 
UUC   Ulster Unionist Council 
UUP   Ulster Unionist Party 
UVF   Ulster Volunteer Force 
UWC   Ulster Workers Council 
VUPP   Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party  
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 
“A Peace of Sorts”………………………………………………………………………1 
 
Chapter 1 
The Belfast Agreement, 1998......................................................................................12 
 
Chapter 2  
The Omagh Bombing, 1998.......................................................................................49 
 
Chapter 3 
The Holy Cross Dispute, 2001....................................................................................82 
 
Chapter 4 
The Murder of Robert McCartney, 2005...................................................................118 
 
Conclusion 
(What’s So Funny ‘Bout) Peace, Justice and Reconciliation?..................................153 
 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..159
   
 
1 
 
Introduction: “A Peace of Sorts” 
 
1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the agreement we 
have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning. 
2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of 
suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their 
families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly 
dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, 
and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all. 
 
The Belfast Agreement, 1998.1  
 
Northern Ireland transformed in 1998. The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (GFA) 
offered the chance to end the thirty year conflict known as ‘the Troubles.’ The GFA aimed 
to maintain the ceasefires between the largest republican and loyalist paramilitary groups in 
Northern Ireland, foster “reconciliation” between Catholics and Protestants and create a 
“just and lasting peace”.2 Many scholars have studied the political, economic and social 
impacts of the GFA, with an interest in the formalities of its processes and provisions. Few, 
however, have focused on what the Agreement meant to non-political actors, especially 
people affected by the paramilitary violence which continued after 1998. This thesis argues 
that the GFA not only attempted to confine violence to the past but also shaped the ways in 
which non-political actors responded to continuing paramilitary violence, such as victims of 
violence, and media commentators. While this violence posed a fundamental challenge to 
concepts of ‘peace,’ ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation,’ my argument is that the post-GFA public 
debate reflected - and consolidated - a shift in the terms in which such violence was 
comprehended. That shift was sufficient to contain the political impacts of ongoing 
paramilitary violence and define a new discourse of community response. Three case studies 
are used to chart the ways in which the post-GFA frameworks of public debate shaped new 
                                                          
1 “The Agreement: Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations (10 April 1998),” CAIN Web Service, 
comp. Fionnuala McKenna, April 10, 1998, accessed September 30, 2016, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/ 
peace/docs/agreement.htm. 
2 “Second Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln,” The Avalon Project, March 4, 1865, accessed February 7, 
2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln2.asp. The phrase “just and lasting peace” was used by 
President Clinton in a 1993 speech in Belfast. The phrase originates in the last line of American President 
Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address in 1865: “With malice toward none, with charity for all, with 
firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up 
the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do 
all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations”.  
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identities, which both marked a clear point of departure from past trauma while also revealing 
the ambivalent and unequal ways in which still divided communities found a voice. I argue 
that the GFA should not only be considered as a political document. It also laid the 
groundwork for new ways in which people spoke about their opposition to violence, 
campaigned for a more peaceful future and reflected on their own changing identities in the 
process. 
While the GFA aimed primarily at creating peace, the processes it reflected also 
shaped how people were able to, or were enabled to, respond to violence. The public debate 
in which violence was comprehended underwent a distinct shift from that which had 
characterised the Troubles, when actors such as paramilitary groups maintained significant 
discursive power. Instead, the post-GFA discussion was shaped more by the power of 
testimony, the recognition of individual suffering and rights arising from it, and new 
conceptions of justice defined by civil action more than criminal procedure. In this transition, 
the perspectives of non-political actors and victims had a role that has largely been ignored 
by academic literature surrounding the Agreement. The wealth of scholarship so far 
dedicated to the GFA presents a history from above, concentrating on interactions between 
powerful political actors, and using opinion polls and elections to assess the success - or 
failures - of the Agreement. This thesis advances instead an analysis not so much ‘from 
below’ as of the mediating space of a political culture in which the impact of the GFA can 
be traced in a more subtle but enduring change in the terms within which success or failure 
were understood.  
Modern conceptions of ‘discourse’ are heavily influenced by French philosopher 
Michel Foucault. In his 1969 work The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault describes a 
‘discourse’ as being defined by the exact specificity of its occurrence. In establishing that 
‘specificity,’ the priorities are to: 
determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations 
with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of 
statement it excludes … we must show why it could not be other than it was, in what 
respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of others and in 
relation to them, a place that no other could occupy. The question proper to such an 
analysis might be formulated in this way: what is this specific existence that emerges 
from what is said and nowhere else?3 
 
                                                          
3 Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2013), accessed October 15, 2016, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/lib/anu/detail.action?docID=1144626., 30-31. 
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Foucault was interested in ideas of domination and power, with discourse and language being 
expressions of such power.4 I apply these conceptions of discursive power to ‘public’ 
discourse. Cultural historian and philosopher Jürgen Habermas assessed public discourse as 
evolving out of European seventeenth-century ideas including ‘publicity,’ ‘public opinion’ 
and ‘general opinion’.5 Historically, public discourse was a “sphere between civil society and 
the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally 
guaranteed”.6 In keeping with Foucauldian conceptions of discourse, public discourse is “no 
less permeated by power relations than society as a whole”.7 For the purposes of this thesis, 
‘public discourse’ incorporates these ideas and refers to who could say and write what 
through the primary vehicles of public discourse, the ‘mass media,’ especially newspapers 
and television. 
In exploring changes in Northern Ireland’s public discourse, the perspective of 
cultural history is particularly valuable in – as Alessandro Arcangeli explains – focussing on 
“motives and meanings that individual and collective historical agents from the past gave to 
whatever they were doing, and the context in which they operated”.8 Contemporary trends 
in cultural history, influenced by psychology, sociology and philosophy, focus on how 
meaning is represented.9 Miri Rubin succinctly assesses that cultural history lies in the 
“domain of representation, the struggle over meaning” and in exploring “meanings beyond 
any observable reality” which are “disseminated powerfully through the constitutive 
language practices, rituals and representations”.10 I explore two components of the discursive 
change brought about by the Agreement. First, I examine how victims responded to 
instances of paramilitary violence after the GFA and how these responses indicated 
discursive shifts in allowing victims to speak about their experiences. Second, I focus on how 
expectations surrounding the GFA and the ‘struggle over meaning’ of its key ideas of peace, 
justice and reconciliation were expressed in the years after 1998. In addition to what they said, 
my interest is in the terms in which they sought to represent themselves: the identities that 
                                                          
4 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 6. 
5 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Space: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeoisie Society, 
trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 25-26. 
6 Thomas McCarthy, introduction to The Structural Transformation of the Public Space: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeoisie Society, by Jürgen Habermas, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), xi. 
7 Simon Susan, “Critical Notes on Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere,” Sociological Analysis 5, no. 1 
(Spring 2011): 53. 
8 Alessandro Arcangeli, Cultural History: A Concise Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 16. 
9 See Peter Burke, What Is Cultural History?, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).  
10 Miri Rubin, “Cultural History I: What’s in a Name?,” Institute of Historical Studies, last updated 2008, 
accessed January 10, 2017, http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/cultural_history.html. 
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the GFA made available to them, as victims of violence but also in bearing witness to its 
impacts.  
While histories of Northern Ireland published since 1998 have focused on the GFA 
and its aftermath, they have concentrated mostly on the political impacts of the Agreement.11 
As it has featured in broader histories of Irish politics, the Agreement has served to focus on 
the continuing political challenges and crises facing Northern Ireland.12 Interdisciplinary 
studies have gone some way towards exploring post-GFA trends in economics and 
demographics, and the intersection of the Agreement with themes of religion, education and 
on-going segregation in Northern Ireland.13 My thesis is indebted to these studies of 
Northern Ireland’s political landscape after 1998, but my focus is on an examination of the 
ways in which the Agreement shaped a different discourse beneath politics and as a 
dimension of such trends. 
This thesis traces the transformation of public discourse from the ‘Troubles’ to the 
post-GFA era. Throughout the Troubles, republican and loyalist paramilitary organisations 
were powerful groups in shaping the terms of public debate. Although paramilitaries 
constituted only a small percentage of Northern Ireland’s population, at maximum four per 
cent of the population in the early 1970s,14 they were a powerful player in limiting discussion. 
                                                          
11 Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); 
Paul Dixon and Eamonn O’Kane, Northern Ireland Since 1969 (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2014); Feargal 
Cochrane, Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), accessed June 8, 
2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bv40.; Marc Mulholland, The Longest War: Northern Ireland’s Troubled 
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the 
Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 3rd ed. (London: Viking, 2012); Richard Bourke, Peace in 
Ireland: The War of Ideas (London: Pimlico, 2003); Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the 
Belfast Agreement (Oxford: Routledge, 2005); Katy Hayward, “Introduction: Political Discourse and Conflict 
Resolution,” in Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution, eds. Katy Hayward and Catherine O’Donnell 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
12 James Loughlin, The Ulster Question Since 1945, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmilan, 2004); Paul Bew, 
Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Henry Patterson, Ireland 
Since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict (London: Penguin, 2007). 
13 A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement, eds. Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen, 
2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Northern Ireland After the Troubles: A Society in 
Transition, eds. Colin Coulter and Michael Murray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); John D. 
Brewer, Gareth I. Higgins and Francis Teeney, Religion, Civil Society, and Peace in Northern Ireland (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, Conflict to peace: Politics and society in 
Northern Ireland over half a century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). 
14 The population of Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles was between 1.5 and 1.6 million people, 
based on census records from 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001. Estimates from the early 1970s put the UDA’s 
largest total membership at 40,000, however, this number refers to how many people the UDA could muster 
in support, rather than how many were active in the organisation. Gusty Spence claimed that UVF 
membership was 1500 in 1972, while the PIRA’s total membership throughout the Troubles was estimated by 
Martin McGuinness to be 10,000 people. In any case if we add the (largest, but by no means all groups) 
together, we can assume is around 52,500 people of a population of 1.5 million, or just over 3 per cent of the 
total population. In reality, active militants have probably numbered far fewer, as the PIRA’s estimate 
includes the whole of the Troubles while the UDA estimate includes supporters, rather than initiated 
UDA/UFF members.  
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Paramilitary groups released highly publicised statements – ceasefires, threats, warnings and 
other publications – and were listened to by governments. Paramilitaries literally enforced 
silence around certain topics by regularly murdering civilians, especially suspected informers 
and by intimidating witnesses,15 facilitating a culture of silence around victims, suppressing 
recognition of their experiences.16 Cultural historian Aileen Blaney has described paramilitary 
organisations throughout the Troubles as commanding a “greater degree of media visibility 
than the victims of violence – deceased, injured and bereaved”.17 Indeed, many victims of 
paramilitary violence felt that they were forgotten, silenced, ignored or marginalised during 
(and sometimes after) the Troubles.18 
As in other societies embroiled in conflict, victims were not all literally ‘silent’ 
throughout the Troubles - although many may have practiced “keeping silent in the hope 
that the problem will at best disappear, or at worst not deteriorate further”.19 One reason for 
this, as Hastings Donnan and Kirk Simpson have noted, was the need to “keep your head 
down” as the “fear of violent threat and intimidation that marked the Troubles” made silence 
“a strategic necessity to avoid attack”.20 This feeling was not universal. Some victims’ groups 
gained prominence, especially relatives of those killed in the Bloody Sunday Massacre in 1972 
and the non-sectarian ‘Community of Peace People’ in the 1970s. Newspaper accounts of 
victims’ ‘stories’ and published collections of testimonies could break through an oppressive 
culture of silence on issues that deeply polarised a society.21 Nevertheless, many victims felt 
forgotten. Heading a body established in 1997 to examine the “feasibility of providing great 
recognition for those who have become victims over thirty years of violence,” the Northern 
Ireland Victims Commissioner Sir Ken Bloomfield reflected that the “most vulnerable of all 
are those numerous victims [were those] who were not associated with any faction, cause or 
                                                          
15 Maria Beville and Sara Dybris McQuaid, “Speaking of Silence: Comments from an Irish Studies 
Perspective,” Nordic Irish Studies 11, no. 2 (2012): 11-12. 
16 Hastings Donnan and Kirk Simpson, “Silence and Violence among Northern Ireland Border Protestants,” 
Ethnos 72, no. 1 (March 2007): 12. 
17 Aileen Blaney, “Visible victims and the politics of suffering in Omagh,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 12, 
no. 4 (2009): 415. 
18 Kirk Simpson, Truth recovery in Northern Ireland: Critically interpreting the past (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2009), 58-59; Personal Accounts from Northern Ireland’s Troubles: Public Conflict, Private Loss, eds. 
Marie Smyth and Marie-Therese Fay (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 6; Donnan and Simpson, “Silence and 
Violence among Border Protestants,” 14-15; Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, Northern Ireland after the Good 
Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance and Blame (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 3-5. 
19 Morrissey and Smyth, Victims, Grievance and Blame, 61. 
20 Donnan and Simpson, “Silence and Violence among Border Protestants,” 12. 
21 Peter Taylor, Families at War: Voices from the Troubles (London: BBC Books, 1989); Tony Parker, May the Lord 
in His mercy be kind to Belfast (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993); Personal Accounts from Northern Ireland’s Troubles was 
published in 2000, but is based upon interviews conducted before the GFA. 
   
 
6 
 
organisation; the many “little people” caught up in violence, often in relatively isolated 
incidents too soon forgotten outside the immediate family”.22 
The GFA did not suddenly allow these previously silenced victims to speak openly 
about their experiences to a miraculously engaged and attentive audience. Indeed, some 
victims actually felt silenced by the GFA’s focus on forgiveness and reconciliation, which 
seemed to override their deep and enduring suffering.23 However, as Donnan and Simpson 
have argued in relation to Protestants in Northern Ireland’s border region, the “Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998 has created the conditions in which it is safer and more acceptable” to 
speak about experiences of violence: it has “encouraged people to come forward and tell 
their stories”.24 While encouraging victims to ‘come forward and tell their stories,’ the GFA 
did not instantly disempower paramilitary groups from a place in this discussion. It did, 
however, require them to significantly recast the ways in which they justified their roles and 
the place of violence within them. Northern Ireland’s post-GFA public discourse was, I 
argue, characterised by a significant revision in the relative power of groups in shaping the 
terms in which both the future and the past of their society might be represented. Equally, 
those terms were redefined by the forms of reportage, public testimony, international 
attention and cultural investment that were associated with the GFA’s context and rationale. 
This influence was exerted, particularly by the new forms of media, where testimonies could 
be aired unaltered to anyone who had access to the internet.  
As sociologists Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith have argued, the 1990s saw an 
increase in the public’s appetite for victims’ stories in post-conflict societies. “Life 
narratives,” “stories of survival,” and the ability of these traumatic stories to “reinvent 
imagined securities” became increasingly prominent in a culture geared towards the 
recognition of, and the marketing of, what Laurent Berlant has termed “interpersonal 
identification and empathy”.25 The new language and wider acknowledgement of 
psychological pain can also be linked to the “development of a ‘therapeutic turn’ in Anglo-
American societies during the 1990s,” in which the existence of ‘trauma’ became more widely 
                                                          
22 “We Will Remember Them: Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner, Sir Kenneth 
Bloomfield KCB,” CAIN Web Service, April, 1998, accessed September 30, 2016, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ 
issues/victims/docs/bloomfield98.pdf, 8, 30. Square brackets added. 
23 Nicole R. McClure, “Injured Bodies, Silenced Voices: Reclaiming Personal Trauma and the Narration of 
Pain in Northern Ireland,” Peace & Change 40, no. 4 (October 2015): 499; Graham Dawson, Making Peace with 
the Past? Memory, Trauma and the Irish Troubles (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 53-54.  
24 Donnan and Simpson, “Silence and Violence among Border Protestants,” 15. 
25 Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith, Human rights and narrated lives: The Ethics of Recognition (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 23-25; Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics,” in Cultural 
Pluralism: Identity, Politics and the Law, eds. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbour: University of 
Michigan Press, 2001), accessed March 18, 2017, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/lib/ 
anu/detail.action?docID=3414563, 54. 
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discussed and accepted.26 Other post-conflict societies in the 1990s experienced similar 
changes in the place of victims’ voices. South Africa undertook ‘truth and reconciliation’ 
commissions following the end of Apartheid in 1991, resulting in untold stories and unheard 
voices gaining recognition.27 Northern Ireland has not commenced such a specific 
endeavour. As social scientists Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern have noted “addressing 
outstanding truth and justice issues [was] absent from the Agreement … avoiding talk of the 
past, rather than addressing it, was the defining leitmotif of the Irish Peace Process in the 
1990s”.28 For reasons specific to Northern Ireland, as will be explained in Chapter 1, the 
discursive shift by which victims of paramilitary violence became more able to speak about 
their experiences did not take place in an official forum such as a truth and reconciliation 
project. Instead, these new expressions of victimhood and identity can be examined in the 
media, the central format in which matters of public debate and discourse were discussed – 
but not – crucially – systematically addressed.29  
In constructing a cultural history of the GFA, I focus on the public discourses 
surrounding peace, justice and reconciliation which came to prominence in the GFA and 
referendum debates (Chapter 1) and influenced responses to paramilitary violence (Chapters 
2 to 4). I use three case studies to examine the dimensions and changing nature of this 
influence: the Omagh bombing in 1998, the Holy Cross dispute of 2001 and the murder of 
Robert McCartney in 2005. Each of these examples highlights the ways in which inter-
communal reconciliation, controversies surrounding the justice system and the nature of 
peace itself, were understood in post-GFA environments. These violent events demonstrated 
that while paramilitaries would continue to be active in Northern Ireland, the responses, in 
newspapers, in television, in memoir and autobiography, reflected distinct processes in 
delegitimising such violence. In these case studies, victims of violence found an 
unprecedented voice. Equally, each of these case studies demonstrate the ways in which such 
voices were in themselves shaped by new cultural registers of empathy and identification in 
ways that added their own dimensions to the peace process. 
                                                          
26 Chis Gillian, “Traumatised by peace? A critique of five assumptions in the theory and practice of conflict 
related trauma policy in Northern Ireland,” Policy & Politics 34, no. 2 (2006): 337. 
27 Fiona C. Ross, “Women and the politics of identity: Voices in the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission,” in Violence and Belonging: The quest for identity in post-colonial Africa, ed. Vigdis Broch-Due (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 214-215, 233. 
28 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Attitudes towards a Truth Commission for Northern Ireland in 
Relation to Party Political Affiliation,” Irish Political Studies 23, no. 3 (September 2007): 322. Square brackets 
added. 
29 Catherine Happer and Greg Philo, “The Role of the Media in the Construction of Public Belief and Social 
Change,” Journal of Social and Political Psychology 1, no. 1 (2013): 321-322. 
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Chapter 1 outlines the processes leading to the GFA and public reactions to its 
conclusion. This chapter surveys the political and social context of the Agreement in the 
1990s and analyses the subsequent referendum to endorse it, to explore how and for whom 
the ideas of peace, justice and reconciliation acquired meaning in 1998. Through this process 
many victims of violence came to prominence, shaping popular perceptions of the GFA and 
establishing expectations of it.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the Omagh bombing. This event resulted in the largest loss of 
life in a single incident in the Troubles, with 29 people dead and over 200 injured. The 
bombing was carried out by the Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA or RIRA) who 
opposed the peace process. Most responses by the victims’ families, journalists and 
politicians argued that no revenge should be carried out in response to the bombing. Crucial 
to the management of these responses was the wide public and international condemnation 
it generated, and the ways in which this outrage played out in the discourses already 
associated with the Agreement. No event in the years after the GFA so thoroughly challenged 
the principles of the GFA. As Michael Gallagher, father of a victim of Omagh and subject 
of 2004 film Omagh, noted, the bombing “occurred in what was supposed to be peacetime. 
So many had worked hard to secure that peace with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
and that is why Omagh was shocking to so many”.30 The bombing created a space for 
relatives of the victims to engage with the meaning of the GFA and to frame their campaign 
for justice, by pursuing a successful civil suit against RIRA members, the first of its kind in 
British history. 
Chapter 3 explores the Holy Cross dispute in 2001. Attacks on the Protestant enclave 
of Glenbryn in north Belfast caused its residents to protest against mothers and children 
walking to the Catholic Holy Cross girls’ school located within ‘their’ territory. This protest 
resulted in almost daily riots for three months in late 2001. The protest caused widespread 
condemnation with a particular focus on the figure of the suffering child. The dispute 
revealed the tensions inherent in the GFA, especially its focus on creating a more reconciled 
Northern Ireland. The incident allowed for the protesters, parents of Holy Cross children 
and journalists to reflect on the progress of the GFA, and how their expectations of 
reconciliation were being damaged by such an impasse. The parties involved questioned how 
much had actually changed since the Troubles - especially as the GFA constructed children 
as the symbol of a more reconciled future. The dispute not only showed nationalist and 
unionist dissatisfaction with the GFA, it revealed how the use of new avenues of expression, 
                                                          
30 Graham Spencer, Omagh: Voices of Loss (London: Appletree, 2005), 9. 
   
 
9 
 
especially through the internet, could be utilised by victims (with varying levels of 
effectiveness). 
My final chapter focuses on the murder of Robert McCartney. McCartney was a 
nationalist from the Short Strand area of east Belfast, and it was here that he was murdered 
by Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members on 31 January 2005. While the killing 
was neither planned nor authorised by PIRA leadership, it led to widespread condemnation 
of the PIRA and its seeming lack of commitment to the ‘peace process.’ McCartney’s sisters 
and fiancée formed a campaign to bring Robert’s killers to justice, after dozens of potential 
witnesses to the murder failed to come forward to police. The family’s campaign led them to 
Dublin, London and Washington, where they met United States President George W. Bush 
in March 2005. The Agreement had, indirectly, empowered the McCartney family - 
exemplars of the new prominence of personalised trauma - to demand justice from Robert’s 
killers. 
Central to the consideration of these three cases is the ways in which they featured 
in media coverage. The print media was the primary outlet through which discourses 
surrounding the GFA were debated, shaping how victims of paramilitary violence were seen 
and heard. Newspapers also dictated which voices became prominent after the GFA. To 
assess this mix of expression and selection, I focus on the coverage of violence and victims 
in the most widely-circulated newspapers in Northern Ireland, including the unionist-aligned 
Belfast Telegraph and Belfast News-Letter in addition to the nationalist Irish News. I also 
incorporate the republican newspaper An Phoblacht (The Republic) as well as regional 
publications relevant to my case studies such as the Tyrone Constitution, Shankill Mirror and 
Andersonstown News. The Irish Republic’s Irish Times and Irish Independent and British tabloids 
including the Sun and Daily Mail as well as liberal broadsheets including the Guardian, 
Independent and Observer each reveal the ways in which the GFA influenced reportage and the 
place of victims in mainstream, and popular print media, in both the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland. 
In addition to these sources, I incorporate documentaries and news footage as the 
other main form of popular media which actively shaped the public culture of the GFA. I 
utilise video footage from Ulster Television (UTV), the major commercial news channel 
based in Northern Ireland. I also make use of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
and Associated Press (AP) archives as both organisations covered the events that constitute 
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the case studies in this thesis.31 Documentaries and news footage formed a crucial component 
of public discourse in Northern Ireland in both shaping what became ‘newsworthy,’ and 
specifying which voices were heard. Films focusing on victims’ experiences of post-GFA 
violence also form a part of my archive, as well as popularly-produced paintings, poems and 
songs, all of which reflected the forms of expression seized upon in a proliferation of voices 
after the GFA.32 I incorporate ‘new media’ including blog posts and archived websites from 
1998 to 2007, which show how technology played a significant role in the discursive changes 
brought about by the Agreement.33 These sources are part of the democratisation of media 
in Northern Ireland in the 1990s and 2000s, allowing new voices to be heard without 
requiring the interest or mediation of the print media. In them, ‘interpersonal identification’ 
became a core medium in responses to violence and in generating political momentum to 
address these issues. 
I also incorporate biographies and autobiographies of key political actors in addition 
to politicians’ published diaries. These sources - which also proliferated in the course of the 
period covered, and in reflection on it - illustrate the power for personal storytelling available 
to the political actors involved in the GFA, and also the importance such key players placed 
on adding their own personal investment to understanding the process.34 To balance such 
personalised perspectives, I have also examined autobiographies of less-prominent people 
affected by violence in each of my case studies.35 The publication (and sometimes self-
publication) of these sources demonstrates the willingness of victims and their relatives to 
                                                          
31 UTV is owned and operated by the Independent Television Network (ITV). ITV is owned by the 
Independent Television News (ITN) group and it is through ITN’s website ‘ITN Source’ 
(http://www.itnsource.com/en/) that I have accessed footage broadcast on UTV. I would like to thank the 
BBC archive in Belfast for allowing me to view their archived footage. 
32 Mark Brozel, Holy Cross (BBC, 2003); Pete Travis, Omagh (A-Film Distribution, 2004). 
33 “The Omagh Bombing - Your Reaction,” BBC News, August 16, 1998, accessed January 10, 2016, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/reaction/152096.stm; “The Blanket: A Journal of 
Protest and Dissent,” 2008, accessed January 14, 2017, http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/; “Internet 
Archive,” Internet Archive, accessed September 19, 2016, https://archive.org/. 
34 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004); Bertie Ahern and Richard Aldous, Bertie Ahern: The 
Autobiography (London: Arrow Books, 2010); Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow Books, 2011); George 
Mitchell, The Negotiator: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Mary McAleese, Love in Chaos: 
Spiritual Growth and the Search for Peace in Northern Ireland (London: Bloomsbury, 1999); Dean Godson, Himself 
Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism (Hammersmith: Harper Collins, 2004); Steve Bruce, Paisley: 
Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Liam Clarke and 
Kathryn Johnston, Martin McGuinness: From Guns to Government (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2003); 
Roy Garland, Gusty Spence (London: Blackstaff Press, 2001); Gerry Adams, An Irish Journal (Dingle: Brandon, 
2001); Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (London: The Bodley Head, 
2008); Alastair Campbell, The Irish Diaries [1994-2003], ed. Kathy Gilfillan (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2013). 
35 Kevin Skelton, Sent by an Angel: A True Story of Tragic Loss and Unexpected Love (London: Hay House, 2011); 
Anne Bill, Beyond the Red Gauntlet: The Silent Voices of Upper Ardoyne Amidst the Travesty of Holy Cross (Belfast: AB 
Publications, 2002); Aidan Troy, Holy Cross: A Personal Experience (Dublin: Currach Press, 2005); Catherine 
McCartney, Walls of Silence (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2007); Raymond McCord, Justice For Raymond (Dublin: 
Gill & Macmillan, 2008). 
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reflect their experiences, and also, the public appetite for such personalised ways of 
comprehending violence. The biographical and autobiographical turn of the 1990s - 
pervasive across so many forms of cultural production - forms an integral part of the GFA’s 
context and significance.36 
The GFA was a transformative event in the history of Northern Ireland. For the first 
time, the British, Irish and American governments as well as unionists, nationalists, 
republicans and loyalists agreed on a set of principles and the necessity of ‘peace’ as endorsed 
by a popular vote. Despite useful scholarship and personal reflections from key actors, there 
remains another story to be told. In constructing a cultural history, focused on public 
discourse, we can better understand the larger, non-political impacts of the GFA and how 
unionists and nationalists, Protestants and Catholics, viewed Northern Ireland after the 
Troubles. By exploring discourses surrounding peace, justice, reconciliation, and by 
employing largely underutilised sources, including autobiographies of victims of violence 
after the GFA, this study offers an alternative narrative to the prevailing political focus on 
the Agreement. In constructing a cultural history of the GFA, we can better understand how 
people, especially victims of paramilitary violence and their relatives, saw the ‘new’ Northern 
Ireland, and their place in it.
                                                          
36 Tom Wengraf, Prue Chamberlayne and Joanna Bornat, “A Biographical Turn in the Social Sciences? A 
British-European View,” Cultural Studies - Critical Methodologies 2, no. 2 (2002): 251-252. 
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Chapter 1: The Belfast Agreement, 1998 
 
 
Figure 1.1 David Trimble (left), Bono (centre) and John Hume (right). This image was 
taken at the Waterfront Hall in Belfast on 18 May 1998. This was an important moment 
for the YES campaign and was the first time that Trimble and Hume campaigned for the 
Agreement in public together. 
 
On 18 May 1998, two men shook hands on a stage. In the blue shirt was David Trimble and 
in the yellow shirt was John Hume (see figure 1). The choice to wear shirts rather than suits 
was made by Trimble, who believed the outfit change could make the pair seem “less 
formal”.2 After months of campaigning in their respective electorates, an outfit change still 
seemed needed to please thousands of screaming teenagers who now packed the newly 
refurbished Waterfront Hall in Belfast. The venue formed part of the revitalisation of the 
waterfront area of Belfast, a physical sign of the re-branding of Northern Ireland as a modern 
tourism and investment opportunity, after the republican and loyalist paramilitary ceasefires 
in 1994. Joining the men on stage were the Portadown-based band ‘Ash,’ probably the most 
popular Northern Irish band of the 1990s, and Irish band U2, who remained an influential 
force in international pop music. The audience of children were handpicked to represent 
both Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, while the concert itself 
contained iconic songs of peace, optimism and hopefulness: ‘One,’ ‘Give Peace a Chance’ 
                                                          
1 “Iconic images from the Northern Ireland peace process,” BBC News, June 27, 2012, accessed 30 
September, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-18611032. 
2 Sean O’Hagan, “I was there, helping to make history. (I just wish I hadn’t been scratching my chin),” 
Observer, May 24, 1998, 2. 
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and ‘Don’t Let Me Down’.3 It featured a minute of silence for victims of the Troubles. The 
Reverend Dr Ian Paisley criticised the concert, commenting that Trimble was “already 
rocking now and he would be rolling on Friday”.4 All this effort - the song choices, the 
location, the handshake, the shirts - was part of a final push to secure a YES vote on Friday 
22 May that could see an end to political violence in Northern Ireland. This date marked the 
referendum in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic on the Belfast or Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA).5  
The GFA and referendum campaign not only created the framework for peace in 
Northern Ireland, these events established the ways in which peace, justice and reconciliation 
would be conceptualised and discussed in the years after the Agreement. The public 
discourse surrounding the GFA revolved around these three ideas which shaped the 
expectations of what the Agreement was meant to achieve. The media coverage of the GFA 
and the referendum revealed contradictions and unresolved tensions in the peace, justice and 
reconciliation advocated by the Agreement. This chapter analyses these themes - the cultural 
history of which will be developed in this thesis - at their inception in the GFA. 
Historical Preamble 
Captain Terence O’Neill, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1963 to 1969, noted in 
1967 that “all too often any discussion of Irish affairs becomes lost in a lengthy historical 
preamble, long before reaching the present day”.6 Taking this criticism into account, some 
background information to the conflict euphemistically called the ‘Troubles’ remains 
necessary. In nineteenth-century Ireland, ‘Home Rule’ referred to the popular political 
movement to create a devolved Irish Parliament subservient to Westminster, an idea 
championed by the Irish Parliamentary Party.7 Under the leadership of Charles Stewart 
Parnell, the party held the balance of power in Westminster in 1885, the same year it was 
                                                          
3 While U2 were strong advocates for peace, John Lennon had publicly supported the IRA in the early 1970s, 
and Paul McCartney’s song ‘Give Ireland Back to the Irish’ was banned on the BBC in 1972. 
4 Kim Sengupta, “Oldest swingers join Bono's crusade to rock young voters,” Independent, May 20, 1998, 
accessed September 27, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/oldest-swingers-join-bonos-crusade-to-
rock-young-voters-1158569.html. 
5 Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (London: The Bodley Head, 2008), 
108. As Powell points out, unionists tend to refer to the agreement as the Belfast Agreement, while 
nationalists tend to refer to it as the Good Friday Agreement. I have chosen the latter, as the abbreviation 
‘GFA’ is more concise than ‘the Belfast Agreement’ and because it is used by academics from both unionist 
and nationalist backgrounds.  
6 Terence O’Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 123. 
7 Richard Bourke, “Introduction,” in The Princeton History of Modern Ireland, eds. Richard Bourke and Ian 
McBride (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 10-12. 
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officially supported by the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland.8 Many Protestants, especially 
in the northern province of Ulster, feared that any Irish Parliament would be Catholic 
dominated and hostile to their interests. In the early twentieth-century, Ulster’s population 
was largely made up of Protestant descendants of Scottish and English settlers who were the 
majority in counties Down, Antrim, Armagh and Londonderry.9 In 1912, half a million Ulster 
men and women signed the ‘Ulster Covenant.’ This document declared that 
Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the 
whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our 
citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the Empire … in the event of such a 
Parliament being forced upon us, we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves 
to refuse to recognise its authority.10 
 
In 1913, opposition to Home Rule in Ulster resulted in the creation of the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) under the enigmatic Dublin-born lawyer Sir Edward Carson. Armed with 
military equipment purchased from Germany, the organisation numbered over 90,000 men 
and pledged to resist Home Rule by force.11  
In 1916, against the background of the First World War (1914 to 1918), the ‘Irish 
Volunteers,’ along with other republican paramilitary groups such as the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB), took part in the 1916 Easter Rising. The Rising, centred in Dublin, was 
a rebellion aimed at overthrowing British rule in Ireland and establishing an independent 
Irish Republic. The ‘Proclamation of the Irish Republic’ circulated during the Rising declared  
the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered 
control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of 
that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor 
can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people.12 
 
The proclamation’s signatories claimed that Ireland had always been a nation, that British 
imperialism had attempted to extinguish this nation, and that the Irish people had the right 
to an independent state. The proclamation’s claims were fundamentally incompatible with 
the Ulster Covenant’s refusal to recognise Home Rule, let alone an independent Irish 
republic which would encompass Ulster. After the failed rising, the Irish Volunteers aimed 
                                                          
8 Paul Bew, C.S. Parnell (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1980), 68. 
9 Youssef Courbage, “The Demographic Factor in Ireland’s Movement Towards Partition (1607-1921),” 
Population: An English Selection 9, no. 1 (1997): 185. 
10 “Understanding the Ulster Covenant,” Ulster Scots Community Network, 2011, accessed December 16, 
2016, http://ulster-scots.com/uploads/USCNCovenant.pdf, 2. 
11 David Fitzpatrick, “Ireland Since 1870,” in The Oxford History of Ireland, ed. R. F. Foster (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 191-192. 
12 “Proclamation of the Irish Republic, 24 April 1916,” CAIN Web Service, comps. Martin Melaugh and 
Fionnuala McKenna, last modified February 9, 2016, accessed December 10, 2016, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ 
issues/politics/docs/pir24416.htm. 
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to create an Irish republic through a campaign of escalatory violence against the British 
state.13 The Irish Volunteers would come to be called the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
throughout the subsequent Irish War of Independence (1919 to 1921).14 In response to the 
War of Independence, Westminster passed the 1920 Government of Ireland Act which 
created Northern Ireland, containing six of the nine historic counties of the province of 
Ulster: Armagh, Antrim, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone. The historic 
province of Ulster also contained Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan, but the inclusion of these 
counties would have threatened a Protestant majority in the creation of Northern Ireland.15 
On this basis these counties were excluded from Northern Ireland. Negotiations between 
the British and Irish governments in December 1921 resulted in the Anglo-Irish Treaty and 
the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, comprised of the remaining 26 counties of 
Ireland.16  
Violence surrounded the creation of Northern Ireland. Almost 500 people are 
estimated to have died in clashes between the IRA and Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), 
as well as Protestant and Catholic civilians in Belfast during the early 1920s.17 Even as 
Belfast’s ‘Troubles’ of the 1920s subsided, many Catholics did not feel at home in the newly 
created Northern Ireland and many Protestants were suspicious of the political threat posed 
by the Catholic minority.18 Protestants in Northern Ireland remained overwhelmingly 
unionist, while Catholics retained hopes for a united Ireland independent of Britain. Brian 
Barton has summarised the early period of Northern Ireland as one in which Catholics 
experienced “a large, armed, almost exclusively protestant police force; emergency powers 
applied selectively; a judicial system with a reputation for bias; rural electoral districts 
gerrymandered; and P.R. [Proportional Representation] extinguished in local elections”.19 
The Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), which had formed in 1905 in order to oppose Home 
Rule, now governed at the newly created Parliament at Stormont as the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP), without any serious political challenge in those chambers from 1921 until it was 
                                                          
13 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA, 3rd ed. (London: Pan Macmillan, 2012), 15-17. 
14 Ibid., 14-16.  
15 James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, “Imperialism and nationalism: The Home Rule struggle 
and border creation in Ireland, 1885-1925,” Political Geography 26, no. 8 (2007): 945. 
16 “The Anglo-Irish Treaty, 6 December 1921,” CAIN Web Service, comp. Fionnuala McKenna, December 
6, 1921, accessed January 4, 2017, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/ait1921.htm. 
17 Alan F. Parkinson, Belfast’s Unholy War : The Troubles of the 1920s (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 12. 
18 James Loughlin, “Politics and Society, 1800-1960,” in Ulster Since 1600: Politics, Economy, and Society, eds. 
Liam Kennedy and Philip Ollerenshaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 241. 
19 Brian Barton, “Northern Ireland, 1920-25,” in Ireland, 1921-84, ed. Hill J. R., vol. VII of A New History of 
Ireland, eds. F. J. Byrne, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 196-197. Square brackets added. 
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suspended in 1972. Northern Ireland’s ministers were ultimately subservient to Westminster 
especially in matters of taxation.20 
Discrimination against Catholics in government and the civil service was common 
and widespread gerrymandering extended to local councils.21 Preferential treatment for 
Protestants and suspicions towards the Catholic minority were publicly reinforced by 
Northern Ireland’s political leaders, as future Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke declared in 
1933 that Catholics were “endeavouring to get in everywhere and were out with all their force 
and might to destroy the power and constitution of Ulster”.22 The IRA conducted the so 
called ‘Border Campaign’ against the British state as represented by Stormont from 1956 to 
1962, but this was largely ineffective as it had little support from the nationalist community.23 
In the mid-1960s, inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States, many 
Northern Irish Catholics began protesting against their continuing lack of political 
representation coupled with discrimination in accessing employment and housing. The civil 
rights movement in Northern Ireland began by promoting non-violent protests in the late-
1960s. Various organisations, including the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
(NICRA) established in 1967, and regional groups including the Derry Citizens Action 
Committee (DCAC) created in 1968, formed the backbone of this movement. The civil rights 
movement had no central leader and was, at various times in different areas, led by people 
including Bernadette Devlin, Seamus Mallon, Eamonn McCann and John Hume, all of 
whom would eventually hold elected office.24 Yet these protests elicited a violent response 
from the largely Protestant police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and the 
overwhelmingly Protestant militia, the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC).25 Many working-
class Protestants believed that the “ordinary working-class was as discriminated against as 
much as any Catholic” and viewed these protests as a cover for nationalist political 
aspirations that heralded the re-emergence of the IRA.26 There was some IRA support for 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 163. 
21 Henry Patterson, Ireland Since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict (London: Penguin, 2007), 6-7. 
22 Brian Barton, Brookeborough: The making of a Prime Minister (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1988), 78. 
23 Matt Treacy, The IRA 1956-69: Rethinking the Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 
accessed January 3, 2017, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/lib/anu/detail.action? 
docID=1069729, 9-10. 
24 Feargal Cochrane, Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), accessed 
June 8, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bv40., 42. After more than forty years of public life, 
Eamonn McCann was elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2016. 
25 The USC was created in 1920 as a militia group to assist the RUC in countering the activities of the IRA. 
Its successor was the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), created in 1970 which was amalgamated into the 
Royal Irish Regiment (RIR) in 1992. 
26 Peter Taylor, Loyalists (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), 49-51. 
   
 
17 
 
the civil rights movement,27 although the majority of civil rights leaders and supporters were 
nationalist civilians. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was established in 1966, taking its 
name from Carson’s UVF of the 1910s. The ‘new’ UVF aimed to maintain Northern 
Ireland’s place within the UK and defeat republicanism by executing IRA members and 
supporters.28 After the UVF accidently killed a Protestant woman and a Catholic civilian 
during one operation at a pub on 26 June 1966,29 O’Neill declared the organisation illegal.30 
Counter-demonstrations to these civil rights marches were led by the firebrand 
preacher turned politician Ian Paisley throughout the late 1960s and often resulted in street 
violence. Paisley became a bulwark of Ulster unionism in the 1960s and in 1971 established 
his own party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Paisley served as Member of 
Parliament (MP) for North Antrim from 1970 to 2010, and as a Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) for Northern Ireland from 1979 to 2004. He was also moderator of the 
Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster (which he founded) from 1951 to 2008. Steve Bruce 
argues that “to a majority of unionists, he is the man who preserved the union from 
premature compromise”.31 Political scientist Feargal Cochrane describes Paisley, from the 
1960s onwards, as “a past-master at scaring the unionist electorate into the polling booths to 
vote for his populist and moralizing messages”.32 This is the Paisley we encounter the 1960s, 
first opposing ecumenical relations between major churches in Northern Ireland before 
leading the loyalist reaction to the civil rights movement.33 During the late 1960s, violent 
clashes between nationalists, counter-demonstrators and the RUC in Derry, Northern 
Ireland’s second largest (and highly gerrymandered) city, grew more frequent. In August 
1969, protracted rioting led the Northern Ireland cabinet to request the British Army to enter 
Belfast and Derry to regain control of the streets. The hope was that their presence would 
be a temporary measure.34 Nationalists attempted to destroy factories while Catholic 
neighbourhoods in west and north Belfast were burned, causing thousands of refugees to 
flee the city - remembered by many nationalists as a ‘pogrom’ against their community.35 The 
IRA, far smaller than it had been in the 1920s, was logistically unable to defend Catholic 
                                                          
27 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles (Cork: Cork 
University Press, 1997), 41-42. 
28 Taylor, Loyalists, 41. 
29 David McKittrick et al., Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern 
Ireland troubles, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2007), 28-29. 
30 Marc Mulholland, The Longest War: Northern Ireland’s Troubled History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 67. 
31 Bruce, Paisley, 280. 
32 Cochrane, Reluctant Peace, 190. 
33 James Loughlin, The Ulster Question Since 1945, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 57-58. 
34 Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, 154. 
35 Marianne Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 417-418. 
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neighbourhoods. This failure, and a growing divide between republicans from the Irish 
republic and younger, more militant members from Northern Ireland, resulted in the split 
between the Official (OIRA) and Provisional IRA (PIRA) in 1969.36 The PIRA was 
responsible for an overwhelming proportion of republican violence throughout the 
Troubles,37 dwarfing the OIRA and its splinter group, the Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA), in terms of members, weapons and activities.38 The death toll in Northern Ireland 
would rise when the PIRA focused its attacks on the British Army beginning in 1971.39 
Disastrous government policies further alienated the Catholic minority, including an 
extremely unpopular curfew in the republican heartland of the Falls Road in west Belfast in 
1970 and the introduction of internment without trial for suspected paramilitaries in 1971. 
Both initiatives seriously alienated the nationalist community and increased support for the 
PIRA.40 In 1972, the deaths of thirteen unarmed protesters in Derry at the hands of the 
British Parachute Regiment, an incident later called ‘Bloody Sunday,’ further bolstered 
nationalist support for the PIRA. The PIRA’s response to Bloody Sunday, the bombing of 
the Belfast City Centre which killed mostly Protestant civilians, would come to be known as 
‘Bloody Friday.’ This event directly influenced many Protestants to join loyalist paramilitary 
organisations, including future loyalist politician David Ervine, who joined the UVF days 
after the bombing.41 The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was created as a conglomerate 
of separate loyalist paramilitary groups in 1971 and would continue its campaign, largely 
against Catholic civilians, under its cover name the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). The 
largest paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, the UDA had tens of thousands of members 
and associates throughout the Troubles.42 Both the UVF and UDA targeted the PIRA and 
its associates, although an overwhelming majority of their victims throughout the conflict 
were Catholic civilians.43 Focusing its violence on security forces in Northern Ireland 
                                                          
36 English, Armed Struggle, 107-108.  
37 Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
29. 
38 Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party (London: 
Penguin Books, 2009), 283. 
39 Mulholland, Longest War, 87. 
40 Cochrane, Reluctant Peace, 57.  
41 Taylor, Loyalists, 106-109. 
42 Ian S. Wood, Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 
accessed May 7, 2016, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/lib/anu/detail.action? 
docID=264973, 195; Paul Tanney, “15,000 UDA members march in Belfast,” Irish News, August 20, 2001, 
accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/15-000-uda-members-march-in-belfast-
1.323339. 
43 Dixon, Politics of War and Peace, 27-30. 
   
 
19 
 
including the Army, RUC and UDR, the PIRA nonetheless targeted Protestant civilians in 
their operations.44  
The 1970s and 1980s were characterised not only by a war between the PIRA and 
British Army, but paramilitary violence directed towards Protestant and Catholic civilians. 
The ‘war’ continued for a number of reasons. By the mid-1970s, the PIRA leadership realized 
it could not achieve a decisive military victory against the British Army and adopted the ‘long 
war’ strategy, expanding the organisation’s arms supplies and beginning to focus on political 
change, while continuously attacking the British Army.45 Officially, the PIRA did not target 
Protestant civilians, although many Protestants were massacred as a result of its actions, 
famously at Kingsmill, Armagh in 1976 and the La Mon Restaurant bombing in 1978.46 
Loyalist paramilitaries, equally unable to militarily defeat the PIRA, usually responded to 
republican violence by killing Catholic civilians. This would result in a retaliatory PIRA 
action, and then visa-versa. This sectarian zero-sum game was a key feature of the Troubles, 
a psyche that David Ervine later termed the “hamster wheel to hell”.47 It continued, in part, 
because of the ‘self-appointed’ nature of the paramilitaries. Republicans and loyalists both 
took it upon themselves both to defend ‘their’ communities, and to respond to attacks from 
the ‘other’ community. 
In response to the civil rights movement, O’Neill proposed changes to housing 
allocation and legislation aimed at reducing gerrymandering in Derry in November 1968. 
These reforms did not satisfy the nationalist population48 and O’Neill resigned in 1969, just 
months before British troops first began patrolling the streets of Derry and Belfast. The 
PIRA, loyalist paramilitaries and the army escalated operations, leading to over 400 deaths in 
1972 alone.49 Political violence led to political realignments. The non-sectarian Alliance Party 
and the nationalist Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) were both formed in 1970, 
followed the DUP in 1971. Violence on the streets of Northern Ireland fractured relations 
between Stormont and the British government and led to the suspension of Stormont on 1 
April 1972 and the introduction of ‘Direct Rule’ from Westminster.50 The British 
Government’s ‘Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals’ document, written after the 
suspension of Stormont, proposed “giving minority interests a share in the exercise of 
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executive power”.51 In practice, this meant giving nationalists a place in the government of 
Northern Ireland as a partner in government rather than as an opposition party. This 
proposal resulted in an agreement between the SDLP, UUP and Alliance Party at 
Sunningdale in Berkshire, called the ‘Sunningdale Agreement.’ Crucially, the PIRA opposed 
the deal, as did many members of the UUP and most importantly, loyalist paramilitaries. In 
1974, the Ulster Council Workers (UWC) organized a strike alongside loyalist paramilitaries 
which brought about the resignation of Brian Faulkner, the sixth (and final) Prime Minister 
of Northern Ireland. This led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement and power-
sharing assembly. 
Many leaders from 1973 were active politicians in 1998. Indeed, politicians 
responsible for the GFA would reflect on the opportunities and perils of Sunningdale.52 One 
loyalist active in 1973 was Augustus ‘Gusty’ Spence, then serving a sentence in Long Kesh 
prison where he took over command of the UVF prisoners.53 Spence delivered the loyalist 
ceasefire in 1994 and in 1998, he headed the delegation of the Progressive Unionist Party 
(PUP), the political representatives of the UVF, in negotiations resulting in the GFA. In the 
early 1970s, Gerry Adams was at the same prison, having been arrested in 1973 with key 
members of the PIRA’s Belfast Brigade.54 Adams became president of Sinn Féin, the PIRA’s 
political wing, in 1981 and helped steer violent republicanism towards politics, culminating 
in the GFA. Outside prison, David Trimble joined the radical Vanguard Unionist Progressive 
Party (VUPP) while lecturing in Law at Queen’s University Belfast, and was a legal advisor 
to the 1974 UWC strike.55 A Queen’s law student of this time was the Ardoyne-born Mary 
McAleese, who graduated in 1973 and went on to become President of the Irish Republic 
(1997 to 2011). Meanwhile, John Hume was part of the new power-sharing government 
established by Sunningdale in 1973. By 1998, Hume was crucial in negotiating the GFA, 
which his SDLP colleague Seamus Mallon called “Sunningdale for slow learners”.56 Clearly, 
key figures who crafted the GFA had been active in both paramilitary and political groups in 
the 1970s. Thus, the spectre of the Sunningdale Agreement’s collapse and violence of the 
early 1970s would shape the formulation of the GFA. 
                                                          
51 “Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals,” CAIN Web Service, comp. Fionnuala McKenna, 1973, 
March, accessed January 20, 2017, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd5259.htm. 
52 Alastair Campbell, The Irish Diaries [1994-2003], ed. Kathy Gilfillan (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2013), 110; 
Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 106; Moloney, Voices from the Grave, 346. 
53 Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 117-118. 
54 Moloney, Secret History of the IRA, 133. 
55 Dean Godson, Himself Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism (Hammersmith: Harper Collins, 2004), 
43-45. 
56 Dixon, Politics of War and Peace, 267. 
   
 
21 
 
By the 1990s, few civilians and victims of the conflict had public outlets in which to 
express their fears and hopes for the future. An enormous gap existed between the political 
process, paramilitary violence and public opinion. In 1993, the independently researched and 
funded ‘Opsahl Report’ under the leadership of Norwegian scholar Torkel Opsahl addressed 
this imbalance by publishing the findings of a wide-ranging citizens’ inquiry. Marianne Elliott 
recalled the authors’ desires to give “preferential treatment to those whose voices were 
normally not heard,” including “women, working-class Protestants, republicans, and the 
young”.57 As a result of these submissions, the report recommended that Irish nationalism 
be legally recognised, the Irish republic remove its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, 
the British government open informal channels of communication with Sinn Féin and 
paramilitaries work towards a ceasefire.58 Crucially, the report introduced the idea of ‘Parity 
of Esteem’ for both communities.59 This required both communities to be respected as 
equals: nationalists could aspire to a united Ireland while unionists were free to advocate for 
the maintenance of the union with the UK.60 None of the submissions believed that a 
“military solution” could end paramilitary violence and most thought that paramilitaries 
would need to be involved in any “peace-seeking process”.61 The report, created without 
either British or Irish government support,62 made many recommendations which would 
materialise in the GFA and demonstrated that ‘the public’ wanted a political solution to the 
conflict. Nevertheless, paramilitary groups had yet to publicly accept the possibility of a 
political solution to the conflict. 
By the 1990s, with the PIRA intact but Northern Ireland still part of the UK, neither 
republicans nor loyalists could claim ‘victory.’ Civilian deaths were the single largest group 
of fatalities associated with the Troubles, accounting for a total of 1967 out of 3720 total 
deaths from 1969 to 2007.63 One incident, the 1987 Enniskillen bombing in which the PIRA 
killed twelve Protestant civilians, resulted in backlash from republicans and seriously altered 
the republican movement’s strategy, facilitating a shift towards the ‘peace process’.64 One 
month after the bombing, Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Féin, met John Hume in secret 
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for the first time, with Hume acting as a representative for Irish Taoiseach Charles 
Haughey.65 By 1993, loyalists entered into similar secret talks with the British and Irish 
governments.66 Under British Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, 
the ‘Joint Declaration of Peace’ or ‘Downing Street Declaration’ reiterated that the British 
Government had no “selfish or economic interest” in Northern Ireland, and that the 
government’s “primary interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by 
agreement among all the people who inhabit the island”.67 The declaration did not explicitly 
refer to paramilitaries, rather appealing to “all concerned to grasp the opportunity for a new 
departure”.68 This declaration opened up a space to negotiate with paramilitaries as it 
signalled that the British and Irish governments were now working together. This marked a 
distinctive conceptual shift from previous British statements on Northern Ireland, especially 
Margaret Thatcher’s (reciprocated) hostility towards republicans and occasionally frosty 
relations with the Irish Republic in the 1980s. The document was explicitly intended as the 
“starting point of a peace process designed to culminate in a political settlement,” a shift 
away from violence and towards a political solution to the conflict.69 The British 
government’s statement eventually resulted in a PIRA ceasefire in August 1994,70 helped in 
part by back channels of secret communications between the British government and the 
PIRA.71 This was followed by a loyalist ceasefire in October, announced by the Combined 
Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) representing both the UVF and UDA.72 
There are numerous reasons, circumstantial and structural, why the ‘peace process’ 
occurred in the 1990s and not before. In the 1990s, American support for the ‘peace process’ 
in Northern Ireland was strengthened by President Bill Clinton’s visits to Belfast beginning 
in 1995, and the appointment of Senator George Mitchell as United States Special Envoy for 
Northern Ireland in the same year.73 Clinton had taken an interest in the conflict in Northern 
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Ireland as a Rhodes Scholar during the late 1960s,74 an interest that he had retained during 
his Presidency from 1993 to 2001. Another Oxonian, Tony Blair, requested that his college 
subscribe to the republican newspaper An Phoblacht (The Republic) in the early 1970s, 
demonstrating the future Prime Minister’s early interest in the conflict.75 Blair had ancestors 
who were Ulster Protestants, while his wife Cherie was Catholic.76 He recalled in his 2011 
autobiography that as the “70s rolled on into the 80s and 90s, the names of the failed peace 
attempts became imprinted on our consciousness,” indicating his (perhaps retrospective) 
understanding of previous attempts at peace.77 Blair’s election as Prime Minister in 1997 
proved fortuitous as his House of Commons majority meant that, unlike his Conservative 
Party predecessor John Major, he did not have to rely on the UUP for votes in order to pass 
legislation in Westminster. Simultaneously, the 1997 general election in the Irish Republic 
saw Bertie Ahern, a popular Fianna Fáil politician, elected as Taoiseach. Blair and Ahern’s 
were both (relatively) young new national leaders with an interest in (and lack of political 
baggage on) Northern Ireland. Clinton, Blair and Ahern were in a stronger position than 
previous leaders to facilitate dialogue between paramilitaries and politicians, and part of their 
political appeal rested on a capacity to make such a decisive break with the past. Their 
involvement indicated a significant shift in cultural frameworks: these were popular, 
charismatic politicians who reflected, or projected, a distinctively personalised integrity. A 
discourse of individual conscience, tinged with political celebrity, emerged in relation to 
Northern Ireland. Behind that public discourse, secret dialogue between Adams and Hume, 
loyalists and republicans, the British and Irish governments as well as the increasing 
mediating role of the United States, contributed to the eventual paramilitary ceasefires in 
1994.78 
Between 1994 and 1998, representatives from republican and loyalist paramilitaries, 
unionists, nationalists and non-sectarian parties, as well as representatives from the United 
States, United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, converged on Stormont in order to discuss 
a peace settlement. After Sinn Féin entered talks in 1997, the DUP left in protest. Having 
(consciously or unconsciously) recognised some lessons of Sunningdale, and the 
recommendations of commissions like the Opsahl report, participants desired to keep Sinn 
Féin in talks, fearing that without the party’s inclusion, republicans would return to violence.  
                                                          
74 Peter Coulter, “Christmas with the Clintons: When Bill and Hillary Came to Belfast in 1995,” BBC News, 
January 18, 2013, accessed September 30, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-21029865. 
75 Paul Bew, Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 555.  
76 Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow Books, 2011), 154-155. 
77 Ibid., 156. 
78 Cochrane, Reluctant Peace, 129. 
   
 
24 
 
A deadline of 9 April was set to establish a workable solution that could be acceptable 
to all parties involved. The proposals discussed were categorised into three strands. The first 
sought to foster better relations within Northern Ireland through the establishment of a new 
political body and the maintenance of paramilitary ceasefires. A 108-member Assembly (the 
Northern Ireland Assembly) was proposed, containing a power-sharing cabinet comprised 
of members of each major party, likely (at that time) to be the UUP and SDLP. Ministers 
would be allocated through a variation of the D’Hondt system: the largest party would 
nominate a First Minister, the second largest would nominate a Deputy First Minister while 
other ministers would be chosen from all elected members and parties.79 This model allowed 
unionists and nationalists to share power, rather than the majority party ruling, while also 
allowing the two smaller parties, Sinn Féin and the DUP, a place in government. This 
proposal also envisaged, for the first time that republicans be represented in the government 
of Northern Ireland.80 In addition to these measures, paramilitary prisoners would be 
released within two years (with the exception of those who posed a serious risk to public 
safety) with the hope that by this time they would have decommissioned their weapons and 
soon afterwards disband.81 During negotiations, Blair wrote a letter to Trimble stating that 
paramilitary decommissioning should begin immediately after the referendum. Blair’s also 
stated that despite exclusion from the assembly being decided on a “cross-community basis,” 
he would support changes if this proved to be ineffective.82 Blair effectively promised 
Trimble that if the PIRA did not decommission and Sinn Féin remained in the Assembly, he 
would support stronger measures in achieving either decommissioning or Sinn Féin’s 
suspension. According to Trimble, these reassurances gave him the confidence to take the 
Agreement to the UUC, resulting in the council, and thus the UUP accepting the 
Agreement.83  
The second strand of the Agreement focused on healing divisions between Northern 
Ireland and the Irish Republic. In order to achieve this aim three North/South consultative 
bodies were formed, including the ‘North/South Ministerial Council,’ the ‘North/South 
Inter-Parliamentary Association’ and the ‘North/South Consultative Forum’.84 Strand three 
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aimed at fostering better relations between the governments of the UK and the Irish 
Republic. Representative bodies including a ‘British-Irish Council’ and new ‘British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference’ would be established to improve relations between the UK 
and the Irish Republic. Britain’s constitutional claim over Northern Ireland remained, while 
the Republic of Ireland agreed to vote on changing Articles two and three of its constitution, 
which claimed Northern Ireland’s six counties. These articles, originally written into the Irish 
Constitution of 1937 were considered a threat to Northern Ireland’s sovereignty by 
unionists.85 While these changes reassured unionists, others like Paisley saw the new bodies 
as “at best, for Unionism, a luncheon club, but at worst it is a council where the two 
Governments will continue to interfere in the affairs of Northern Ireland over the heads of 
the people of the Province”.86 
The original 9 April deadline expired, but the deal was finally agreed to on Friday 10 
April, Good Friday on the liturgical calendar. The process - so dominated by the personalities 
of key figures - generated an atmosphere of almost redemptive power. Blair’s press secretary 
Alistair Campbell described the moment of the 8:10 am press conference announcing the 
deal, having stayed up most of the night, as “amazing, unbelievable. I actually felt like crying 
but I held it together … I got home, wired and exhausted, and still trying to remember how 
it all came together in the end”.87 The Agreement itself was also pragmatic. The proposals 
allowed both republicans and loyalists, most crucially the PIRA, to claim victory.88 Sinn Féin 
were able to position the Agreement as part of a process leading towards a united Ireland,89 
as the ‘consent principle’ of the GFA allowed Northern Ireland to become a part of the Irish 
Republic through democratic means. Loyalist groups were able to rest on the reality that, 
despite some input of the Irish Republic in Northern Irish affairs, the union with Britain had 
been maintained.90 Nationalists now had more political expression through the new power-
sharing Assembly, and stronger links to the Irish Republic. Yet, there remained significant 
opposition to the GFA in Northern Ireland, and support for the Agreement would only 
erode in the months and years after Good Friday. Catholic support for the deal was 
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consistently strong, whereas Protestant support was difficult to precisely calculate. The 
Agreement was most likely supported by just over half of Protestant voters in 1998.91 
By 1998, over 3500 people had died as a result of the conflict. Almost 20,000 had 
been incarcerated and over 40,000 had been injured in a province of 1.5 million people.92 
With the scale of casualties and timescale of the conflict in mind, we can better understand 
why voters in 1998 did not want the conflict to continue for another generation, and why 
71.1 per cent voted YES to the GFA, which promised something approaching ‘peace,’ 
‘justice’ and hopefully ‘reconciliation’ between Catholics and Protestants. The Agreement 
attracted widespread international endorsement and support from all major political parties 
in Northern Ireland, with the crucial exception of the DUP. The 22 July referendum finalised 
the deal, with a strong turnout of 81 per cent of eligible people voting in Northern Ireland.93 
71.1 per cent of Northern Irish voters and 94.39 per cent of Irish voters cast YES votes in 
the referendum.94 In 1998, the Nobel Peace Prize was jointly awarded to John Hume and 
David Trimble. This choice both recognised the work of these men, and sought to “inspire 
peaceful solutions to other religious, ethnic and national conflicts around the world”.95 It also 
compounded the perception that the Troubles was now being superseded by a culture of 
internationalised recognition of trauma and promises of cultural renewal. The previous 
winners of the Nobel Peace Prize in the 1990s reflected this international focus on peace and 
reconciliation as the solutions to long running conflicts: Aung San Suu Kyi (Myanmar) in 
1991, Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk (South Africa) in 1993, Yasser 
Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin (Israel and Palestine) in 1994 and Carlos Filipe 
Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta in 1996 (East Timor). Crucially, the conflict in 
Northern Ireland was not only resolved through political innovations. The GFA was 
confirmed through a referendum that signified its legitimacy, tangible evidence of the 
support of the majority of people in Northern Ireland. 
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Newspapers “Give Peace a Chance” 
One of the GFA’s architects was UUP leader David Trimble, an uncompromising unionist 
in the 1970s, who became a compromising political leader in the 1990s. Trimble noted in his 
1998 Nobel Peace prize lecture that  
we have a peace of sorts in Northern Ireland. But it is still something of an armed 
peace … there are two traditions in Northern Ireland. There are two main religious 
denominations. But there is only one true moral denomination. And it wants peace.96 
 
Even in accepting the Nobel Prize for Peace, Trimble reflected that Northern Ireland, at 
best, had a ‘peace of sorts.’ Northern Ireland’s ‘relative’ peace ‘of sorts’ was a cornerstone of 
the GFA, shaped by a wide range of expectations of peace and experiences of the Troubles. 
Polls conducted in 1997 suggested that 97 per cent of people supported “the principle of a 
negotiated settlement for the political future of Northern Ireland”.97 Despite supporting ‘the 
principle’ of a settlement, achieving a peace settlement acceptable to both communities 
proved problematic. Indeed, Northern Ireland was born in the violence surrounding the 
partition of Ireland from 1920 to 1921 and violent clashes between Protestants and 
Catholics.98 What exactly did peace mean in 1998?  
At the very least, peace entailed a reduction in paramilitary violence. The GFA itself 
did not require paramilitary groups to disband, rather it encouraged participants’ 
“commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations … to achieve the 
decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in 
referendums North and South of the agreement”.99 In reality, it would take almost a decade 
for large paramilitary groups including the PIRA and UVF to decommission large portions 
of their arsenals (see Chapter 4). A lack of significant paramilitary decommissioning would 
influence the peace process in numerous ways, not least in the rise in power of the DUP. 
The ‘peace’ that many expected in 1998, one free from paramilitary violence, was severely 
challenged by events after the GFA, most notably, by the Omagh bombing only months 
later.  
The public discourse surrounding peace can be explored through the newspaper 
coverage of the GFA and subsequent referendum. The focus of these reports was on the 
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personal investment in, and reaction to, the Agreement. The GFA had a wide spectrum of 
support in the press from the distinct perspectives represented by the major papers. The 
Belfast Telegraph, Belfast News Letter and Irish Times newspapers were the three largest selling 
daily newspapers in Northern Ireland in the late 1990s. The Belfast Telegraph, the most widely 
read, had traditionally been a unionist paper, but by the 1990s drew its readership from both 
nationalist and unionist communities.100 The Belfast News Letter had traditionally represented 
views from the unionist community, although it did not directly endorse loyalist 
paramilitaries.101 Both newspapers, which Greg McLaughlin and Stephen Baker describe in 
The Propaganda of Peace as “unionist in terms of content and editorial stance,” supported the 
GFA, even though unionists had at best “ambivalent support” for the Agreement.102 The 
Irish News largely represented the views of the nationalist community, and had distanced itself 
from republicanism since the 1980s,103 instead aligning itself with the SDLP and Catholic 
hierarchy within Northern Ireland.104 The republican viewpoint was expressed in An Phoblacht 
which John Horgan has described as the media “organ of the Sinn Fein party”.105  
The print media, both unionist, nationalist and largely pro-GFA, was the medium 
through which public debate surrounding the GFA was conducted. On the day of the 
referendum, the Belfast News Letter, Irish News, Daily Star, Daily Express, Guardian, Daily Mail, 
Independent, Daily Mirror, Sun, Irish Times and Irish Independent all endorsed the GFA.106 Israeli 
academic Gadi Wolfsfeld later argued that media coverage of the GFA was categorised by a 
“relatively low level of sensationalism. This set of circumstances turned the news media into 
an important tool for promoting the peace process”.107 Alternatively, McLaughlin and Baker 
argue that many newspaper editorials followed Tony Blair’s core message that there was no 
alternative to the GFA, and that there was no “Plan B” if it failed.108 Understandably, 
newspapers such as the Irish News supported the deal, as its readership largely consisted of 
nationalists who overwhelmingly supported the GFA. Public discourse surrounding the 
GFA was partially influenced by newspaper editors and journalists who tended to support 
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the Agreement. The eventual result of the referendum showed just under thirty per cent of 
voters voting NO in Northern Ireland. Disproportionately, virtually all newspapers in 
Northern Ireland, Britain and the Irish Republic officially supported the YES campaign.  
The major British and Irish newspapers ran numerous stories focusing on people’s 
adulation and cautious optimism at the news of the GFA. The British Independent newspaper 
reported one woman in the centre of Belfast who recalled that, “I saw people with tears in 
their eyes. I shed a few myself” after the announcement of the GFA.109 This celebration 
expressed what many people felt at the prospect of a Northern Ireland without conflict. 
British tabloid the Mirror reported on a Falls Road resident Theresa McCarron who quipped 
“I believe for the first time that this could be it – once the hot heads have sense and put 
down their guns. I would appeal them to give peace a try. They might even like it”.110 A letter 
sent to the Belfast News Letter the day after the GFA reminded readers “of the crucifixion of 
the last 30 years and of all the people who suffered and died … the outcome of that historic 
and long Good Friday at Stormont can … lead to a resurrection for the whole community”.111 
Similarly, the Belfast Telegraph ran an editorial the day after the GFA outlining “this newspaper 
has charted the course of Ulster’s history since 1870 and in the often violent perspective of 
times past – 1912, 1916, 1921, 1969 – this Good Friday 1998 will take its place as a day of 
destiny … the gun and the bomb need to be taken out of this society - period”.112  
As this coverage elucidated, the idea of ‘peace’ varied between people and was 
informed by different memories of the Troubles. On 10 April, the Belfast Telegraph 
interviewed Mary Rodgers, a Belfast housewife. Rogers said “I’m here with my two kids this 
morning and for the first time in their lifetime real peace is possible … I grew up not knowing 
people from the opposite religion and all this suspicion was passed on to my generation. 
Maybe in theirs they will know something different and better”.113 Another interviewee, 
Catherine Courtney, believed “everybody wants this to work, we all want to be able to live 
in peace, especially for the young people … but the younger people are different – they know 
nothing but division. When I was younger, we didn’t know the difference, the kids of all 
religions played together. Estates were mixed. It’s different now and much harder to break 
that suspicion down”.114 We can see that even on this same page, the idea of peace was 
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informed by different experiences and memories of the conflict. Hopes of ‘peace’ were 
certainly widespread, but they were influenced by the different memories of Protestants and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland.115 The media coverage surrounding the GFA referendum 
allowed for these different, and sometimes conflicting, memories to be expressed publicly 
and demonstrated the capacity for people to speak about their experiences.  
 
 
Figure 2.116 The front cover of the GFA which was sent to every family in Northern 
Ireland. The bi-line reads “THIS AGREEMENT IS ABOUT YOUR FUTURE. 
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. It’s Your Decision”. The emphasis on ‘your’ 
illuminates the necessity of the referendum in legitimising the GFA. The focus on 
children is also present, with a family at dawn looking to the future. 
 
Another force in the referendum debate were the celebrities in the YES campaign. Actors 
including Kenneth Branagh and musicians such as Bono came out in support of the GFA, 
as did billionaire Richard Branson, who promised to invest in Northern Ireland if the YES 
campaign was successful.117 The celebrity nature of the YES campaign may have been tied 
to the campaign’s emphasis on the youth and young voters. To add to the momentum of the 
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YES campaign, every family in Northern Ireland was sent a copy of a booklet containing the 
Agreement (see figure 2) and a VHS tape, containing interviews, including one with Branagh, 
advocating for the Agreement.118 Blair and Trimble stated that they believed the referendum 
would require a seventy per cent vote for YES in Northern Ireland in order to succeed, 
counting on overwhelming nationalist support and strong unionist support.119 This aim was 
eventually realised, thanks in part to the widespread support for the Agreement from 
politicians, the print media, celebrities and victims of the Troubles. 
Despite widespread support for the GFA, the strength of the NO campaign and 
unionist opposition to the GFA should not be underestimated. According to sociologist 
Steve Bruce, the GFA contained “much that was abhorrent to unionists” including giving 
“Sinn Fein leaders the respectability of government office” along with releasing paramilitary 
prisoners and not requiring paramilitaries to decommission their weapons.120 This was 
demonstrated in the political lines drawn after 10 April. Although the  UUC, the governing 
body of the UUP, voted 55 to 23 in favour of the Agreement, the Loyal Orange Institution 
(or Orange Order) did not follow suit.121 Six UUP MPs, the DUP and United Kingdom 
Unionist Party (UKUP) formed an anti-agreement bloc, but the strength of the anti-
Agreement campaign lay behind Paisley (see figure 3). When the referendum was announced, 
David Trimble stated that a majority of Protestants had voted for the Agreement, despite no 
precise mechanism of determining how exactly the Protestant vote was split.122 Because of 
this, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Mo Mowlam claimed that a majority from “both 
communities” had voted for the GFA, while Paisley was able to claim that the result was 
illegitimate, based on his belief that a majority of Protestants had voted against the 
Agreement.123  
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Figure 3.124 This image comes from a pamphlet issued by the DUP in the weeks 
before the referendum. It reads “IT’S RIGHT TO SAY “NO” TO THE UNITED 
IRELAND PROCESS”. This pamphlet and others issued by the anti-GFA parties 
linked the GFA with republicans’ hopes for a united Ireland. This slogan was 
expanded into the catchier “It’s Right to Say No When There’s a Better Way to Go” 
in other pamphlets of the time. 
 
Even prominent unionists who supported the GFA had reservations in completely endorsing 
its content. Dr Robin Eames, the Church of Ireland Archbishop of Armagh,125 admitted “I 
have big problems with the document,” but “none of us want the grandchildren of Northern 
Ireland, let alone the children of Northern Ireland, to live their lives as so many of us have 
had to live ours”.126 On the eve of the referendum, nationalists still overwhelmingly 
supported the Agreement, while the Protestant vote was split as many unionists remained 
undecided.127 Some unionists were not swayed by the celebrity endorsements for the GFA, 
as a letter to the Belfast News Letter noted, “I cannot be swayed by celebrities or world leaders. 
Like my fellow countrymen and women I would prefer to rely on my own common sense 
and intelligence … I want peace, I want prosperity, I want a better future for all, but I do not 
believe that this Agreement will deliver these”.128 This statement outlines the feeling that 
many people opposed the GFA, while still desiring the peace that it promised. Coverage of 
the referendum and the debates throughout the print media reflected some of these different 
perspectives, reinforcing that despite differences between unionist and nationalist 
perspectives on the GFA, an overwhelming majority of people in Northern Ireland desired 
an end to paramilitary violence. 
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Victims speak 
Victims of the Troubles came to the forefront of public debates surrounding the GFA and 
May referendum. Many victims felt that throughout the conflict, their voices were not heard. 
In November 1997, the Victims Commissioner for Northern Ireland, Sir Kenneth 
Bloomfield, investigated the experiences of victims in Northern Ireland. His report, released 
in April 1998 as ‘We Will Remember Them,’ observed that the British government has 
“created victims through violence, and we have produced violence out of division. It follows, 
then, that any form of recognition likely to generate division rather than to foster 
reconciliation should be avoided”.129 Bloomfield noted other problems associated with 
different categories of victimhood, particularly the “numerous victims who were not 
associated with any faction, cause or organisation; the many “little people” caught up in 
violence, often in relatively isolated incidents too soon forgotten outside the immediate 
family”.130 ‘We Will Remember Them’ begins to acknowledge the widespread suffering of 
the Troubles, and recognised that some victims had more powerful voices than others. 
Similarly, the final report of the Cost of the Troubles (COTT) project, an independent inquiry 
released in April 1999, stated “many individuals and groups have a sense of injustice and 
grievance against the paramilitaries, the authorities, the media, politicians, or the human 
service organisations. The lack of acknowledgement or denial of their needs, questioning of 
their rights to be considered sympathetically or the lack of support for them after their 
bereavement injury or loss has often exacerbated this”.131 As these reports hinted, in the 
debates surrounding the GFA, victims were simultaneously held up as beacons of authority 
on the need for peace, while also using this newfound interest as an opportunity to have their 
personal trauma heard.  
Victims’ emphasis on the need for ‘recognition’ of their personal trauma was not a 
new phenomenon in 1998. In Making peace with the past?, Graham Dawson notes that the 1994 
paramilitary ceasefires removed some of the climate of fear surrounding the Troubles. For a 
short time people experienced the effect of “opening up of spaces for reflection and 
remembrance [and] stimulated widespread telling of personal stories of loss, trauma and 
survival, and also a new public receptivity to such stories as representations of a collective 
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experience”.132 In 1994, the widespread hope that the conflict was (at least temporarily) over 
allowed many people to express themselves in ways not previously possible. Newspaper 
coverage of the GFA indicates that this ‘opening up of spaces’ occurred again in 1998, with 
the logic that an Agreement would ‘bring closure’ to families traumatised by the Troubles. 
As Dawson has noted, “for survivors to speak at all about the experience is to engage in a 
struggle to shape the traumatic event into narrative form … but they are also seeking 
recognition of that pain, disturbance, dislocation and horror from others”.133 Victims were 
utilised by newspapers as spokespeople for the Agreement, as individuals who could “break 
down communal divisions and act as ‘moral beacons’ for future reconciliation” or 
alternatively, to act as deterrents for political change.134 If even those most traumatised by 
the Troubles could bring themselves to vote YES, the general public had no excuse not to 
support the GFA. As Marie Smyth has noted, victims of violence are “often held up, 
implicitly or explicitly, as instances of a higher state or example of a feat of self-
transformation. If they can forgive the great injuries inflicted upon them, then those who 
have suffered less have little justification for persistent grievance”.135 In the debates 
surrounding the GFA, victims of violence were certainly held up as agents of forgiveness 
and used by the media, but they also had their voices amplified through renewed interest in 
their stories in the form of public meetings, political discussions and media interest.  
The 11 April edition of the Irish News led by listing five separate families who 
supported the GFA and emphasised their relatives’ deaths in the Troubles. Under the main 
headline “Deal is too late for victims” were numerous columns including “Noreen welcomes 
news,” “Mother optimistic for future,” “Family hopes guns fall silent” and “Parry family 
‘delighted’ at deal”.136 All (but one) of the families referred to their trauma as a reason for 
voting YES.137 The prominence of victims of violence and their families was not confined to 
nationalist publications. The Belfast Telegraph ran a story on 10 April entitled “Please Give Us 
a Future” with the subheading “Tragic gran in call for peace”.138 The woman in question, 
Gina Murray, recalled that her daughter, a victim of the Troubles, “would have been 17 now, 
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she would have been an auntie”.139 Similar stories ran in the Belfast News Letter.140 These stories 
both demonstrated newspapers utilising victims for the political purpose of supporting the 
Agreement, and indicated more fundamentally the authenticity the process gained through 
personalised endorsement. Public interest had created a space in which to discuss the future, 
and as a consequence, previously ‘silent’ victims had their voices amplified.  
In exploring victims of paramilitary violence, I am keenly aware that experiences, 
memories and traumas in the Troubles vary enormously, and that conceptions of 
‘victimhood’ remain contested.141 Indeed, in prioritising stories of forgiveness and acceptance 
of the past, the Northern Irish news media neglected stories of people refusing to forgive 
paramilitaries or forget their suffering. Yet memory of the origins and causes of the Troubles 
in Northern Ireland became important in 1998, as negotiations attempted to acknowledge 
the “tragedies of the past” and that “we must never forget those who have died or been 
injured, and their families”.142 Catholic and Protestant memories of the conflict differed in 
understanding its origins, and the reasons and responsibility for its continuation. Polls 
compiled in 1999 by political scientist Colin Irwin suggest that a large percentage of 
Protestants believed the PIRA to be responsible for the Troubles, while a majority of 
Catholics believed that a lack of equality was a key cause.143 As political scientist Nevin T. 
Aiken has assessed “no consensus exists on the broader ‘story’ of why violence occurred 
during the Troubles and who the real ‘victims’ are. This lack of a common understanding … 
directly impeded efforts to move forward in any meaningful way in advancing 
socioemotional reconciliation through truth and justice in postconflict Northern Ireland”.144 
Ian McBride notes collective memory’s ability to “reduce complex historical processes to 
basic images and narrative types that answer specific ideological needs,” a feature of memory 
which may explain the divide between Protestant and Catholic memories of the Troubles, 
and differing expectations of peace.145  
                                                          
139 Ibid. 
140 “Letters Special - YES!,” Belfast News Letter, May 22, 1998, 11. 
141 Marcel M. Baumann, “Contested Victimhood in the Northern Irish Peace Process,” Peace Review: A Journal 
of Social Justice 22, no. 2 (2010): 172. 
142 “The Agreement.” 
143 Irwin, People’s Peace Process, 38. 
144 Nevin T. Aiken, “Learning to Live Together: Transitional Justice and Intergroup Reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 4, no. 2 (2010): 181. 
145 McBride, “Memory and National Identity,” 36. 
   
 
36 
 
“A Just and Lasting Peace”  
‘Justice’ was another powerful theme of the GFA document and the debates surrounding 
the referendum. The very different conceptions of ‘justice’ in the unionist and nationalist 
communities would, however, become an issue of contention. For many in the nationalist 
community, ‘justice’ was the impetus behind the civil rights movement. Housing, 
employment, as well as social and political discrimination resulted in extreme deprivation for 
the Catholic minority, especially in densely populated areas like Derry. Many unionists 
believed that the PIRA, rather than the British state or structural inequality, was responsible 
for the violence of the Troubles.146 ‘Justice’ for many unionists therefore meant the legal 
prosecution of PIRA leaders and members, especially those involved in atrocities against the 
Protestant community. I explore how ‘justice’ in 1998 revolved around dealing with the past, 
paramilitary prisoner releases and the reform of the RUC. 
In 1997, after a motion put forward by John Hume in the House of Commons, Tony 
Blair announced an inquiry into the 1972 ‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre. According to historian 
Paul Bew, this was done in order to “build up nationalist confidence in the peace process,” 
by addressing a long-standing issue in the nationalist community.147 The inquiry, under the 
leadership of Justice Lord Saville investigated the massacre of thirteen civilians “none of 
whom was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury” to the Parachute Regiment in 
Derry.148 An earlier inquiry, the ‘Widgery Report,’ had largely absolved the soldiers of 
responsibility for the protesters’ deaths, claiming that there was “no reason to suppose that 
the soldiers would have opened fire if they had not been fired upon first,” and that there 
would have been no deaths “if those who organised the illegal march had not thereby created 
a highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces 
was almost inevitable”.149 Many nationalists felt the Widgery Report was a cover-up.150 The 
Saville Inquiry was part of a broader attempt to satisfy nationalist concerns. Nevin T. Aiken 
suggests its 2010 findings were “vital in helping to put to rest one of the single most 
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contentious events of Northern Ireland’s violent past … the official acknowledgement of 
the innocence of the Bloody Sunday victims appears to have satisfied one of the key demands 
for justice and to have provided an important source of closure”.151  
Similarly, under the ‘Constitutional Issues’ section of the Agreement, the document 
outlines 
the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with 
rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and 
traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, 
civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all 
citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, 
ethos, and aspirations of both communities.152 
 
This emphasis on ‘parity of esteem’ also attempted to make the nationalist community more 
comfortable in Northern Ireland. This was one of the policies recommended in the Opsahl 
report and came to fruition in the GFA document. In addition to parity of esteem and the 
Saville Inquiry, the Independent Commission for Policing in Northern Ireland, under the 
leadership of former Conservative MP Chris Patten, was designed to assess the RUC in the 
light of nationalist concerns153 and to guarantee nationalist support for the Agreement.154 
These proposals attempted to make the case that in the ‘new’ Northern Ireland, justice would 
work for, rather than against, the nationalist minority. 
A key idea aimed at maintaining the republican and loyalist ceasefires was the 
introduction of staged prisoner releases from 1998 to 2000. Republican and loyalist prisoners, 
some serving multiple life sentences for murder, would be released by the end of 2000. 
Section ten of the GFA outlined an  
accelerated programme for the release of prisoners, including transferred prisoners, 
convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland or, in the case of those 
sentenced outside Northern Ireland … prisoners affiliated to organisations which 
have not established or are not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will 
not benefit from the arrangements.155 
 
The issue of prisoner releases was highly emotive and unpopular among many unionists in 
1998. Convicted terrorists, who many unionists believed instigated violence, could become 
partners in the government they had tried to destroy. This reaction also explains why, unlike 
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many republican ex-paramilitaries who were warmly welcomed home by some sections of 
the nationalist community, loyalist ex-paramilitaries had more difficulty re-adjusting to 
domestic life after 1998.156 For example, Raymond McCord, a 44-year-old Protestant whose 
son had been murdered by the UVF, rejected the symbolism of the releases by insisting on 
“justice for my son and Mo Mowlam can’t deliver that”.157 William Smith, also a relative of a 
Troubles victim, commented “we can see that these people have not put away their guns. All 
my family feel the same way. None of them will be voting yes. I think one would have to be 
silly to think that signing this thing will get rid of terrorism”.158 Along with prisoner releases, 
many unionists had concerns about the recently introduced Parades Commission. This group 
was established in 1997 and became a statutory body in 1998, and was formed in order to 
regulate all parades in Northern Ireland. Parades, especially unionist parades under the 
coordination of the Orange Order were an important feature of unionist political expression 
and “Protestant identity”.159 Regulation of these parades would become another key unionist 
concern, especially among Orange Order members who viewed the commission as a hostile 
to their interests and stifling their cultural expression.160 
Other unionists were more optimistic, even relatives of victims. Charlie Butler, 
interviewed in the Scottish Daily Record, whose relatives had died in the Shankill Road bombing 
of 1993, said “I had to explain to my family … why I was voting yes … I told them terrorism 
shaped their past but I didn’t want to shape my children’s future. Destiny is in our hands. 
The people of Northern Ireland are the only people that can resolve the Troubles”.161 Glyn 
Roberts of the group Families Against Intimidation and Terror (FAIT) noted “many 
members of Fait have suffered over the years at the hands of the paramilitaries and it is 
difficult for us to live with prisoner releases”.162 But as with other voters, Roberts considered 
the generational impact of the Agreement, “what we don’t want is to have a new generation 
suffering the same sense of pain and loss. For God’s sake get out and vote Yes”.163  
In creating a more just future, the GFA is notable for what it did not recommend, 
specifically, a ‘truth and reconciliation’ project akin to other post-conflict societies. Cillian 
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McGrattan has pointed out the effect of ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ commissions in other examples 
of conflict, especially in Germany and Israel, and how truth recovery can contribute to 
reconciliation.164 A truth and reconciliation commission also famously took place in South 
Africa in 1996. A Northern Ireland commission, an idea considered during the referendum 
campaign, proved difficult to envision, as “agreeing on or at least having a broadly accepted 
narrative of the “causes” of the Troubles, is one of the biggest challenges to building some 
form of reconciliation into the future”.165 Northern Ireland did not engage in a single wide-
ranging inquiry into deaths in the Troubles, although it established the Historical Enquiries 
Team (HET) in 2005, focusing on unsolved murders from the Troubles, subsequently 
disestablished in 2014. While implementing different reforms to address issues of justice 
following the Troubles, the GFA was ambiguous on how to confront the issue of injustices 
that occurred before the Agreement.  
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) established shortly after 
the GFA, aimed to implement “the range of judicial and non-judicial processes that are 
necessary to deliver truth, justice, accountability and redress in a society emerging from 
armed conflict”.166 As Nigel Biggar has described, the purpose of criminal justice in societies 
such as Northern Ireland should be thought of “in terms not of retribution but the 
vindication of victims” which “significantly relaxes the tension between justice and the 
politics of making peace … the ultimate goal of justice is also to make peace - by repairing 
damage, protecting victims, and reforming criminals - both apart from, and also through, 
retributive punishment”.167 This restorative focus of justice in the GFA contradicted some 
unionist perceptions of justice as for many in the unionist community, ‘justice’ focused on 
the legal prosecution of terrorism. The creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) to replace the RUC in 2001 allowed for the possibility of better relations between the 
nationalist community and police, but this change also made some unionists fear that an 
important legal protection from terrorism was being removed.  
Republicans had other conceptions of justice. An Phoblacht, the republican 
movement’s key publication, described the moment the “Balcombe Street Heroes” entered 
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Sinn Féin’s 1998 annual meeting, the Ard Fheis. These four ex-paramilitaries had taken 
hostages in Balcombe Street, London in 1975 and were eventually charged with multiple 
counts of murder. The newspaper reported that “the four men received a ten minute standing 
ovation from the packed audience was testament to their courage and fortitude. They had 
endured so much in the past years yet survived”.168 The men were “unbowed and unbroken 
… the surge of emotion that swept through the hall came not from any inherent desire to 
rub peoples’ noses in it the way we understand triumphalism”.169 In response to this, the 
Guardian reported that this reaction had “chilled Unionists” and “overwhelming nationalist 
support for the deal has not reassured waverers: “when they're that happy, you have to 
worry,” says Julie Blemmings, an undecided voter on the Cregagh Road”.170 This revealing 
comment illustrates some remaining mistrust between the two communities and reservations 
over changes in the judicial treatment of paramilitaries. A similarly joyous greeting met 
Michael Stone, a UDA prisoner on temporary release who was welcomed to a rally at 
Belfast’s Ulster Hall, hosted by the UDA-aligned Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). For Kate 
Fearon and Monica McWilliams, members of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition 
(NIWC) involved in the GFA talks, the presence of these paramilitary prisoners 
demonstrated that “the war was over. Prisoners were coming home”.171 
Whereas newspapers and public debate had indicated that virtually all parties in 
Northern Ireland wanted an end to paramilitary violence, the idea of justice was polarising 
in 1998. Debates surrounding the GFA gave a chance for those who wanted ‘justice’ to be 
heard, both pro and anti-GFA voices, through the medium of an overwhelmingly pro-GFA 
media. Debates in the new Northern Ireland Assembly would revolve around these ideas of 
victimhood and justice. As a recent PhD thesis from the University of California, San Diego 
notes, in the years after the GFA 
debate over the definition of victimhood was brewing in the Northern Irish 
Assembly… disagreement over to what degree retributive or restorative mechanisms 
should be used to deal with past political crimes. … a clash of different ideals of 
justice: formed both by local experience and political philosophies, and in reaction 
to the recent institutional focus on victims as subjects of state intervention.172 
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The idea of justice, so crucial to the implementation of the GFA, would become a divisive 
issue to both the politics of Northern Ireland and the changes in public discourse brought 
about by the Agreement.  
“Teach Your Children Well” 
The GFA opens with the pledge to “firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of 
reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the 
human rights of all” while also attempting to “strive in every practical way towards 
reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed 
arrangements”.173 The Agreement itself was, as social scientist Duncan Morrow has noted, 
“profoundly marked by the language of reconciliation”.174 But what did reconciliation mean 
before 1998? Many voluntary organisations, with support from Protestant and Catholic 
communities pre-date the intense violence of the Troubles, and seven ‘reconciliation’ groups 
were formed between 1964 and 1992.175 The existence of such organisations indicates that 
many groups believed relationships between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland 
were often strained, and that a society as divided as Northern Ireland needed to change. The 
importance of reconciliation in resolving the conflict was a view shared by Betty Williams 
and Mairead Corrigan, co-founders of the ‘Community of Peace People,’ and joint winners 
of the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize.176 Williams, who came from a mixed Catholic and Protestant 
background, believed “energetic reconciliation among peoples” was possible by “getting 
them to know each other, talk each other's languages, understand each other's fears and 
beliefs, getting to know each other physically, philosophically and spiritually”.177 In her Nobel 
lecture, Williams reiterated her organisation’s declaration from 1976: 
we want to live and love and build a just and peaceful society … we want for our 
children, as we want for ourselves, our lives at home, at work and at play, to be lives 
of joy and peace … we dedicate ourselves to working with our neighbours, near and 
far, day in and day out, to building that peaceful society in which the tragedies we 
have known are a bad memory and a continuing warning.178 
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The focuses of this speech, on the ‘simple message’ of peace, the necessity of a ‘just and 
peaceful’ society as well as all of this being ‘for our children’ were just as strong in 1977 as 
they were in 1998. The years between 1977 and 1998 resulted in greater trust between the 
British and Irish governments, paramilitary ceasefires in 1994, a lessening of violence from 
the 1970s and mass public support for a negotiated political settlement. Only in 1998 did a 
political solution exist which satisfied a majority of political preferences, and a supportive 
media that acted as a space for such views to be expressed.  
There was a widespread view in 1998 that reconciliation was not just political, but 
that it required an end to sectarianism and better relationships between Protestants and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland. Theologian Cecelia Clegg has argued that, in the context of 
Northern Ireland, “societal reconciliation rather than political reconciliation is the key to 
sustainability” and suggests a typology of reconciliation that requires personal, interpersonal, 
societal and finally, political reconciliation.179 Clegg also makes the crucial distinction that 
reconciliation is “both a process and a goal” which helps capture idea of the ‘peace process,’ 
and the GFA’s aim of the ‘achievement of reconciliation’.180 Duncan Morrow defines 
reconciliation as an “end to all threat of violence, a political system which commands 
legitimacy across ancient hostilities and the development of a culture of independent action 
and cooperation in which the claims of citizens to goods and rights from the whole 
community are treated as personal and individual”.181 These ideas describe how many people 
in 1998 conceptualised reconciliation, something that was political, but also societal, between 
Protestants and Catholics, rather than being based on a political settlement alone. As Aiken 
has noted, transitional justice requires “intergroup reconciliation, therefore, transitional 
justice strategies must keep socioemotional, instrumental and distributive ends in mind, or 
should at the very least be designed to work in tandem with other ongoing societal efforts to 
rebuild trust, cooperation and equality between former enemies”.182 For Israeli academics 
Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, reconciliation requires the 
formation of new beliefs, attitudes motivations, goals, and emotions that support the 
peaceful relations. This new psychological repertoire includes the evolvement of 
mutual respect, trust, positive attitudes, and sensitivity to the other group’s needs, 
fostering friendly and cooperative relations marked by equality and justice, 
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Reconciliation, then, is essentially a psychological process. Structural measures both 
contribute to its evolvement and are among its consequences.183 
 
The psychological element of reconciliation is crucial in this definition, and is not one that 
can be achieved by political means alone. Research conducted before, during and after the 
GFA indicated that better relationships between Protestants and Catholics in Northern 
Ireland required not only ‘structural measures’ such as a new Assembly, but also ‘mutual 
respect, trust, positive attitudes, and sensitivity to the other group’s needs.’ The GFA was 
full of reconciliatory language, but crucially, did not explicitly state how such reconciliation 
would be achieved.  
Why did reconciliation become such an influential idea associated with the GFA? In 
1998, reconciliation became a catch all term for a better future and was one idea in which 
victims of violence in the Troubles and their relatives could express their hopes for what the 
Agreement could achieve. The print media encouraged the idea of reconciliation as a solution 
to the Troubles and hopefully a consequence of the GFA. One writer to the Belfast News 
Letter expressed joy at the “expression of Christian compassion and hope for the future” 
elicited by the Agreement, hoping that it would be a “source of inspiration for those 
politicians, and ordinary decent people who are striving for genuine peace and 
reconciliation”.184 On the day of the referendum, the newspaper’s front cover read “WE 
MUST SAY YES” reasoning that “today, unionism and nationalism can begin to work 
together to build the new model we can be proud of … a New Ulster which provides an 
example to the world of how people with old grudges can set their differences aside, leave 
the past behind, and walk together into a bright new future”.185 Others were not so optimistic. 
In an interview with the Belfast Telegraph, Church of Ireland Archbishop Robin Eames warned 
“the vast majority of people are longing for a settlement, but if there is an agreement, the 
real problem is going to be the attitude on the streets of Northern Ireland”.186 Archbishop 
Eames outlines a counter claim to the political emphasis of the peace process: that the issue 
of the Troubles was based around the relations between the two communities, something 
the GFA alone could not fix. The morning before the referendum result was announced, the 
Belfast News Letter reported “unionists, who for decades have been preoccupied with 
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maintaining an unsatisfactory status quo … will have voted for reconciliation”.187 The 
Observer pointed out in the wake of the referendum “no sooner is the triumph of the 
referendum digested than minds turn to the next phase in the long road to reconciliation”.188 
On 24 May the newspaper also noted that the GFA’s “loud call for peace and reconciliation 
from the whole island of Ireland, will impress even those who call the vote a gerrymandered 
sham”.189 We can see in these reflections the validity of Clegg’s claim that reconciliation is 
both a process and a goal. The print media’s coverage of the GFA reflected the 
conceptualisation of the Agreement as an agent for a change in societal relationships between 
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, not just a political settlement between 
paramilitaries and political parties.  
As well as featuring victims of violence, newspaper reports pointed to generational 
reasons for wanting peace, the idea that those who had grown up in the Troubles did not 
want their children to experience further trauma. In various statements, prominent YES 
politicians including Tony Blair, Gerry Adams, John Hume and Bill Clinton mentioned 
children (often their own) as reasons for voting YES in the referendum.190 This was also a 
trope used by the media. Under the headline “Just vote yes,” a Daily Mirror story began with 
the line “We can’t deny our children a future”.191 This article echoed First World War 
recruitment posters: “when your children and grandchildren ask: “What did you do in the 
great referendum of 1998”, what shame there will be if you were not part of this great 
moment”.192 Similar headlines came from the Scottish Daily Record: “vote Yes for your kids 
and your grandchildren”.193 The Independent reported a resident of the Falls Road – the 
republican heartland of west Belfast – Kathleen McPeake noting: “my three children were 
brought up in the Troubles and I don’t want the same as my grandchildren”.194 The 
newspaper reported another Falls resident, Bernadette McMenery, stating “my children grew 
up like this. It was hard for them to try and keep away from it when it was all around them. 
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But we have to have peace for the children. Even the men of violence know that. We can’t 
let another generation grow up the way the last did. We can’t let any more lives be 
destroyed”.195 Gloria Hunniford, a Northern Irish media personality, revealed to the Mirror 
“I brought my kids up in Northern Ireland. Despite all the troubles it is a wonderful place 
full of wonderful people and they deserve to have normality after all these years”.196 Similarly, 
a resident from the Protestant Shankill Road in Belfast’s west said to the Mirror “all I know 
is that I have nine beautiful grandchildren and I want them to grow up in a country where 
there is no killing. People just want to live normal lives”.197 Children, symbolising innocence 
and the future, had become a central part of the YES campaign. 
In the lead-up to the Agreement, singer-songwriter Tommy Sands composed a song 
entitled ‘Carry On’ in support of the talks at Stormont. Sands performed the song outside 
the Stormont Castle buildings. The performance incorporated children from both 
communities, attracting enough attention that participants in the talks including John Hume, 
David Trimble, Gerry Adams, David Ervine, Seamus Mallon and Mo Mowlam joined in the 
chorus. The song’s message was direct, as the final four lines made abundantly clear “Don’t 
betray your children’s birthright / That’s the right to stay alive / For there is no greater 
treachery / Than to let your children die”.198 Not all children were universally in favour of 
the Agreement. The Guardian reported that a mock election at the Ballyclare high school, a 
largely Protestant grammar school in County Armagh, resulted in a NO vote by 268 votes to 
135.199 Regardless, children remained a feature of the referendum, as it was ‘their future’ that 
was at stake. A campaign in which British, Irish and American politicians campaigned 
alongside loyalists, republicans, nationalists, unionists, celebrities and musicians needed a 
clear and simple message that all could endorse. Children may have been an important feature 
of the YES campaign because ‘their future’ was one of the few things the ideologically broad 
YES campaign, and the public, could unanimously agree upon (see figure 4).  
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Figure 4.200 This advertisement from 22 May 1998 appeared in Northern Ireland’s 
major newspapers including the Irish News and Belfast Telegraph in the days before the 
joint referendums. It reads “Hannah Louise Davidson was born in the Royal Maternity 
Hospital yesterday. Time 2.40 p.m. Weight: 9lb 2oz. Give her a future. VOTE YES. 
IT’S THE WAY AHEAD”. This advertisement associated the GFA with hopes for 
the future, especially the hopes that children would not have to live through violence 
of their parents’ generation.  
 
Notably, children also were the main attendees at U2 and Ash’s Waterfront Hall concert on 
18 May. Children not only applauded the politicians searching for peace, they also vocally 
endorsed them. Catherine Hamill and David Sterrett, a Catholic girl and Protestant boy, who, 
according to the Mirror, “symbolised Northern Ireland’s desire for peace,” both celebrated 
the deal.201 11-year-old Catherine assessed the impact of the multi-party talks, summarising 
“I can’t stop smiling, I always said my prayers for peace every night and hoped it would 
happen” while 14-year-old David approved of the international dimension, adding “Bill 
Clinton is magic and so is Tony Blair. We’re gonna have peace now”.202 The idea of Catholic 
and Protestant children, male and female, having friendly relations symbolised what 
reconciliation could look like in a peaceful Northern Ireland. Parents also wanted their 
children to continue this newfound spirit. Anne and Clive Patterson named their baby 
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daughter born on the day of the Agreement ‘Hope.’ The Patterson family explained in an 
interview to the Scottish Sunday Mail that they “wanted to call the baby Hope so we would 
be able to tell her that they signed for peace on her birthday. The idea that she could grow 
up in a country that doesn’t tell the difference between religions would be wonderful”.203 
Clive Patterson also explained to the News of the World “I am 30 years old now and my wife 
is 27. We have known nothing but Troubles all our lives”.204 The hopes of reconciliation 
instilled in children were certainly part of the appeal of the GFA, and a love of children may 
be one of the few things that truly united the republicans, loyalists, nationalists and unionists 
who supported the YES campaign.  
In 1994, John Hume noted that the “real division in Ireland is not the line in the map 
that we call partition. That line in the map simply institutionalized a division that has existed 
for centuries in the hearts and minds of the Irish people”.205 Although the GFA explicitly 
outlined reconciliation as one of its goals, becoming an important feature of the public 
discourse surrounding the Agreement, there was a vagueness as to how this would be 
achieved. Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland remained segregated in education, 
employment and housing, a feature of life that would make reconciliation and the perception 
of better community relations difficult to achieve in the years after the Agreement.206 Far 
from ending sectarianism, journalist Eamonn McCann believed that the Agreement 
“envisages the reformation, not the removal of sectarianism. The structures are designed to 
contain sectarian rivalries, not get rid of them”.207 Even amidst the goodwill of 1998, and a 
public discourse focused on achieving reconciliation, concerns remained that a political 
settlement alone would not help Northern Ireland become a more reconciled society.  
Explaining a moment 
Authors David McKittrick and David McVea have expressed how, in 1998, “the sense of a 
new era was in the air, many feeling that nothing would be the same again”.208 Many of the 
reactions to the GFA reflected the significance of the Agreement in changing relations within 
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the British Isles. British and Irish newspapers printed thousands of stories on the GFA, 
highlighting its significance. British tabloid the Daily Mirror urged its readers to 
remember the date. Good Friday, 1998. The day a new future dawned for Northern 
Ireland after decades of bloodshed. Yesterday’s agreement is truly historic. It is so 
remarkable, such a fantastic achievement that it barely seems possible … in the new 
Northern Ireland everyone is going to have to work with everyone else … but they 
did it. They got this far and their names will go down in the history books because 
of it.209 
 
These celebratory responses were common and many journalists, voters and politicians were 
extremely happy with the result. When the referendum proved to have been successful, the 
threads surrounding the GFA came together: silenced voices amplified, future generations 
free from trauma and a ‘new’ Northern Ireland built on peace, justice and reconciliation. The 
Observer went so far as to announce that “a new people is born in Ireland”.210 Yet the media-
driven public discourse left many questions unanswered, especially what peace, justice and 
reconciliation would look like in the ‘new’ Northern Ireland. The discussion above reveals 
some of the differing expectations surrounding the GFA – most notably the contested idea 
of justice. These differing ideas shaped the public discourse surrounding the GFA, but were 
themselves highly malleable and in some cases, meant different things to unionists and 
nationalists. As I have outlined in this chapter, the GFA was not only politically significant, 
it shaped what people thought the ‘new’ Northern Ireland would be and how peace, justice 
and reconciliation would be a part of it. The greatest challenge for those wanting to 
implement the Agreement, and for those attempting to live peaceful lives after the GFA, was 
the persistence of paramilitary violence. While virtually all political and paramilitary groups 
in Northern Ireland supported the GFA, a dangerous minority of paramilitaries did not. With 
hindsight, seemingly pessimistic accounts of the GFA can be re-read as cautious warnings. 
An article published in the Observer on 24 May, two days after the success of the referendum, 
warned “the Continuity IRA, the INLA and the latest faction to join the rejectionists, the so-
called Real IRA, have been holding joint meetings on a common campaign to destroy the 
agreement” and that although these groups had little support, “they still pose a threat”.211 
Indeed, it would only be 85 days between the announcement of the successful referendum, 
and the worst single loss of life in a paramilitary attack in Northern Ireland – the Omagh 
bombing.
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Chapter 2: The Omagh Bombing, 1998 
 
 
Figure 5.1 An image appearing in the Tyrone Constitution on 27 August 1998. The people 
have been whited out to protect their identities. The image depicts Market Street in 
Omagh, County Tyrone. The red Vauxhall Cavalier in the right of the picture contained 
the 500lb Real IRA bomb which killed 29 people only hours after this image was taken. 
 
At 3:04 pm on 15 August 1998, a car bomb exploded in the market town of Omagh, killing 
29 people and injuring over 200 others (see figure 5). The bombing was carried out by the 
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA or Real IRA), a group that split from the PIRA in 1997 
and opposed the ‘peace process.’ The Omagh bombing came only 85 days after the historic 
GFA referendum and was the worst single loss of life in a paramilitary attack in Northern 
Ireland.2 This chapter investigates the public discourse surrounding the Omagh bombing and 
examines how discourses of peace, justice and reconciliation were reformulated in light of 
the bombing. I argue that the Omagh bombing is a defining moment in the ‘new’ public 
discourse formulated by the GFA, evidenced by changes in the discursive power of 
paramilitaries and the victims and relatives of the Omagh bombing. The Omagh bombing 
indicated that legally, ‘justice’ would be extremely difficult for victims to achieve after the 
Agreement. However, the Omagh relatives’ successful civil suit against the RIRA in 2009 
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would also demonstrate that public discourse had changed in Northern Ireland, to the point 
that relatives of victims of paramilitary violence could now actively campaign for justice in 
ways not possible before the Agreement. 
“An Armed Peace” 
The GFA had passed the test of a referendum, supported by voters north and south of the 
border, but support for the Agreement was never as strong in the unionist community as it 
was among nationalists. Indeed, unionist support for the Agreement would drop after the 
referendum. 74 per cent of Protestants polled said they supported the Agreement in March 
1998, a number which would drop to 47 per cent by October 2000.3 Positive perceptions 
among unionists of the Agreement also fell. Polls surveyed by Roger Mac Ginty from 1998 
to 2002 indicated that 41 per cent of Protestants believed that unionists and nationalists 
benefited equally from the Agreement in 1998, dropping to 19 per cent by 2002.4 Similarly, 
the belief among Protestants that nationalists benefited “a lot more” from the Agreement 
than unionists rose from 31 per cent in 1998 to 55 per cent in 2002.5 For unionists, 
dissatisfaction revolved around the key concerns outlined in Chapter 1: paramilitary 
decommissioning, prisoner releases, Sinn Féin in government, North/South bodies, the 
Parades Commission and police reform. In the months and years after the Agreement, these 
concerns would become magnified, as paramilitary prisoners were released in 2000, the police 
service was transformed from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) into the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2001 and Sinn Féin retained a place in the Assembly from 
1998 to 2002 without substantive PIRA decommissioning. Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) positioned itself as the champion of disaffected unionists and began to overtake 
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) as Northern Ireland’s largest political party, after the 2001 
Westminster election, by promising a ‘new agreement’ more favourable to unionists. 
Expectations that loyalist paramilitaries would have active involvement in the new 
Assembly faced numerous setbacks. The UVF and UDA had forged political parties, the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) respectively. The PUP 
won only two out of the 108 seats in the first Assembly election in June 1998, whereas the 
                                                          
3 Colin Irwin, The People’s Peace Process in Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 260. There is 
a jump for Protestant support in a May 2000 poll, but this support falls in a subsequent October 2000 poll. 
4 Roger Mac Ginty, “Unionist political attitudes after the Belfast agreement,” Irish Political Studies 19, no. 1 
(Summer 2004): 89. 
5 Ibid. 
   
  
51 
 
UDP won none and dissolved in 2002.6 Both the UDA and UVF continued to carry out 
paramilitary attacks, often targeting each other in various feuds throughout the early 2000s. 
A violent feud broke out between the two groups in 2000, enflamed by sections of the UDA 
supporting the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), a splinter group of the UVF.7 
Simultaneously, the LVF (which had opposed the GFA) continued to carry out attacks 
against nationalists and their UVF rivals.  
The most infamous loyalist attack in the months after the referendum was the murder 
of the Quinn Brothers on 12 July 1998.8 Jason, Mark and Richard Quinn, aged eight, nine 
and ten burned to death after members of the UVF fire bombed their house in Ballymoney 
in County Antrim.9 The attack was carried out at the height of the 1998 Drumcree dispute, 
a recurring disturbance surrounding requests for Orange marchers to pass through the 
nationalist Garvaghy Road in Portadown, County Armagh. This dispute had become an 
annual test of the peace process during the 1990s, and a chance for paramilitaries including 
the LVF and UDA to reiterate their status as the defenders of the loyalist community.10 The 
murder of the Quinn brothers at the height of the 1998 Drumcree dispute “brought 
condemnation from both sides of Northern Ireland's sectarian divide,” notably, First 
Minister David Trimble and his deputy Seamus Mallon, who both attended the Quinn 
brothers’ funeral.11 The incident demonstrated that loyalist paramilitaries had (clearly) not 
voluntarily disbanded in the months following the GFA. They remained willing and able to 
carry out acts of violence and the entire political spectrum in Northern Ireland would 
continue to condemn such violence. 
The key unionist fears of the GFA, especially police reform and the creation of the 
Parades Commission, had facilitated the development of a more confident and vocal 
nationalist minority in Northern Ireland.12 Like unionists, the nationalist community was 
changing politically. Nationalists began to support Sinn Féin over the Social and Democratic 
Labour Party (SDLP), with the latter being the largest nationalist party since its formation in 
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1970. As the Assembly began to falter over the issue of decommissioning, nationalist faith 
in the SDLP began to waver. In a distinct change from voting patterns before 1998, the UUP 
lost votes to the DUP and the SDLP lost votes to Sinn Féin.13  
As Sinn Féin began to gain significant electoral success after the GFA, their dissident 
republican rivals continued the ‘armed struggle.’ The origins of the Omagh bombing can be 
seen in the 1997 split within the PIRA that created the Real IRA. The PIRA had largely scaled 
down its attacks by 1998 despite not fully decommissioning its weapons until 2005 (see 
Chapter 4). Even before the GFA, some republicans did not support Sinn Féin’s embrace of 
political republicanism and participation in the new Assembly and instead, supported groups 
which broke away from the PIRA. Throughout the Troubles, the PIRA had been the largest 
republican paramilitary group since the split between the ‘Provisional’ and ‘Official’ IRA 
(OIRA) in 1969.14 The 1969 split occurred over both the failure of the IRA to defend 
Catholic homes during rioting in August of that year and the plans to repeal the traditional 
republican abstentionism of the parliaments of Dublin, London and Belfast.15 The Dublin-
based OIRA increasingly focused on Marxism, whereas PIRA members tended to be 
younger, Northern Ireland-based and focused on defending the northern nationalist 
community.16 The Provisionals quickly overtook other republican groups such as the OIRA 
and its subsequent splinter group, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), in terms of 
members, weapons and activities.17 The next key split was again over the issue of 
abstentionism. Sinn Féin had an official policy of abstentionism in the Dáil Éireann since the 
Irish Civil War ended in 1923. This changed in 1986, when party members were allowed to 
sit in the Dáil, much to the disdain of traditionalist supporters of abstentionism. Opponents 
of this change formed Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) in 1986 which eventually established its 
own militant group to rival the Provisionals, the Continuity IRA (CIRA). The RSF even 
established its own newspaper Saoirse (freedom) to rival An Phoblacht. 
Under the leadership of Michael McKevitt, Quartermaster General of the PIRA since 
1985, the Provisionals split again in 1997, this time into a group dubbed by the media as the 
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“Real IRA”.18 The Real IRA opposed republican involvement in the peace process and 
established its own military command along with a political affiliate, the 32-County 
Sovereignty Movement (32CSM).19 The Real IRA vigorously opposed the politicisation of 
the republican movement in the 1990s. 32CSM co-founder Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, 
Michael McKevitt’s wife and hunger striker Bobby Sands’ sister, defended the group’s 
opposition to the peace process and the 1997 ceasefire. Sands stated that her brother “did 
not die for cross-border bodies with executive powers. He did not die for nationalists to be 
equal British citizens in the Northern Ireland state”.20 This was an uncomfortable assertion 
for Sinn Féin. In the 1970s, the party had promised nothing less than a unified Irish Republic 
but had by the 1990s, diverted attention to civil rights issues and the culpability of the British 
state in the conflict.21 Peace studies scholar John Darby has described the RIRA as “Zealots,” 
who refused to engage in the peace process and forged an “alliance of convenience” with the 
“well-established Continuity IRA”.22 Zealots or not, the RIRA had the support of Bobby 
Sands’ sister, a former PIRA Quartermaster General as well as Marian Price, an ex-prisoner 
described by International Relations scholar Andrew Sanders as “arguably the most 
prominent female IRA volunteer”.23  
The RIRA began its campaign in January 1997 by targeting large towns and RUC 
stations with large car bombs. The group bombed the town of Banbridge in County Down 
on 1 August 1998 after giving a thirty minute warning, devastating the town centre and 
injuring dozens.24 According to Conflict Studies scholar James Dingley, the Real IRA were 
“beginning to establish genuine momentum … starting to pick up recruits from old and 
current Provisionals”.25 Strategically, Omagh’s town centre, especially the courthouse, was 
considered a centre for ‘British’ justice and thus a legitimate target.26 Additionally, the town 
had a nationalist majority which displayed “above average republican support” including 
Francie Mackey, a 32CSM member of the Omagh District Council.27 The audience for these 
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attacks was republicans with reservations about Sinn Féin’s participation in the peace 
process.28  
On Saturday 15 August, families from Omagh and the surrounding area visited the 
town centre to shop for school supplies, as classes were set to resume after the summer 
holidays. Few expected violence in this place at this time. As Michael Gallagher, whose son 
Aidan died in the bombing noted, it had “occurred during peacetime. So many had worked 
hard to secure that peace with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and that is why Omagh 
was shocking to so many”.29 On that day, Maggie Hall, an assistant at Ulster Television 
(UTV), received a phone call from a man representing ‘Óglaigh na hÉireann’ (Soldiers of 
Ireland or IRA) – the official name used by the Real IRA. The man warned of a “Bomb 
Courthouse Omagh, Main Street, 500 pounds explosion, 30 minutes” followed by a second 
warning claiming a bomb was “about 200 yards up from the courthouse – High Street, the 
main street”.30 Omagh does not contain a ‘main street,’ and this confusion caused police to 
move people away from the courthouse, and towards the car containing the bomb on Market 
Street, which detonated at 3:04 pm.31 
The resulting explosion killed 28 people, and injured hundreds more.32 The blast was 
devastating and random. Kevin Skelton remembered being “six feet away” from the bomb 
when it exploded and escaped uninjured, while his wife Philomena “took the full force of 
the blast and saved my youngest daughter in the process”.33 For hundreds of people on 
Market Street, injuries ranged from minor scratches to limb loss and even decapitation.34 
Numerous limbs scattered around the explosion site and hundreds of people were rushed to 
hospital (see figure 6). Some were killed instantly while others died in the days after the 
bombing. Due to the sudden influx of patients, many of the injured had to be transported to 
hospitals outside of Omagh, meaning some families waited until the next day to learn if their 
loved ones had died. Two victims, Oran Doherty and Sean McLaughlin, were from the Irish 
Republic. Fernando Blasco Baselga and Rocio Abad Ramos were Spanish and James Barker 
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was born in England. The remaining the victims were from Omagh or its surrounding areas 
including Avril Monaghan, who died while pregnant with twins.35 
 
 
Figure 6.36 The aftermath of the Omagh bombing. Similar images were beamed 
around the world following the bombing. The RIRA’s telephoned warnings led the 
RUC to move people from around Omagh courthouse at the western end of Market 
Street further east, towards the car containing the 500lb bomb. The bomb burst a 
water main, leading to a visible ‘river of blood’ flowing down Omagh’s Market Street.  
 
Processing the so-called “so-called peace process” 
Politicians, clergy and other prominent figures were quick to condemn the bombing. Bertie 
Ahern, Tony Blair, David Trimble and Bill Clinton were among the political leaders who 
issued statements in the days after the event. The most significant figure to condemn 
bombing was Gerry Adams, who, in an interview with a group of journalists, stated “I 
condemn it without any equivocation whatsoever”.37 The use of the word ‘condemn’ was 
momentous, as it marked the first time Adams had ever used the word in relation to 
republican violence, albeit, ‘dissident’ republican violence.38 Adams reiterated his stance on 
1 September, saying “my position on what happened in Omagh on 15th August is quite 
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categoric. I have condemned it without equivocation”.39 Ahern welcomed Adams’ September 
statement, with a press statement saying that the Taoiseach “also endorses the view of Sinn 
Féin that there is a shared responsibility to removing the causes of and to achieving an end 
to all conflict and to making the Omagh bombing the last violent incident of its kind”.40 
Ahern, Trimble, Blair and Clinton’s remarks on the bombing were expected, but Adams’ 
condemnation demonstrated that republicans’ responses to violence had changed, 
acknowledgement of new political context that allowed Adams to condemn republican 
violence without alienating the republican base from the peace process. 
In condemning the bombing as an aberration, politicians also linked the atrocity with 
the need to continue the political peace process and their vision of a ‘new’ Northern Ireland. 
Although not ‘using’ the bombing as part of a purely self-interested political calculation, some 
politicians positioned the atrocity as a direct attack on the peace process, rather than being 
in some way caused by it. Ahern condemned the attack as “an attack on democracy, a cruel 
denial of the clearly expressed wish for peace of the overwhelming majority of the Irish 
people, as shown by the referendums of the Good Friday Agreement”.41 The Irish 
Government released a statement building on these remarks, calling the bombing “a direct 
attack on the Good Friday Agreement and the principles of democracy itself”.42 Having only 
just been informed about the bombing, Blair commented in an interview “so much of our 
emotions are grief, but there has to be with that grief a determination that they won’t succeed, 
that they won’t destroy the chance of a decent future for the people of Northern Ireland”.43 
However, such rallying to the cause was predictably not uniform. Ian Paisley and other anti-
GFA unionists interpreted the bombing as evidence of the weaknesses of the GFA and 
capitalised on public shock and horror. Paisley noted “no one can do a bombing anywhere 
in Northern Ireland without the knowledge of the IRA and without their collusion in it”.44 
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Paisley also condemned the British government for entering into agreements with Sinn 
Féin.45 This exchange of views began a pattern of responding to post-GFA violence: pro-
GFA politicians viewed the bombing as evidence for the need to continue the peace process 
while anti-GFA politicians saw paramilitary violence as evidence of the Agreement’s faults.  
President Clinton addressed the people of Omagh on 3 September 1998 at the 
Omagh Leisure Centre, a building used as a field hospital in the days after the bombing. 
Clinton quoted a letter he received, originally sent to the US Ambassador to Ireland. The 
letter sent by a man from County Mayo said “throughout my life there has never been peace 
on this island. I never realized how precious peace could be until my wife, Martina, gave birth 
to our daughter, Ashleen, 20 months ago. We don't want her to grow up in a society that is 
constantly waiting for the next atrocity, the next bunch of young lives snuffed out in a sea of 
hatred and fear”.46 Clinton concluded “we came here today to say we grieve for your loss, 
but to pledge to that little Ashleen in Mayo … that we will work to build this peace, to make 
it a place where children can dream; to redeem the loss of innocents from the madness of 
people who must fail so that your life can go on”.47 As in the referendum campaign, 
politicians such as Clinton incorporated children as symbols of hope for the future and a 
reason to continue the political peace process. This sentiment was reiterated by republican 
paramilitaries, through an An Phoblacht interview with an anonymous PIRA spokesperson, 
who stated “we suspect that this attack and previous bomb attacks by this and other 
groupings have been aimed at the peace process, in general, and at Sinn Féin’s peace strategy 
in particular”.48 Such reactions to the bombing demonstrated that the commitment of (at 
least) the core elements of the disparate coalition of paramilitaries and politicians in 
supporting the GFA would continue in the aftermath of such an atrocity.  
Simultaneously, many who had opposed the GFA saw the bombing as evidence of 
both the futility of the Agreement and the peace process in general. Free Presbyterian Church 
ministers from County Tyrone blamed the peace process for the bombing. They accused the 
British government of “of pursuing a policy in Northern Ireland that has encouraged this 
atrocity and the many others that have gone before, by seeking to placate terrorism through 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 “Remarks by President Clinton to the Victims and Families of Victims of the Bombing in Omagh, (3 
September 1998),” CAIN Web Service, comp. Brendan Lynn, September 3, 1998, accessed November 4, 
2016, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/bc030998.htm. 
47 Ibid. 
48 “Text of an Interview with an IRA Spokesperson, 1 September 1998,” CAIN Web Service, comp. 
Fionnuala McKenna, September 1, 1998, accessed November 1, 2016, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/ 
peace/docs/ira1998.htm. 
   
  
58 
 
immoral concessions such as the present early release of convicted”.49 The emotive issue of 
prisoner releases, especially worrying to some unionists in the May referendum campaign, is 
positioned here as a precursor to paramilitary violence exemplified by the Omagh bombing. 
Ian Paisley, the moderator of the church, linked the bombing to the decommissioning, and 
said the “bomb would not have been made or detonated if Sinn Fein/IRA had handed over 
its explosives and weapons”.50 Paisley repeated this idea in the Northern Ireland Assembly’s 
15 September debate dedicated to the bombing, saying that there was “no difference between 
the killings of the past, on both sides of the religious and political divide, and this killing in 
Omagh. The only thing that happened this time was that the Governments had a vested 
interest in their so-called peace process, so that is why they had such a quick and swift answer 
to this matter”.51 Pro-GFA politicians stressed how unacceptable Omagh was compared to 
other paramilitary attacks, emphasising its uniqueness, as Blair later stated “we have known 
tragedy in Northern Ireland many times before; but this was an indiscriminate attack on a 
whole community”.52 Contrastingly, Paisley honed in on the similarities between pre-GFA 
paramilitary attacks, reiterating “there is no difference between the villainy, the hellishness 
and the hideousness of what took place in Omagh and all the killings of the past”.53 Paisley’s 
statement is a direct a rejection of the ‘peace’ promised by the GFA and frames the bombing 
as a consequence of the Agreement itself.  
The public reaction to the bombing was spontaneous and enormous. Hundreds of 
letters were written to major newspapers expressing condolences for the victims and their 
families. Memorial services and minutes of silence were held all over the Irish Republic, with 
thousands attending services in Dublin and Cork. A hurling match between Clare and Offaly 
was halted to observe an ecumenical service.54 The Tyrone Constitution, one of Omagh’s largest 
newspapers, along with the Ulster Herald, were inundated with messages of condolence from 
dozens of local organisations including businesses, churches and sports groups as well as 
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letters of sympathy from as far away as India and Australia.55 The Ulster Herald reported a 
similar response, recording condolences from other newspapers, banks, grocery stores and 
schools along with dozens of funeral notices.56 Tens of thousands of signatures filled dozens 
of condolence books across Northern Ireland, in the cities of Belfast and Derry as well as 
the towns of Enniskillen, Strabane, Newtownstewart, Castlederg, Clady, Plumbridge, 
Donemana and Omagh itself.57 In the Irish Republic, thousands queued to sign books of 
condolences in Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Galway, Dundalk and Buncrana.58 In addition, an 
online book of condolences was opened by the Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ), the Irish 
national broadcaster, which recorded 500 messages and 2000 signatures of condolence.59 An 
independently organised “International Book of Condolence” was created, and amassed over 
500 online messages which were then sent to the Omagh District Council.60 The website 
declared that the messages “will also remain here [online], lest we ever forget the sadness”.61 
This use of ‘new media’ allowed for people all over the world to express their solidarity with 
the people of Omagh. Ruth Dudley Edwards recorded that 800 books of condolences were 
delivered to Omagh after the bombing, containing up to two million signatures.62  
The public outpouring of sympathy was certainly used by politicians to reinforce the 
peace process, but it was not forced on an unsympathetic public. The public outcry over the 
bombing was a chance for politicians, and for many members of the public, to reaffirm their 
commitment to the principles of the GFA through traditional and new forms of personal 
expression. Letters from Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic and Britain contained a 
combination of sympathy and anger. Anger was especially strong in letters from the Irish 
Republic, where many sought to distance themselves from republicans claiming to be 
fighting on behalf of the Irish nation. One letter to the Irish Times, addressed to the RIRA, 
thought the bombing “will do absolutely nothing to convince people, North and South, 
rightly sickened and appalled by the 30 years of chaos that you have wrought, of the 
worthiness of your fascistic intentions. For “patriots” like you, the foulest pits of hell seem 
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too good a place”.63 Another letter outlined the feeling that the RIRA “DO NOT SPEAK 
FOR US. WE DO NOT WANT YOU. GO AWAY AND LEAVE US IN PEACE”.64 The 
overwhelming tone of letters selected by newspapers such as the Irish Times was anger and 
shame that that the bombers had an ideological link with the Irish Republic. This public 
rejection of the Real IRA is also a repudiation of the discourse of ‘national liberation’ and 
‘armed struggle,’ so central to republican ideology throughout the Troubles, now 
delegitimised by paramilitary violence.  
Letters condemning the bombing in relation to the GFA were particularly prominent 
in the unionist Belfast News Letter, which had supported the GFA, but also expressed doubts 
about the peace process in editorials and letters throughout the referendum campaign. One 
letter to the newspaper from 19 August summarised the pro-GFA public response to the 
bombing, “far from marking the end of the peace process this tragic event is a brutal 
reminder of what life in the Province will be like if we fail to energetically pursue its 
objectives”.65 However, others linked the bombing to Adams, the PIRA and Sinn Féin. A 
letter on the same page of the newspaper considered, “if this is the peace and stability on 
offer then I think that I was right to say “NO”. Is the murders of innocent men, women and 
children in Omagh the price Northern Ireland has to pay, so the prisoners get their freedom 
and we get Sinn Fein/IRA in government?”66 For contributors such as this, the bombing 
was evidence of the falseness of the GFA and evidence that allowing republicans in 
government and releasing paramilitary prisoners was a fundamentally flawed plan. For 
example, another letter pointed to the perceived hypocrisy in Gerry Adams’ condemnation 
of the bombing, as “one merely has to think of Bloody Friday to wretch [sic] at the sheer 
scale of hypocrisy involved” concluding “the Stormont Agreement [GFA] is yielding a bitter 
harvest”.67 This letter notes that PIRA’s infamous ‘Bloody Friday’ massacre in 1972, scarred 
in many people’s (especially unionists) memories of the Troubles, resembled the Omagh 
bombing and that Northern Ireland had changed for the worse as a result of the GFA. Public 
sympathy for the victims of the bombing should not be misconstrued as support for the 
Agreement which was, in the unionist community, fragile at best. The Belfast News Letter 
would publish more anti-GFA views in the following months, as unionists began to reject 
the GFA. 
                                                          
63 Edwin McCloughan, letter to the editor, Irish Times, August 17, 1998, 17. 
64 John McEneaney, letter to the editor, Irish Times, August 18, 1998, 15. 
65 M Stephens, letter to the editor, Belfast News Letter, August 19, 1998, 12.  
66 Colin Dean, letter to the editor, Belfast News Letter, August 19, 1998, 12. 
67 Dieu et Mon Droit, letter to the editor, Belfast News Letter, August 18, 1998, 12. Square brackets added. 
   
  
61 
 
The public response to the Omagh bombing demonstrated that not only had 
thousands been devastated by the atrocity, but much of the power in public discourse had 
shifted away from paramilitaries and towards the victims of their actions. Some dissident 
republican paramilitary groups announced ceasefires in the wake of the bombing, including 
the INLA. The Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), the political wing of the INLA, issued 
a statement asking “the Irish National Liberation Army, who we know have been considering 
a ceasefire, to reach a decision quickly”.68 In response, the INLA issued a statement on 22 
August: 
although we, for our part believe that the Good Friday Agreement was not worth the 
sacrifices of the past 30 years and are still politically opposed to it, the people of the 
island of Ireland have spoken clearly as to their wishes … we acknowledge and admit 
faults and grievous errors in our prosecution of the war. Innocent people were killed 
and injured and at times our actions as a liberation army fell far short of what they 
should have been … it is now time to silence the guns and allow the working classes 
the time and opportunity to advance their demands and their needs.69  
 
This statement contains a level of reflection not seen by other paramilitary groups, especially 
as the INLA acknowledged its opposition to the GFA while accepting its legitimacy. The 
statement can also be considered as accepting the power of the public’s response to the 
bombing. The INLA now recognised that the GFA was legitimised by the ‘people of the 
island of Ireland,’ who no longer supported the idea of an ‘armed struggle.’ Even the 
inclusion of the word ‘innocent’ shows a change from how many paramilitary groups fought 
the Troubles, in which few victims were classified as innocent. The statement followed ‘the 
script’ of the GFA, the expectation that paramilitary groups would bow to the will of the 
‘public,’ or in this case the ‘working classes,’ and the Agreement could allow for republican 
and loyalist groups to have a dignified exit from paramilitary activities. 
The INLA statement was not matched in its magnanimity by the Real IRA. On 18 
August, a RIRA statement blamed security forces for not heeding their three bomb warnings, 
defended the bombing as “part of an ongoing war against the Brits” and ended curtly by 
saying “we offer apologies to the civilians”.70 The organisation then revealed that it had 
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suspended its military campaign.71 The 32CSM also released a statement, lamenting the 
deaths but noting that the organisation was “a political movement and we are not a military 
group. We reject categorically any suggestions that has been publically made, that our 
movement was responsible in any way”.72 The blame directed towards security forces and 
the seeming lack of remorse for civilian deaths led to a widespread rejection of the RIRA 
and 32CSM’s statements by politicians and victims of the bombing. These statements were 
not only interpreted as insensitive to the Omagh victims, but a serious faux pas in the 
discourse of the ‘new’ Northern Ireland. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo 
Mowlam, described the RIRA’s statement as “a pathetic attempt at an excuse for mass 
murder, I think it's contemptible and I think it's an insult to the people of Omagh … the 
sole responsibility lies with the bombers”.73 Mowlam promised that “we and the Irish 
government will continue to do all we can to hunt them down”.74 Similarly, Seamus Mallon 
called the Real IRA’s statement “beneath contempt … I believe what we see happening right 
throughout the length and breadth of Ireland is a victory, a victory of the human spirit, over 
the evil of terrorism and violence”.75 The RIRA statement was not only condemned by 
political leaders, but by people who experienced the bombing. The Belfast News Letter reported 
the response of Rita Aroua, a nurse who helped treat injured people after the bombing, who 
said that the apology “is an absolute insult. People will be disgusted”.76 This was echoed by 
Geraldine Keys, a community worker from Omagh, who said that “just admitting that they 
had done it does not make a blind bit of difference to the families who are burying their 
loved ones and those visiting injured relatives in hospital”.77  
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In a change from past tactics, loyalist paramilitaries on a tentative ceasefire did not 
carry out revenge attacks for the bombing. In the aftermath of previous atrocities committed 
by republican paramilitaries, the UDA and UVF often responded by attacking suspected IRA 
members or Catholic civilians. For instance, loyalist paramilitaries killed a number of Catholic 
civilians in response to the PIRA’s Coleraine (1973), Enniskillen (1987) and Teebane (1992) 
bombings. Chris Hudson, a mediator between the UVF and the Irish government said after 
the bombing that a “combination of national and international condemnations about the 
Omagh bomb helped defuse pressure for loyalist retaliation” after Omagh.78 This also 
marked a distinct change, as in this case, public opinion appeared to affect paramilitary policy. 
This statement indicates that the public response to the bombing may have inadvertently 
reinforced the peace process, by proving to loyalist leaders and paramilitaries that retaliation 
was not what the public wanted. John White, former UDA prisoner and a spokesman for 
the UDA-affiliated UDP party said the “Loyalist paramilitary groupings who I would be close 
to are saying very clearly that they don't want to be drawn into the conflict, which would be 
the hopes of the people who planted this bomb … so I'm very hopeful that the Loyalist 
cease fire from the UFF's point of view will remain intact”.79 From White’s statement, we 
can suppose that some loyalist paramilitaries perceived the bombing as a provocation for a 
paramilitary response and that loyalists purposefully chose not to respond. In any case, the 
lack of a loyalist response shows the power of the public’s response to the bombing. As 
opposed to the early 1990s when paramilitaries ignored the overwhelming desire for a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, these groups now actively listened to ‘national and 
international condemnations.’ 
“The Bridge of Hope”   
Reconciliation became an important idea in discussions surrounding the Omagh bombing. 
Newspapers across Northern Ireland and the UK, which had been largely supportive of the 
GFA, responded to the bombing by emphasising the peaceful nature of Omagh as a town 
and its good cross-community relations. The Omagh District Council had, in the lead up to 
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the referendum, voted ten to four in favour of the GFA.80 Exit polls estimated a turnout of 
83.23 per cent in Omagh’s surrounding area of west Tyrone, leading to a corresponding 83 
per cent YES vote in the referendum.81 The town’s peacefulness was emphasised by a 20 
August Irish Times article which reported that, before the bombing, Omagh “had seen no 
atrocities like the Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen to the west, and no sectarian 
confrontations like those in Cookstown and Portadown to the east”.82 The article went on 
to describe how  
in a town of about 60% Catholics and 40% Protestants, community relations have 
been relatively cordial. There is a philosophy of “live and let live” … locals point to 
the gesture of local Catholics when the area’s Methodist church was damaged by 
sectarian vandals 18 months ago. The parish priest at the Sacred Heart Church 
organised a collection among his congregation to help with repairs.83  
  
Similarly, the Ulster Herald reported that the community of Omagh which was “assaulted as 
one, has already shown that it intends to face the future as one”.84 This description rendered 
Omagh as more sheltered from sectarianism than other parts of Northern Ireland and aimed 
to further delegitimise the RIRA’s choice of target. These descriptions also created the 
impression that these victims were particularly innocent and that their murders were 
absolutely unnecessary.  
Newspapers reported many stories of many large and small acts of reconciliation in 
the wake of the bombing. The Irish Times carried a story in which  
two Protestants said they had dealt with their despair by demonstrating to their 
Catholic neighbours that even a 500 lb [bomb] would not destroy their friendship. 
They went to their local Catholic Mass and walked up to receive Communion. 
Another Protestant woman, Heather Wilson, had a friend who said she was ashamed 
to be a Catholic “but I had said the same to her when the Quinn boys were murdered 
… many of my friends are Catholic and that certainly will not change”.85  
 
The British Catholic Tablet magazine made a similar point:  
there was a universality to the group who died - Protestant and Catholic, from south 
of the border as well as north, and ranging from grandmothers to babies, some of 
them unborn. The consequence was to unite the community, to bond it rather than 
divide it. Moreover, by including so many Catholics among their victims, the 
republican rump had wiped out large numbers of innocents from its own side.86  
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The symbolism espoused by these anecdotes was that the bombing had actually strengthened 
relations between Protestants and Catholics, undermining the supposed aim of the bombers. 
A core component of the GFA’s reconciliatory pitch and the YES campaign was the place 
of children and the idea the new generation would not need to grow up in a violent Northern 
Ireland. The fact that children were among the victims of the bombing, was utilised in the 
media’s coverage of the bombing’s aftermath and poetry was one mechanism that the public 
used to express this grief, sadness and anger. Twelve-year-old Sean McLaughlin, who died as 
a result of the bombing, had previously written a poem entitled ‘The Bridge’ for President 
Mary McAleese: 
Orange and Green, it doesn’t matter 
United now, don’t shatter our dream 
Scatter the seeds of peace over our land, 
So we can travel hand in hand 
Across the bridge of hope.87  
 
Here was a poem, written by a victim of paramilitary violence, advocating for a reconciled 
future that he would never have the chance to experience. ‘The Bridge’ and other poems 
offered a version of reconciliation that was incorporated by numerous publications and 
encapsulated public grief and hopes for a more reconciled future. The poem was printed in 
the Omagh’s Ulster Herald as well as other Northern Irish and Irish newspapers.88 It was later 
read by Liam Neeson in a collaborative album, ‘Across the Bridge of Hope,’ containing songs 
performed by Sinéad O'Connor, Van Morrison, U2 and Boyzone.89 Just as in the campaign 
surrounding the May referendum, celebrities reinforced the need for reconciliation for the 
children of Northern Ireland.  
Other poems focused on the youthfulness of the victims of the bombing. One poem 
titled ‘The Driver’ appeared in the Tyrone Constitution on 20 August and read “Are you the 
hero of the day / Now there’s flesh and blood in Market Street / From young and old you’ve 
taken life, / You’ve broken hearts and severed limbs away”.90 Another poem, ‘The people of 
Omagh’ referred specifically to the suffering of children “Tearing and destroying, women, 
children, teenagers lying all around … I want to gather up my family and run from your 
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town”.91 A 27 August poem called ‘A Sad Sad Day in County Tyrone’ talked again about 
children’s suffering “There were children there who came from Spain / And babies, too, 
who were barely born / Together they died and shared the pain”.92 The same day another 
poem published in the newspaper read 
Is there children in your life? [sic] Are you in touch with a young one? 
Just look at that child, what do you see? 
A world surrounded by hope, joy and a promise to be free. 
But only you decided for some families that was not to be, 
They will always ask and search - why me?.93 
 
The 3 September edition of the Tyrone Constitution offered numerous other poems that 
reflected on these themes, explicitly linking the innocence of children to the necessity of the 
peace process. Most explicitly, ‘How Can This Be?’ said that 
This time we’re not spared the details, we must remember this pain, 
We voted for Peace, now voice your condemnation again and again … 
Religious borders now broken by murder - what a tragedy! 
Saturday 15th August, Omagh, a dark day in our history.94 
 
“Precious Tears” described “Mothers and daughters, fathers and sons. Brothers and sisters, 
Babies so young” while the poem ‘And the Greatest of These …..’ referred to “Burned ….. 
blinded …. broken …. and torn / Mothers and children, babies unborn”.95 Linking these 
various poems are themes of the reconciliation and the tragedy of children suffering. The 
choice of newspapers to publish these poems pays tribute, not only to the children killed in 
the bombing, but to the belief that children desired and deserved a reconciled future.  
These poems also served a political purpose, as the poems chosen by these 
publications restated the public’s support of the GFA, especially the generational reasons for 
achieving peace expressed during the 1998 referendum campaign. The form of poetry is also 
important to note. Whereas personal suffering and experience of trauma throughout the 
Troubles was often sidelined as many victims of violence felt silenced, poetry as a personal 
form of reflection represents a change – personal experience was now made public. As 
Seamus Heaney, Derry-born poet remarked in his Nobel acceptance speech, poetry contains 
“the power to persuade that vulnerable part of our consciousness of its rightness in spite of 
the evidence of wrongness all around it, the power to remind us that we are hunters and 
gatherers of values, that our very solitudes and distresses are creditable, in so far as they, too, 
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are an earnest of our veritable human being”.96 Poetry is, in other words, a highly personal 
form of communication, one that can be utilised to process enormous tragedy using one’s 
own words. In 1998, many members of the public not only shared their experiences in the 
media, but recorded them in the highly personal form of reflective poetry. Heaney himself 
asked one week after the bombing 
could it be that we have finally moved beyond "the politics of the last atrocity"? 
Could it be that we now perceive the enemy in "dullards", in "insensibility" itself? 
Could it be that tears have finally shown what the "totality of relationships" boils 
down to, namely, a care for each other as creatures of the species, creatures who need 
safety and shelter and grounds for trust among ourselves? As realists, we know that 
such a trust will be constantly disappointed and that the atrocious will always be a 
threat; but as mourners, we have reason also to believe that we have reached some 
tragic conclusion, and that the whimper of exhausted grief just might turn into the 
cry of something vulnerable and new.97  
 
Whereas the poems submitted by the public may not have possessed the polish of Heaney’s 
words, the hope that ‘we have reached some tragic conclusion’ is evident throughout the 
poetic responses to the bombing.  
The bombing other artistic responses including U2’s melancholic 2000 song Peace on 
Earth, which went as far as to mention the names of the victims 
They're reading names out over the radio 
All the folks the rest of us won't get to know 
Sean and Julia, Gareth, Ann and Brenda 
Their lives are bigger, than any big idea …  
Hear it every Christmas time 
But hope and history won't rhyme 
So what's it worth? 
This peace on Earth.98 
 
U2 had publicly supported the GFA and this song expresses some of the band’s feelings of 
hopelessness in the wake of the bombing. Powerful reactions to the bombing also came in 
the form of visual arts. Gerry Gleason’s painting ‘Interface (for Omagh)’ captures some of 
the disbelief that a bombing could happen after the 1994 ceasefires and the GFA (see figure 
7). As Gleason reflects “the ceasefires had occurred the society was moving towards power 
sharing and people were a bit more optimistic. Then this dreadful act happens”.99 The 
bombing also inspired a painting by visual artist Michael Farrell entitled ‘Omagh Bombing,’ 
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which pictured a pair of boy’s shoes surrounded by blood as well as McLoughlin’s poem (see 
figure 8). 
 
     
Figures 7 and 8.100 ‘Interface (for Omagh)’ by Gerry Gleason (left) and ‘Omagh 
Bombing’ by Michael Farrell (right). Gleason’s painting sees a figure planning the 
Omagh bombing who “sits at a computer planning the event, dates, times, logistics, 
mobile phones etc. He is remote from it all, almost in virtual space the foot soldiers 
will do the rest and carry it out in real space, in real time. I hope that a dreadful act 
like this does not happen again in my life time”. Farrell’s painting involves “a pair of 
boys shoes” which are “awash in blood. Standing above is the lower part of a sinister 
black overcoat and heavy black shoes”. Farrell also makes use of poetry by inscribing 
McLoughlin’s poem on the bottom of the canvas. 
 
The religious affiliations of the fatalities were significant in the discussions following the 
bombing. During the referendum campaign Blair had hoped for a “Northern Ireland where 
no one gives a damn whether you're Catholic, Protestant, wherever you come from”.101 
Blair’s tone changed after the Omagh bombing. The Prime Minister’s statement to the House 
of Commons in September noted that, of the Omagh victims, “seventeen were Roman 
Catholic, 11 were Protestant, 11 were under the age of 18 … you sought to divide the 
community, and you failed”.102 Although contradicting his previously stated belief in the need 
to look past other people’s religion, the cross-community nature of the victims of the atrocity 
was a necessary point for Blair and other politicians to make. That more Catholics were killed 
than Protestants was crucial to note, as these fatalities meant that neither community could 
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claim unequivocal victimhood and the attack could not be considered a sectarian victory for 
the RIRA or republicans more generally. The civilian and cross-community nature of the 
bombing’s victims may explain the huge public reaction in the form of vigils, memorials and 
thousands of signatures in books of condolences. 
There were also times when official commemorations and public sentiment mirrored 
one another. Reconciliatory symbolism was extensively utilised in the ‘Omagh: Act of 
Remembrance’ ceremony and BBC Northern Ireland television broadcast, one week after 
the bombing.103 The broadcast began with a metaphor of community reconciliation: “two 
rivers meet in the heart of the town … this week, people have found consolation in the 
symbol of that confluence, they have come through this together and they hope to move on 
from it as one”.104 Present at the ceremony were representatives from the Catholic, Church 
of Ireland (Anglican) and Presbyterian churches. Just as in the referendum campaign, music 
was used to bring the communities together, with “the Lord is my Shepherd” being played 
by St. Eugene’s band, described as having “members from across the community”.105 Dr 
Brendan McCarthy, Pastor of Omagh Community Church said in his address “we stand 
together as a united community” and “our community will not be torn apart” by the 
bombing.106 The subtext of these comments was that the bombers had aimed to ignite 
sectarian tensions between Protestants and Catholics in the town and perhaps to provoke a 
paramilitary response. The ‘Omagh: Act of Remembrance’ ceremony was a chance for 
numerous politicians to restate their commitment to the peace process, including attendees 
David Trimble, Gerry Adams, Seamus Mallon and John Hume as well as religious figures 
including Church of Ireland Archbishop Robin Eames and Catholic Archbishop Seán Brady. 
The presence of these political and religious figures along with the statements about the 
divisive intent of the bombing positioned the attack as being not only against the peace 
process, but as an attempt to bring the Catholic and Protestant communities into conflict. 
The bombing also allowed for the public to express its grief online as the BBC 
established a webpage entitled ‘The Omagh Bombing – Your Reaction.’ This page enabled 
the international community to directly express their reactions to bombing. This was the first 
act of violence in Northern Ireland in which anyone with internet access had such a direct 
way of expressing their views. The development of these technologies did not, in the case of 
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Omagh, directly change the types or responses that were recorded. Rather, these changes 
allowed more people than ever to have their voices heard. One contributor summarised that  
one only recently prayed that the burning alive of the Quinn Brothers might bring 
this cycle to an end. Now we have the sheer horror of the largest single bombing in 
Northern history. That the bomb seems to have ripped indiscrimately [sic] into both 
Catholic and Protestant shoppers may be the difference … together protestants and 
catholics [sic] must learn to live, or die, in No. Ireland. Sectarianism, obviously, will 
only drive an individual, or an entire people, mad.107 
 
A majority of responses on the website called for peace and many statements such as the one 
above focused on the inane nature of sectarianism in Northern Ireland. ‘Diane’ asked “how 
many families today are without loved ones just because of religion? … I come from a mixed 
family and I love everyone the same - regardless of whether they are Protestant or 
Catholic”.108 These statements reflected the editorials from Northern Ireland’s major 
newspapers, which unanimously condemned the bombing as an attack on reconciliation. 
Responses such as theses also demonstrated continuing public engagement in responding to 
paramilitary violence and a perception that the bombing was an attack on reconciliation. 
Alongside the rise of biographies and autobiographies relating to the Troubles, the inclusion 
of personalised reactions to violence through mediums including the internet would only 
increase in the years after 1998.109 
On 3 September 1999, just over a year after the bombing, a free concert took place 
in Omagh. The Corrs, one of Ireland’s most famous bands, performed to a crowd of around 
30,000. Andrea Corr said that the victims of Omagh were “prepared to move on and to go 
forward and they have always put peace first and I think that’s always the message from 
Omagh … this evening is about moving forward I think”.110 The concert also contained a 
performance from the ‘Omagh Youth and Community Choir’ containing Catholic and 
Protestant members. Mo Mowlam said that the young people of Omagh “have an ability to 
not forget what happened, but say that we must try, with a determination that amazes me, 
not just to build bricks and mortar but the spirit that is necessary to re-build, and that is what 
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you feel when you look at these young kids here tonight … primarily the millennium 
generation are here”.111 Judging by these comments, we can infer that the concert was not 
only designed to aid the town of Omagh, but to demonstrate the necessity of the peace 
process and reconciliation through music. More broadly, Mowlam’s comments reiterate the 
Agreement’s acknowledgement of the “tragedies of the past” while acknowledging victims 
through a “fresh start”.112 The British and Irish governments positioned the bombing as a 
sectarian attack on reconciliation, designed to promote violence between communities in 
Northern Ireland and by doing so, further delegitimised the bombing and attempted to 
strengthen support for the GFA. The enormous public response to the bombing 
demonstrated that public discourse largely mirrored the political focus on reconciliation, 
particularly as tens of thousands attended memorial services and denounced sectarian 
violence in the media. 
“We will not be quiet, we will not be forgotten” 
The political call for justice was issued shortly after the bombing took place. Blair assured 
the House of Commons in a 1 September address that the “investigation to bring to justice 
those responsible is being pursued with the utmost intensity and with complete unity of 
purpose between the British and the Irish authorities”.113 Ahern promised the Dáil Éireann 
that the “people of this island, North and South, will enjoy the peace they democratically 
endorsed and that the victims of Omagh will have justice”.114 Once politicians had made 
speeches and the public had mourned the victims of the bombing, the question arose, what 
was to be done to the perpetrators? Whereas throughout the Troubles the primary judicial 
practice was retributive – focusing on imprisoning paramilitaries - the emphasis in the GFA 
was on restorative justice. In comparison to retributive justice, restorative justice focuses on 
rehabilitation of criminals and integration back into their respective communities.115 This was 
a paradigm shift in thinking which focused on social outcomes of prisoners rather than 
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punishment for crimes, as the GFA attempted to “facilitate the reintegration of prisoners 
into the community by providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance 
directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training and/or re-skilling, and 
further education”.116 The Omagh bombing posed a serious dilemma for lawmakers: the 
prospect of releasing perpetrators of terror before the GFA while prosecuting those who 
conducted terror during the ongoing ‘peace process.’  
In comparison to the progressive treatment of current paramilitary prisoners, the 
British and Irish governments introduced tough anti-terror legislation in the wake of the 
Omagh bombing in an attempt to destroy the RIRA and other dissident republican groups. 
British law changed under the ‘Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998’ which 
increased the power of senior police’s evidence in convictions, allowing an inference of guilt 
to be drawn from a suspect’s silence and stronger forfeiture and confiscation penalties against 
those suspected of handling the assets of a terrorist group.117 The Irish government 
introduced the ‘Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1998’ which extended Gardaí 
arrest and fortitude powers, created new offences and increased penalties for explosives and 
firearms offences – all aimed at constraining the activities of dissident republican 
paramilitaries operating in the Irish Republic.118  
The introduction of strict anti-terror laws in 1998 stands in stark contrast to victims’ 
legal avenues for achieving justice for crimes committed before the GFA. While there were 
almost 20,000 imprisonments for paramilitary offences during the Troubles, in 1998 there 
remained over 3000 unsolved killings.119 The Historical Enquiries Team (HET) was 
established in 2005 to investigate 2535 of the 3268 unsolved murders of the Troubles, 
although due to funding constraints, the organisation was closed in September 2014.120 A 
crucial component of the GFA was the negotiated release of paramilitary prisoners by the 
end of 2000. The British government had the unenviable task of attempting restorative justice 
measures by releasing hundreds of paramilitary prisoners from 1998 to 2000; simultaneously 
assuring the victims and families of the Omagh bombing that the perpetrators would be 
brought to justice. 
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The Omagh justice campaign revolved around the creation of the Omagh Support 
and Self Help Group (OSSHG) formed by some relatives of Omagh victims and others 
impacted by the bombing. Within this group formed the core group of victims’ relatives who 
eventually won a civil suit against the Real IRA in 2009, including Michael Gallagher, Kevin 
Skelton and Victor Barker. A 2000 inquest by the Greater Belfast coroner John Leckey 
outlined the impacts of the bomb on the victims, posited that the Real IRA were responsible 
and that their warnings were inadequate.121 However, lasting charges were not laid against 
the key suspects. Between the bombing and the 2000 inquest, numerous suspects had been 
arrested, questioned and subsequently released without charge, despite some officers 
revealing that they were aware of the bombing’s perpetrators.122 A BBC Panorama 
documentary aired on 9 October 2000 named Liam Campbell, Seamus Daly, Colm Murphy 
and Oliver Trainor as suspects linked to the bombing.123 On 23 January 2002, Colm Murphy 
was found guilty of conspiracy to cause the Omagh bombing in a Dublin court, although 
this charge was overturned upon appeal in 2005.124 A lack of evidence against the bombers 
was a key issue, as were allegations of police mishandling of evidence including reports that 
Gardaí detectives lied at various points of the investigation, allegations later proven to be 
false.125 The stagnation in the case was made worse by allegations in 2002 from Northern 
Ireland Police Ombudsman, Nuala O’Loan, that the RUC (and later PSNI) had a breakdown 
in communication and may have been able to prevent the bombing.126 These allegations were 
strongly denied by police Chief Sir Ronnie Flanagan and were further refuted in a 190 page 
report by the PSNI.127 The entire exchange undermined OSSHG faith in the PSNI, the justice 
system and the hope that the state would prosecute the Omagh bombers.  
Following Murphy’s overturned conviction and lacking any criminal prosecutions 
against suspected bombers, twelve families of Omagh victims including members of the 
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OSSHG decided to take legal matters into their own hands. Represented by Lord Daniel 
Brennan QC, the families began a civil suit in 2008 against suspected Real IRA members 
Liam Campbell, Michael McKevitt, Seamus Daly, Colm Murphy and Seamus McKenna. This 
case marked the first time in British and Irish history that a civil suit (rather than a criminal 
suit) had been filed against members of a terrorist organisation. The successful civil suit filed 
against the suspected bombers resulted in £1.6 million being awarded to the Omagh victims’ 
families in 2009, with all suspects other than McKenna found liable for the bombing.128 As 
Dudley Edwards notes, there was “no precedent for a group of victims challenging the 
system who were neither attached to nor under the wing of a political party”.129 Why was the 
Omagh justice campaign successful while the victims of so many other comparable 
republican bombings such as Kingsmill, Enniskillen and the Shankill Road, have never 
resulted in criminal convictions? What had changed in Northern Ireland to facilitate such a 
precedent? The difference lies not only with the nature of the Omagh bombing, a dissident 
republican attack which impacted both communities, but the changes in the public discourse 
surrounding justice after the GFA. 
The clearest difference between Omagh and previous bombings was the reaction of 
the victims’ families and the public. Many journalists called for the continuation of the peace 
process and urged victims to pursue justice through legal channels. Tim Pat Coogan, popular 
historian and supporter of the GFA, wrote in the Irish Times “we must keep before our eyes 
the image of justice, not of vengeance” and argued that the “only way to prevent further 
Omaghs is to make the Belfast Agreement work”.130 The Belfast Telegraph editorial on 17 
August called for the people of Northern Ireland to “commit ourselves to peace, and peace 
alone. Let us back the forces of law and order”.131 This is not to say that there were not angry 
and revanchist public responses to the bombing; there were some calls for the bombers to 
be killed. The Irish Times reported Omagh resident David Graham, who had been in the town 
during the bombing, asking “what peace process? … the only solution is to take an Israeli 
attitude. Shoot to kill and annihilate the terrorists. Give the RUC, the British Army and the 
Royal Irish Regiment a free hand for 48 hours. Let’s see how brave the bombers are then”.132 
There were also calls for retribution through the BBC’s aforementioned ‘Your Reaction’ 
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website. ‘Diane’ claimed that the “death sentence would even be far too kind for these 
people” while ‘James’ asked “why can’t these murderers be publically hung? [sic]”133 ‘KJ 
Bradbury’ believed “these people when caught should be publicly hanged” while ‘Helen 
McIntosh Veal’ argued that the “death penalty should be re-enacted for the people who have 
done this horrendous crime”.134 There is a sense in these comments that there is some 
difference between previous paramilitary actions and the Omagh bombing and the idea that 
after the GFA, attacks on civilians of this scale were simply unacceptable. Nuala O’Faolain, 
an Irish Times journalist wrote on 17 August “I want to see them tortured, the human beings 
who look upon their innocent fellow beings bustling about their happy Saturday tasks and 
then blast them to an awful death, without a minute to say goodbye … there’s no forgiveness 
for it”.135 The internet may have been the most obvious media to countenance the angriest 
responses including death threats, but such responses were also present in the print media, 
as Nuala O’Faolain’s column demonstrates. 
These voices contrasted with relatives of the victims’ calls for legal, rather than 
paramilitary or vigilante justice. Although there were a wide range of reactions from the 
Omagh victims’ families, none called for violence against the perpetrators of the Omagh 
bombing. Sociologist Graham Spencer noted that none of the victims of the bombing or 
their families that he interviewed from 2003 to 2005, “sought to advocate violent retaliation 
against those responsible” but rather “wished justice to be pursued through the courts”.136 
Previous paramilitary atrocities had not produced such a measured response by victims’ 
relatives or paramilitaries. After the PIRA bombing of the Shankill Road in 1993, which killed 
nine Protestant civilians (and the bomber), one paramilitary prisoner described the how 
“anybody on the Shankill Road that day from a Boy Scout to a granny, if you’d given them a 
gun they would have gone out and retaliated”.137 The UDA did retaliate in this instance, 
killing over 10 Catholic civilians – most infamously in the Greysteel Massacre. None of the 
Omagh victims had direct paramilitary links, loyalist paramilitaries did not respond on behalf 
of victims, victims came from both communities and that the bombing occurred after the 
GFA meant that public sympathy, empathy and support could be harnessed effectively into 
a successful legal campaign.  
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The second difference between Omagh and instances of paramilitary violence before 
the Troubles was the media response. The Omagh justice campaign used media attention to 
its advantage, utilising commemorations, court appearances and interviews to pressure 
police, politicians and paramilitaries for more support. For example, the OSSHG boycotted 
the opening of the ‘Garden of Light’ commemoration space designed by the Omagh District 
Council as a memorial garden for victims of the bombing in 2008. Although much effort 
was made to include themes of reconciliation and healing in the ceremony, the OSSHG 
disapproved of the presence of republican politicians at the event, especially considering that 
no one had yet been convicted of the bombing.138 The boycott resulted in increased media 
attention, with Kevin Skelton giving interviews in which he blamed politicians who had 
“done nothing for the families of the Omagh atrocity and it doesn't matter what side they 
come from. They have done nothing for us”.139 The court appearances of suspects were also 
used as opportunities to promote the case, as were meetings of the 32CSM which the 
OSSHG picketed.140 
The enormous legal costs of the Omagh civil suit were supplemented through public 
donations and support from the Daily Mail which urged its readers to donate to the Omagh 
legal campaign. The Daily Mail, which had consistently supported the Conservative Party 
throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, was particularly opposed to 
Blair’s New Labour.141 The newspaper’s coverage of the justice campaign, with headlines 
including “Shameless betrayal: How Omagh victims were left to confront bombers 
themselves after Blair failed to deliver justice” was part of its wider opposition to Blair’s 
Labour government.142 The 1999 ‘Bridge of Hope’ album generated further funding for the 
Omagh Bomb Appeal Fund, as did charity golf tournaments and a charity auction from 
Newcastle United F.C.143 The role of the media was explicitly acknowledged by the 
campaigners themselves in Graham Spencer’s 2005 book Omagh: Voices of Loss. Interviewed 
in Spencer’s book, Godfrey Wilson, whose daughter Lorraine died in the bombing, said that 
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the “media seems to be our battlefield. It’s the only spot we can turn to that will listen”.144 
Gerald McFarland, whose daughter Samantha died in the bombing, said  
we have met so many politicians, government ministers and so on, but all you get is 
the niceties with no product at the end of it. If it hadn’t been for the media, I do have 
no doubt that it would have died away and been swept under the carpet. The media 
is a very strong weapon and important for the victims seeking justice.145 
 
Michael Gallagher, whose son Aidan had died in the bombing, offered similar sentiments, 
saying  
from early on, I think we realised the value of the media … I think that if we can 
keep Omagh alive, the better chance we will have of getting to the truth of what 
happened. It would cost millions of pounds to pay for the publicity that we have got 
through the media and from very early on, I decided to do anything, to go anywhere, 
to bend over backwards to facilitate the media.146 
 
By utilising the media as a source of public support and funding, the Omagh justice campaign 
was able to keep their story in the media and public pressure on the bombing’s suspects. 
OSSHG members also positioned their campaign against lacklustre political support. Kevin 
Skelton said “we were promised everything at the time, but years down the line and the help 
hasn’t materialised” and Godfrey Wilson felt that the “politicians have used us for PR 
purposes,” sentiments also echoed by Gerald McFarland.147 Positioning their justice 
campaign against a lack of lasting political support, the OSSHG campaign demonstrates 
some of the tensions between the ‘peace’ promised by the GFA, and the belief that the 
Agreement would allow victims of paramilitary violence to achieve justice. Skelton published 
Sent by an Angel in 2011, recording his experience of dealing with the trauma of losing his 
wife Philomena in the bombing. At the end of the book, Skelton concludes  
just because you don’t hear about bombs exploding in Northern Ireland every other 
day does not mean that it’s a peaceful place … when it comes to justice in Northern 
Ireland, in my mind there is none … if the prime minister of either country lost a 
loved one in a bombing, you can be sure that in a matter of weeks, not years, someone 
would be behind bars for the crime.148 
 
This conclusion not only outlines Skelton’s ideas about reconciliation and justice in Northern 
Ireland, this form of personal testimony shows how much Northern Ireland changed after 
the GFA. Far from feeling silenced by the Omagh bombing, Skelton recorded his personal 
trauma and made his experiences public. Indeed, the Omagh bombing was an ideal 
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opportunity for many politicians to ally themselves with victims and to stress the importance 
of the GFA’s role in creating a more peaceful, reconciled and just Northern Ireland. As these 
recollections of Omagh victims’ relatives reveal, victims’ faith that politicians and the legal 
system would support their justice campaign eventually faded, leading victims groups 
including the OSSHG to turn to both the media and the public for support.  
In 2004, Omagh was released, a film based around the bombing and the OSSHG 
justice campaign.149 The film focuses on the experiences of Michael Gallagher, who is 
positioned as a representative of the grief experienced by other Omagh families.150 Director 
Pete Travis utilised production techniques such as grainy film, handheld camera and 
naturalistic dialogue, which were also used in producer Paul Greengrass’ previous 2002 film 
Bloody Sunday. In a similar structure to Bloody Sunday, Omagh portrays devastating loss that 
eventually turns into an ongoing fight for justice.151 The film acknowledges other victims of 
the Troubles, exemplified in the fictionalised Gallagher’s final line “we speak for the victims 
of the Troubles of whatever tradition and all those victims of terror wherever it happens. We 
will not go away, we will not be quiet, we will not be forgotten”.152 The film, released with 
the approval and input of the OSSHG, helped to further bolster the publicity surrounding 
the Omagh justice campaign, especially as it won the BAFTA Television Award for ‘Best 
Single Drama’ in 2005.153 Far from being silenced, the OSSHG had their personal stories, 
memories and traumas publicised through the medium of film. In assessing the Omagh film, 
cultural historian Aileen Blaney describes how, during the Troubles, “paramilitary 
organizations commanded a greater degree of media visibility than the victims of violence - 
deceased, injured and bereaved,” a power that victims’ groups such as the OSSHG 
challenged through Omagh.154 
Celebrity endorsements, which proved important to the YES campaign some months 
before the bombing, also contributed to the success of the Omagh justice campaign. U2, the 
Corrs and other bands played a tribute show on the RTÉ’s ‘Late Late Show,’ while celebrities 
including Bob Geldof lent ongoing support to the campaign.155 In addition to U2’s Peace on 
Earth, heavy metal band Def Leppard released the angry ballad Paper Sun on their 1999 album 
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‘Euphoria’.156 New media also played a role in the justice campaign. A BBC forum ‘Omagh 
verdict: Your reaction?’ also expressed a wide range of opinions on the conviction of Colm 
Murphy, very few of which sympathised with the RIRA member.157 As well as having the 
suspects of the bombing written about, the OSSHG established its own website in 2005, 
entitled ‘Omagh Support & Self Help Group: Campaigning for the Human Rights of Victims 
of Terrorism’. The website allowed supporters from around the world to keep up to date 
with the proceedings of the justice campaign and also lists petitions, donations and press 
releases in its pages.158 It also contained a monthly newsletter first issued in May 2005, letting 
supporters know how they could help further alongside updates on the justice campaign.159 
Through this website, the Omagh justice campaign could gather funding, rather than waiting 
for donations. These examples of new media meant that the Omagh case would remain in 
public interest for the many years after the bombing. 
The successful 2009 ruling occurred a full eleven years after the bombing and only 
after millions of pounds in legal fees were donated by the public, demonstrating the 
enormous effort required on the part of victims’ groups to pursue legal justice. The Saville 
Inquiry, dealing with the Bloody Sunday massacre in 1972, released its findings in 2010, the 
year after the Omagh ruling. The Saville inquiry cost almost £200 million and took thirteen 
years, making it the most expensive legal inquiry in British history.160 For families with 
relatives killed in one-off attacks, or even victims’ groups based around incidents from earlier 
in the Troubles, this meant that atrocities with fewer casualties, and less public attention, 
would prove difficult to fund and prosecute in the ‘new’ Northern Ireland.  
In examining the Omagh justice campaign, the differences between the Real IRA’s 
brash 1998 statements compared to its collapse after the 2009 trial not only demonstrates 
the legal developments in Northern Ireland after the GFA, but how public discourse changed 
over time. Victims of paramilitary violence such as the Omagh relatives showed how public 
discursive power had shifted away from paramilitaries and towards victims of violence. Such 
victims were fearless to openly challenge the paramilitaries who had injured them or killed 
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their relatives and unafraid to use the media to achieve their legal goals. Michael Gallagher, 
one of the leaders of the campaign, said after the successful 2009 verdict “we have sent out 
a message to terrorists that from now on you don't only have to worry about the authorities 
- the families of your victims will come after you” and that the verdict was a “message to 
governments that, if you don't do it, then we will. We have also sent a message to victims of 
terrorism around the world. You now have a way of challenging those who murder your 
loved ones”.161 Gallagher’s statement encapsulates, not only the feelings of the Omagh 
relatives, but some of the key changes in public discourse brought about by the GFA. There 
were clearly legal reasons which can explain why Omagh campaign achieved success in 2009. 
Changes in British and Irish terror legislation had made convictions easier to secure, as had 
improved technology involved in the civil case including cross-border phone tracking. Far 
from being the ‘silent victims’ of violence, the Omagh families demonstrated the new ways 
in which victims of paramilitary violence could openly challenge governments, institutions 
and paramilitary organisations without fear. The public support for the Omagh justice 
campaign marked a significant turning point in how justice was encapsulated in Northern 
Ireland’s public discourse. 
“What peace process?” 
In studying the reactions to the Omagh bombing, we can see how the public discourse 
surrounding the key ideas of the GFA – peace, justice and reconciliation – were debated in 
the wake of Northern Ireland’s worst paramilitary attack. Public support for the peace 
process and reconciliation remained high, shaped not only by official government 
commemorations for the bombing, but by an outpouring of grief and support in the form 
of music, poetry and condolences. The bombing was an important test case of the legal 
avenues for victims of violence after the Troubles. While the OSSHG justice campaign 
served as an example of what could be achieved, few other victims’ groups had garnered the 
attention or funding that their campaign received. Responses to the bombing reveal a tension 
between the peace promised by the GFA and the justice demanded by victims of paramilitary 
violence and their relatives, as well as (sometimes questionable) the value of political 
promises for justice made in 1998. The bombing also demonstrated that paramilitary groups, 
who had been powerful players in Northern Ireland’s public discourse throughout the 
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Troubles, could now be publicly questioned and legally prosecuted by the victims of their 
violence. 
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Chapter 3: The Holy Cross Dispute, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four images above were published in the Belfast Telegraph during the Holy Cross 
dispute.1 These pictures reflected some of the key images of the dispute that were relayed 
worldwide. Top left shows a crying Holy Cross pupil walking to school. Top right shows 
the injuries sustained by a police officer from the 5 September pipe bombing. The bottom 
left image shows the proximity of police, parents, children, the army and protesters 
throughout much of the dispute. The bottom right image shows a protester being 
restrained by the RUC, indicative of resident frustrations over the policing of the incident.  
 
In June 2001, residents of the Protestant Glenbryn2 estate in north Belfast protested against 
parents taking their children to the Catholic Holy Cross Girls’ Primary School along the 
Ardoyne Road. From September to November, a daily picket of Glenbryn residents and their 
supporters captured worldwide media attention by continuing to protest on the Ardoyne 
Road. These protests led to confrontations with police, the army and the parents of Holy 
Cross children. The protest ended on 23 November 2001 after the intervention of the First 
Minister David Trimble, although some violence continued into 2002. I argue that the Holy 
Cross dispute created the space for the media, along with the parents and protesters involved 
in the dispute, to reconsider the formulations of peace and reconciliation enshrined in the 
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GFA. The dispute also revealed how debates around ‘victimhood’ and ‘silencing’ could play 
out in Northern Ireland’s public discourse, with both parents and protesters claiming that 
they were the true victims who had been ignored or misrepresented by the media. As with 
the Omagh justice campaign, the Holy Cross dispute demonstrates the limits of victims’ 
justice campaigns after the GFA, while also revealing how victims’ discursive power had 
changed since the Agreement. 
Ardoyne and Glenbryn: A North Belfast Saga 
In 2001, the political situation in Northern Ireland was bleak. Decommissioning of the 
PIRA’s weaponry had not taken place. This put enormous pressure on David Trimble. 
Trimble had entered into the new Assembly, which included Sinn Féin, with confidence in 
the GFA’s provision that decommissioning would occur “within two years following 
endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement”.3 The PIRA’s 
decommissioning, which was set to begin by June 1998, did not take place.4 After Trimble 
threatened to resign, the Assembly was suspended in 2000 and twice again in 2001 in order 
to pressure the PIRA into decommissioning. Following Trimble’s resignation as First 
Minister on 1 July 2001, the PIRA commenced its first act of public decommissioning on 23 
October.5 Protestant support for the Agreement, which was tenuous at best in 1998, began 
to fall, with polls conducted by the Belfast Telegraph in 2000 suggesting that less than half of 
Protestants would still vote for the Agreement.6 This fed the rise of anti-GFA parties like the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who positioned themselves as the champions of those 
disillusioned by the Agreement. 
While the PIRA did not decommission a significant part of its arsenal until 2005, 
loyalist paramilitaries, especially the UDA, struggled throughout 2000 to 2002 over the 
leadership of the organisation. The UDA did not have a commander of the entire 
organisation since Andrew ‘Andy’ Tyrie stepped down in 1988.7 As part of the GFA’s 
program of prisoner releases, Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair, an infamous UDA brigadier from 
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west Belfast, had been released from prison in 1999. UDA Brigadiers believed that Adair was 
attempting to take control of the organisation and this resulted in a violent feud over the 
group’s leadership.8 This feud, coupled with tensions between the UDA and UVF 
concerning UDA links with the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), undermined the legitimacy 
of loyalist paramilitary ceasefires and resulted in some west Belfast residents fleeing to areas 
of north Belfast.9  
North Belfast was one of the most violent parts of Northern Ireland during the 
Troubles. 577 people died in the area between 1968 and 1998, a figure eclipsed only by nearby 
west Belfast, with a death toll of 623.10 99 people died in the largely Catholic Ardoyne area 
alone.11 In 2001, violence in north Belfast intensified as the summer marching season began. 
Communal tensions were also high as a result of the Drumcree dispute, a traditional Orange 
march opposed by nationalist residents of the Garvaghy Road in Portadown, County 
Armagh, which also resulted in rioting in north Belfast.12 The Parades Commission, 
established in 1997, formed in order to regulate all parades in Northern Ireland, including 
the march at Drumcree. The Commission was concerned with what it described as the 
“Portadown situation” and remained extremely unpopular in sections of the unionist 
community.13 The Orange Order refused to recognise the body, leading the commission to 
describe the Lodge as having an, “unnecessarily unhelpful, uncompromising and self-
damaging stance” on contentious parades.14 The ‘Portadown situation’ would become a 
reference point of conflict during the Holy Cross dispute.  
The Protestant residents of the Glenbryn area of north Belfast were ageing, declining 
in number and wary of the growth in the neighbouring Catholic Ardoyne area. As sociologist 
Peter Shirlow has noted, Glenbryn residents felt “besieged by being domiciled close to a 
growing Irish Republican community” while, for Ardoyne residents, “besiegement is 
influenced by being virtually surrounded by ‘Protestant’ territory’’.15 Both the Ardoyne and 
Glenbryn communities felt encircled and threatened by the nightly violence taking place 
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throughout summer 2001. It was against this background of growing political instability, the 
contentious marching season and the social decline of Glenbryn that trouble broke out on 
the Ardoyne Road.  
On Tuesday 19 June 2001, Jim McClean was putting up both “union flags” and 
“ulster flags,” on the Ardoyne Road when he was accosted by a man wearing a “Celtic 
shirt”.16 Writing in Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA, Ian Wood referred to “UDA flags” 
being raised on the Ardoyne Road.17 Nearby, Amanda Johnson recalled that the“next minute 
the car reversed a bit and rammed towards the ladder”.18 Anne Bill, a Glenbryn resident 
writing in 2002, said “some youngsters” were putting flags up when “a convoy of cars started 
to build up”.19 From another perspective, journalist Anne Cadwallader interviewed the man 
in the Celtic shirt, given the pseudonym “Sean,” who claimed that he was attacked first and 
only reacted to men attacking his car.20 One interviewee in Cadwallader’s book Ardoyne: The 
Untold Truth confirmed Sean’s account and said that a taxi driver was attacked by loyalists 
who “began stoning the car” after which “the taxi driver swerved out of instinct and nearly 
hit some fella on a ladder. The loyalists thought this was done deliberately and within the 
space of a few moments the street was full of them”.21 The BBC’s 2003 docudrama Holy 
Cross takes a line between these two conflicting sets of testimonies, showing a man erecting 
paramilitary flags (contradicting McClean’s own recollection) but portraying ‘Sean’ 
purposefully reversing his car into the flag raisers.22 Whatever the exact events of that 
afternoon, a street riot broke out between Glenbryn and Ardoyne residents, occurring at the 
same time that Holy Cross School pupils finished classes for the day. This meant that Holy 
Cross pupils and their parents found themselves in the middle of a confrontation between 
Glenbryn and Ardoyne residents. Conflicting accounts of the events surrounding 19 June 
hint at the fractured nature of community relations in 2001, as neither side could agree as to 
the origin of the dispute, nor could they agree how it should be resolved. 
As a result of the violence on 19 June, Glenbryn residents began protesting against 
the parents and children walking to the Holy Cross school through the Ardoyne Road on 
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Wednesday 20 June. These protests continued daily until the school term ended the following 
Friday. In the June protest an estimated fifty to sixty Glenbryn residents attempted to 
blockade the Ardoyne Road.23 Parents and children were at times told to use the ‘alternative 
entrance’ to the school through the Crumlin Road (see figure 9). Following the June protests, 
Glenbryn residents formed a group called Concerned Residents of Upper Ardoyne (CRUA), 
while Ardoyne residents and Holy Cross parents formed the Right to Education (RTE).24 
The summer discussions between the two groups, which sought to resolve the conflict, were 
not successful. Nightly violence in north Belfast surrounding the July-August marching 
season provided a bleak background to negotiations. As with the ladder dispute, both the 
CRUA and RTE have conflicting accounts of why talks were not successful, with both sides 
claiming that the other was not interested in dialogue.25 The issue of parents and children 
walking the Ardoyne Road was not resolved and the CRUA agreed to resume its protest 
when school returned in September after the summer holidays. 
 
 
Figure 9.26 This image taken in the late 1980s illustrates the size of the Catholic 
Ardoyne compared to the Protestant Glenbryn area, separated by Alliance Avenue. It 
also shows the position of the Holy Cross School, located well within the Protestant 
Glenbryn estate. In the left side of the image just west of the Ardoyne Road is the 
Crumlin Road, through which the ‘alternative entrance’ to the school was located. 
 
The world’s media became aware of the Holy Cross dispute when the protest resumed on 3 
September 2001. On this day the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) formed a protective 
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barrier around parents and children walking to school to separate them from the Glenbryn 
protesters. However, police were unprepared for the sheer number of loyalist protesters. 
This event was the first since the June protest to be reported by the media, as television and 
radio crews as well as print journalists reported on the events taking place on the Ardoyne 
Road.27 Protests continued every school morning that the Holy Cross children walked to 
school, with a smaller protest most afternoons as the children returned home. A pipe bomb 
was thrown into the group of parents and children walking to the school on 5 September. 
Henry McDonald and Jim Cusack claim in their work UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror 
that the pipe bomb was thrown by a drug dealer who owed £500 to Adair’s infamous west 
Belfast ‘C Company’.28 The unnamed man was faced with two options: being shot or agreeing 
to “carry out an attack for the UDA”.29 Although physical violence on the road never again 
became as intense as the pipe bombing, a 2008 House of Lords’ inquiry into police conduct 
summarised the worst of the protests as also including the 
throwing of other missiles at those making the journey to and from the school … 
bricks, rubbish, balloons filled with urine, dog excrement and in particular in the pre-
Halloween period firecrackers and bangers … death threats … verbal abuse of a vile 
sectarian nature … obscenities of a sexual nature [directed] at women and children 
… racist abuse … pornographic material was displayed … [placards describing 
priests] as paedophiles and stated that they had joined the priesthood to abuse small 
children … children, their parents and the priests already referred to were spat at … 
use of whistles, sirens, horns and other instruments.30 
 
While these were the worst incidents, the protests and responses from the parents varied in 
intensity from day-to-day. On some days, protests were silent as participants turned their 
backs on parents and children, while in other cases the protests were extremely loud, with 
Glenbryn residents blowing “claxon horns, whistles, car horns and sirens”.31 The protest was 
occasionally suspended, for example, after the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks in the United States.  
After meeting with the First Minister David Trimble and Deputy First Minister 
Seamus Mallon, the CRUA permanently suspended the protest on 23 November 2001. The 
total June to December police operation cost approximately £3 million and resulted in 41 
injuries to police officers.32 The Glenbryn residents were promised £8.7 million investment 
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in the community on 19 September,33 and further security and community regeneration 
packages in the November negotiations.34 The dispute became newsworthy fifteen years after 
it had ended, when a September 2016 Belfast Telegraph article revealed that three former Holy 
Cross pupils had been awarded compensation for their trauma as part of the Northern 
Ireland Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.35  
Political Responses 
Politicians were present at the dispute from its commencement. The politicians involved in 
the dispute perceived the protest to be evidence that the GFA needed to be implemented 
more fully, or, evidence of the Agreement’s fundamental flaws. Billy Hutchinson, a former 
UVF prisoner and Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) representing the Progressive 
Unionist Party (PUP) joined protesters. Gerry Kelly former PIRA prisoner and Assembly 
member, supported the parents of Holy Cross. Nigel Dodds, the DUP member for Belfast 
North, was present, as was the SDPL’s Alban Maginness and former UDA prisoner John 
‘Coco’ White,36 now working for the UDA-aligned Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). British 
MPs including Quentin Davies, Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, visited the 
scene, as did Irish President Mary McAleese, who was born in Ardoyne. International 
observers sending support to the Holy Cross children included New York Senator Hillary 
Clinton, members of the ‘Little Rock Nine’ (black high school students who had endured 
pickets at their school in Arkansas in 1957) and South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu.37  
Billy Hutchinson, while aligning himself with the protesters, criticised the 5 
September pipe bombing, saying it made him “ashamed to be a loyalist,”38 but later re-joined 
the protest and was given an award by the CRUA at the conclusion of the dispute.39 
Politicians debated how best to end the dispute in the Northern Ireland Assembly at 
Stormont, Westminster, the Dáil Éireann and Belfast City Council. The Northern Ireland 
Assembly’s 10 September debate on the protest produced predictable results. Most parties 
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and participants who agreed with the protest or its aims were anti-GFA, while those who 
opposed the protest tended to be pro-GFA. The exception to this rule was the PUP, the 
political wing of the UVF, who supported both the Agreement and the aims of the protesters. 
One of the few things uniting politicians’ responses was their criticism of other politicians 
and the new Assembly. In the Assembly debate, Alban Maginness said that the dispute was 
“symptomatic of the failure of all politicians to direct their energies towards dissolving the 
great sickness of intercommunal sectarianism in our society. The Good Friday Agreement 
should have given politicians and the community at large the opportunity to address that 
issue”.40 The dispute was another chance to debate the validity of the GFA, this time in the 
context of the Holy Cross dispute, rather than the issue of paramilitary decommissioning.  
The dispute brought comparisons with the contentious ‘Portadown situation.’ As 
Danny Kennedy, an Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) member, noted during the Assembly’s 
debate, Gerry Kelly’s notion that “those who wish to peacefully process on a main route 
should be allowed to do so. This is welcome news … with regard to the rights of Orangemen 
in Portadown”.41 Similar comparisons were made in the media, as Norman Boyd writing for 
the cross-community Community Telegraph asked, “where was the media coverage when junior 
Orange Order members were being attacked in Portadown? Why were there no live pictures 
on Sky Television for these attacks on young Protestant children by republican thugs?”42 The 
Assembly debates ended by passing an amendment to Gerry Kelly’s motion that the 
Assembly supported the “right to education of school children attending the Holy Cross 
Primary School in north Belfast,” to the more inclusive, “right to education of school 
children attending all schools throughout north Belfast”.43 A meeting of the Belfast City 
Council on 21 September encouraged “community and political leaders in the locality to 
make every effort to defuse this stand-off”.44 The amended notion “this council supports the 
right to education of all children in North Belfast,” split the council, but was approved after 
UUP Lord Mayor Jim Rodgers’ cast his tie-breaking vote.45 These hotly debated phrases and 
resolutions resulted in no change on the ground in north Belfast.  
Politicians used the dispute largely to score political points, but also to debate the 
practical effects of the GFA. The DUP’s Nigel Dodds encapsulated this view, saying at the 
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end of the protest that the “situation in Ardoyne came about as a result of government 
continually ignoring the plight of isolated Protestant communities who have been the subject 
of an organised campaign of intimidation over 30 years”.46 The real and imagined presence 
of paramilitaries on both sides, the UDA orchestrating the protests and the PIRA 
coordinating the parents, also spoke to the belief that paramilitary organisations did not 
suddenly disappear as a result of the GFA. While contemporary paramilitaries were the focus 
of politicians, former paramilitaries were prominent, including Billy Hutchinson and Gerry 
Kelly. Hutchinson and Kelly had a unique opportunity, as two former paramilitaries who had 
personally helped negotiate the GFA on behalf of the loyalist and republican communities,47 
to symbolise the power of dialogue and discussion over violence. Instead, their presence 
validated claims of paramilitary (or at least ex-paramilitary) involvement in the Glenbryn and 
Ardoyne communities and the two ex-prisoners’ personal discussions were chronicled mostly 
as shouting matches broadcast by the BBC.48 Politicians in Belfast, Westminster and Dublin 
did not appear to have any effect in shortening the dispute until the end of the protest in 
November. Did the media fare any better? 
Media Responses 
The competing newspaper coverage of the dispute focused on two issues: problems within 
the Northern Ireland Assembly and, unfinished issues in community reconciliation between 
Protestants and Catholics. As in the debates surrounding the GFA, while the political focus 
was dominant, many newspapers reported on the concern that political change was irrelevant 
while significant reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics had not taken place. The 
Belfast Telegraph was one of few newspapers in the 1990s that had a cross-community 
readership and the newspaper’s support for the peace process was reflected in its coverage 
of the Holy Cross dispute. The newspaper reported “appalling as the past week has been, it 
must not be allowed to derail efforts to put the peace process back on track. A new Northern 
Ireland is being fashioned … life is still infinitely better than it was 10 or 20 years ago”.49 At 
the conclusion of the protest in November, the newspaper again focused on the political 
peace process saying that the protest’s suspension “underlines the power of direct dialogue 
… community dialogue … [which] could serve as a pioneering framework for settling 
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differences in other interface areas of north Belfast”.50 Perhaps unbeknown to the Belfast 
Telegraph, dialogue between the CRUA and RTE had been attempted before the September 
protests but had broken down due to mutual distrust. For the Belfast Telegraph and its editor 
Edmund Curran, who had supported the peace process since he began as editor in 1994, the 
dispute was a chance to explore the weaknesses of the new political system, while arguing 
strongly that the new Assembly needed to function effectively. 
After the 5 September pipe bomb, the newspaper’s editorial read “if the assembly is 
to prove its worth, it should have a means of addressing issues like the Ardoyne trouble 
without delay … too many people feel remote from, or alienated by, the political changes 
that have been taking place … they must be included, or the peace process will fail”.51 The 
selected letters to the editor also reflected the newspaper’s pro-GFA and pro-reconciliation 
stance. A letter to the editor supported the view that “hatred and sectarianism” needed to 
“be decommissioned. We see this poison most potently at work in the daily persecution of 
the little girls trying to go to Holy Cross School”.52 This view reflects many of the concerns 
present in the 1998 referendum, especially the idea that the Agreement was only a political 
innovation, and that there were more fundamental changes required in Northern Irish 
society. Not all of the Belfast Telegraph’s coverage was pro-GFA. Derry-based journalist 
Eamonn McCann wrote that the “images from Ardoyne are relevant, too, in that they suggest 
that the days of the Assembly … are probably numbered anyway … how can the children of 
Ardoyne enjoy a “happy, safe and secure childhood” while the politics which sustain the 
State we live in survive?”53 This assessment echoed McCann’s 1998 position that the 
Assembly had reinforced sectarianism in Northern Ireland.54 This range of views pointed to 
the problems of reconciliation after the GFA, arguing both the top-down view that if the 
Assembly were to function, then community relations would improve and, that community 
reconciliation needed to be improved on a local level. 
For the Belfast News Letter, which as Bill Rolston has noted, never endorsed the 
actions of loyalist paramilitaries,55 the UDA’s pipe bombing delegitimised the protest. The 
newspaper still published articles and letters that criticised the Holy Cross parents, but its 
editorials from 5 September argued for the benefits of ending the protest. On the morning 
                                                          
50 “Viewpoint: School settlement offers hope for all,” Belfast Telegraph, November 24, 2001, 18. Square 
brackets added. 
51 “Viewpoint: The madness must be stopped,” Belfast Telegraph, September 5, 2001, 12. 
52 Patrick McCafferty, letter to the editor, Belfast Telegraph, October 27, 2001, 16. 
53 Eamonn McCann, “Positive intentions but little hope,” Belfast Telegraph, September 5, 2001, 12.  
54 Eamonn McCann, War & Peace in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Hot Press Books, 1998), 241. 
55 Bill Rolston, “News Fit to Print: Belfast’s Daily Newspapers,” in The Media and Northern Ireland: Covering the 
Troubles, ed. Bill Rolston (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 160-161. 
   
  
92 
 
of the 5 September pipe bombing, the newspaper reported “there are some elements on the 
nationalist/republican side in Ardoyne who … may not at all be sympathetically disposed to 
a compromise solution … extreme republicans are prepared to use innocent children in 
pursuit of a narrow sectarian agenda, centred on issues far removed from education”.56 Like 
the protesters, the newspaper reported that republicans were in some way involved in 
coordinating the parents and children’s walk to Holy Cross. In the wake of the pipe bombing 
the newspaper’s tone changed. The 6 September edition still considered that parents “on an 
understandable point of principle … continue placing their children at the front line,” but 
now said that the protest should “desist immediately,” as it had become “a case of innocent 
children of one religion being abused and terrorised by grown men of another … on the 
international stage, comparisons with how the Nazis treated the Jews are being drawn. Is this 
really how the loyalist people of north Belfast want to be regarded?”57 As a result of the pipe 
bombing, the newspaper became more outspoken. On 11 September, it reported that the 
“Ardoyne protest has served to remind us all – and the watching world – there is a very long 
way to go before Northern Ireland is at peace with itself. Indeed, the naked hatred on view 
this week demonstrates vividly that divisions in some places are more pronounced than 
ever”.58 The tone of the newspaper resembled that of the Belfast Telegraph. Whereas that 
newspaper pointed mostly to the failures of the new Assembly, the Belfast News Letter focused 
on reconciliation as a localised problem rooted in sectarianism. 
Other publications such as the nationalist Irish News criticised the parents less than 
their unionist counterparts, although some articles did question their behaviour. An editorial 
in the paper in September mirrored the tone of the Belfast News Letter in calling for “everyone 
concerned to ensure that pupils are removed from the front line in a confrontation which is 
not of their making,” while also noting “there can be no justification for placing the pupils 
at any further physical risk. They should take the alternative route which is available”.59 The 
‘alternative route’ refers to aforementioned back entrance to the school through the Crumlin 
Road (see figure 9). Despite this advice, Irish News journalist Roy Garland wrote “Ardoyne 
children and residents are paying the price for our collective failure to deal with endemic 
sectarianism,” and that it was impossible to return to a “respectful apartheid. There has to 
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be changes in the relationships between the communities”.60 These contributions 
demonstrate not only nationalist expectations of improved civil rights from the GFA, but 
the feeling that reconciliation, especially reconciliation from below, had not yet been 
achieved. The newspaper was also critical of politicians in the dispute, as journalist James 
Kelly reminisced “it seems a long time since we all voted for the new beginning and the news 
was hailed everywhere … what happened to tarnish the dream of a new Ireland at peace with 
itself … ask the politicians”.61 
Republican newspapers like the Andersonstown News also focused on the dispute in 
reference to the GFA: “what is unfolding in Ardoyne is part of the legacy left to us by the 
Orange state, background music orchestrated by those out to thwart the agenda for change 
contained in the Good Friday Agreement”.62 Similar views were aired in An Phoblacht, the 
republican movement’s key publication. On 6 September Laura Friel wrote: “for decades, 
northern nationalists have been forced to run the gauntlet of sectarian hatred … if the Good 
Friday Agreement is to mean anything it has to mean an end to sectarian harassment and 
discrimination, and for the little girls of Holy Cross, the right to walk to school 
unmolested”.63 For republican newspapers such as these, the dispute showed not only that 
sectarianism was still an issue in Northern Ireland, but that the GFA needed to be 
implemented more fully. The idea of a ‘back door’ entrance was contrary to the spirit of the 
Agreement, which as republicans saw it, was meant to foster equality and civil rights for 
nationalists in Northern Ireland. A similar idea was aired by Northern Irish journalist Henry 
McDonald, writing for the Guardian, who blamed the dispute on the GFA’s failure to 
“address the structural sectarianism prevalent in northern society … it rather too neatly 
compartmentalised us all into categories of unionist and nationalist, republican and loyalist 
with no encouragement to the centre ground. In short the Agreement institutionalised 
sectarianism”.64 McDonald’s claim is insightful in interpreting the Holy Cross dispute, as the 
GFA created a framework for unionist and nationalist politicians to share power, but in doing 
so did not directly address the communal sectarianism clearly present in the Holy Cross 
dispute.  
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British and Irish media sided with the Holy Cross parents, and while some criticised 
parents for bringing their children through the Ardoyne Road, most wished for the protest 
to end as soon as possible. This was the case in the Sun, the most widely read British tabloid 
in 2001.65 The Sun’s coverage placed blame on the protesters for the dispute, asking “Is this 
REALLY the United Kingdom in the 21st century? Is this REALLY Northern Ireland, where 
they claim there is a “peace process”?,” describing the protest as a “hate demo” and a “hate-
filled protest”.66 The Sun eventually published a letter from John Reid, Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, decrying the “disturbing images” of Holy Cross.67 The Guardian, Britain’s 
highest selling left-leaning newspaper in 2001, took a wider view, and stated “the best hope 
for the future is mediation between the two communities, an end to paramilitary violence 
and progress in the faltering Northern Ireland peace process, three things that are notoriously 
difficult to achieve”.68 While nationalist and republican publications assessed nationalists as 
the true victims of the dispute, Henry McDonald, writing for the Guardian affiliated Observer, 
noted that in “Northern Ireland’s cult of victimhood, it is Protestants who believe they are 
the true victims of sectarian intimidation”.69 For mainland British newspapers, the dispute 
offered a grim reminder of Northern Ireland’s past, and displayed how much more the 
political peace process needed to do in order to create a more reconciled society.  
The news coverage of the dispute certainly ran along political and sectarian lines, but 
also questioned previously held expectations of the GFA, especially its emphasis on 
reconciliation. Media interest in the Holy Cross dispute not only resulted in the publication 
of thousands of news articles, it empowered protesters and parents. Their views were now 
able to be voiced in a variety of mediums and to a number of different news outlets. 
Protesters and parents were not just the subjects of newspaper and television reports. 
Through the CRUA and RTE, protesters and parents used the media to their advantage. I 
will now focus specifically on the protesters and their use of the media.  
                                                          
65 “Daily Mail overtakes Sun as biggest-selling Saturday paper,” Daily Mail, December 7, 2013, https://www. 
theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/06/daily-mail-overtakes-sun-sales. 
66 “No lower; Sun says; Leading Article,” Sun, September 6, 2001, 8; “Six banned from school hate demos,” 
Sun, September 21, 2001, 16; “Smile of hope,” Sun, November 27, 2001, 24. 
67 John Reid, “Let’s build on a year of progress,” Sun, December 29, 2001, 25.  
68 Simon Jeffery, “Violence at Holy Cross school,” Guardian, September 4, 2001, accessed October 4, 2001, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/04/qanda.schools.  
69 Henry McDonald, “A hard lesson at Holy Cross,” Observer, September 9, 2001, accessed October 4, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/09/northernireland.schools.  
   
  
95 
 
Glenbryn Protesters and the CRUA 
The protesters at Holy Cross, a majority of whom came from the Glenbryn community, 
faced a media battle for public legitimacy when their protest resumed on 3 September. The 
images beamed around the world focused on the plight of the Holy Cross girls crying on 
their way to school, and these images did little to justify the protesters’ civic concerns.70 The 
goals of the protest changed with the CRUA and protesters differing among themselves as 
to their exact demands, although most proposals revolved around improving security in 
Glenbryn.71 By November, the CRUA specifically wanted a “re-design of the Ardoyne Road, 
traffic calming measures, CCTV and windows … with Perspex shutters” in order to protect 
homes from attacks.72 These demands, repeated in Northern Irish newspapers, demonstrate 
that security measures were an important part of the protest. However, in the same document 
issued at the end of the protest in November we also see that protesters wanted “concrete 
evidence that their safety, security and stability is valued”.73 This statement demonstrates that 
the protesters wanted not only physical changes to their community safety, but to know that 
their interests were ‘valued’ and that they were being listened to in a political atmosphere that 
they felt had ignored their concerns. The CRUA and other protesters used the media to 
advance their interests, especially CRUA members Anne Bill, Jim Potts and Marc Coulter. 
The protesters both used the dispute to highlight attacks on the Glenbryn area, and had their 
voices amplified to speak more broadly about their place in the ‘new’ Northern Ireland.  
The protesters and their supporters referred to ideas of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and 
‘genocide’ in order to draw attention to what they saw as the intentional violent expansion 
of nationalists into Glenbryn. Underlying this claim was the idea that Glenbryn residents 
were the true (and ignored) victims of the Holy Cross dispute. One anonymous letter to the 
editor in the Belfast Telegraph noted that the “media seem not to hear – or don’t want to hear 
– and see what happens in Protestant areas such as Whitewell, Glenbryn, South Armagh or 
of the “ethnic cleansing” which is and has been taking place”.74 This idea of Protestant 
marginalisation was reiterated by other letters to the editor, including a letter to the Community 
Telegraph declaring that the “Protestants of north Belfast have, for thirty years, been the 
victims of a sustained ethnic cleansing campaign. The IRA have sought by means of murder, 
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arson, beatings, intimidation of children and many other vile tactics to ethnically cleanse 
north Belfast of Protestants”.75 The claim of ethnic cleansing brought comparisons with 
another sectarian conflict, the Yugoslav Wars (1991 to 2001), which (coincidentally) ended 
during the protest on 12 November 2001.76 The idea of an ethnic cleansing of Protestants in 
Northern Ireland dates to at least 1994, in response to the perception of republicans carrying 
out ethnic cleansing of border areas in Northern Ireland.77 The claim of ethnic cleansing 
demonstrated in clear terms that the ‘reconciliation’ and improvement in community 
relations promised by the GFA had not materialised in north Belfast. Far from this, many 
Glenbryn residents felt they were still under siege from the PIRA who protesters believed 
could act with impunity. While the claim of ethnic cleansing may appear exaggerated, 
especially in comparison to the tens of thousands who were killed in the Yugoslav Wars, the 
idea encapsulates the protesters perception of Glenbryn’s decline as the result of a hostile 
republican force. The ethnic cleansing claim was also validated for the protesters by the 
emergence of a Catholic Reaction Force (CRF) which posted threats to Glenbryn residents 
ordering an end to the protest (see figure 10). Police doubted the authenticity of the CRF, 
especially as other seemingly fake threats began to circulate from “Members of Oldpark and 
Ardoyne Sinn Fein” which misspelt numerous words, crucially, ‘Sinn Féin’ as “Sinn Fien”.78 
Regardless, publication of the CRF’s threats, which were reported by news outlets including 
the BBC, gave some tangible evidence to the threat of violent republicanism, as voiced by 
protesters.79 Despite real nightly violence, which protesters claimed was organised by the 
PIRA, the organisation’s Army Council made no statements on the subject.  
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Figure 10.80 A photograph of Glenbryn resident, Charlie Smith, holding a letter from 
the ‘Catholic Reaction Force’ as printed in the October edition of the Shankill Mirror. 
The letter reads “stop the protest at holy cross school or you will be targetted by the 
north belfast catholic reaction force glenbryn Parade belfast [sic]”.  
 
The protest also provided a chance for Glenbryn residents to voice concerns at the ‘justice’ 
promoted by the GFA, especially the change from the RUC to the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI). Interviewed in the Shankill Mirror, protester Anne Bill said “Upper Ardoyne 
residents who, for over thirty years, have lived in fear of attacks against them by the IRA 
depended on the Security Forces to protect them. Now they feel the protector has turned 
aggressor”.81 This sentiment was reiterated by other protesters, who felt that the police had 
been heavy handed in their tactics throughout the dispute.82 The Patten Commission’s 
recommendation to select recruits equally from the Protestant and Catholic population was 
a demographic and symbolic change from the RUC’s 88 per cent Protestant makeup in 
1998.83 The change from the RUC to the PSNI was a sensitive one for unionists, many of 
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whom saw the old RUC as a legal defence against the PIRA and the historical protector of 
the Protestant community. 
The protest was also a chance for Glenbryn residents and their supporters to argue 
for their victimhood and assert that their experiences of violence were as valid as those 
reported by the parents of Holy Cross. As Peter Shirlow has noted, north Belfast reflects the 
narrative familiar in interface areas of the ‘“Collective Self’s’ suffering at the hands of the 
‘collective other’”.84 The newspaper coverage of the dispute reflected protesters’ perceived 
victimhood which impacted their views of the motives of Holy Cross parents. One letter to 
the Belfast News Letter asked how Catholic mothers could “cry about what loyalists are putting 
their children through each day, when they are the ones who are dragging them right through 
the middle of the mob. Any mother with any sense of maternal instinct left would keep her 
children as far away from angry protesters as she could. But maybe a child left emotionally 
scarred by abuse is a small price to pay to get your political agenda through to the world’s 
media”.85 A later piece in the Belfast News Letter by former DUP politician St Clair McAlister 
condemned the “republicans” who would “use their children to make a political point … 
this is not the typical behaviour of a loving parent one would expect to see in any 
circumstances”.86 From this perspective, the continual use of the Ardoyne Road by Holy 
Cross parents and children was evidence of republican influence on the Holy Cross parents, 
and a reason that the protest should continue. While local and international media broadly 
condemned the protest, protesters turned the focus towards the Holy Cross parents in order 
to establish the validity of their claim of ‘true’ victimhood.  
There was also, as critical theorist Fidelma Ashe has noted, a gendered subtext to the 
dispute, as protesters employed the “ideology of motherhood and femininity to legitimise” 
their actions and discredit the Holy Cross parents.87 The interviewees for the BBC ‘Spotlight: 
Holy Cross’ documentary, aired on 13 November 2001, expressed their feelings of 
victimhood and criticised the parenthood of the Holy Cross parents. Harry McConnell, one 
of the protesters interviewed, said that the dispute was “bringing stress on all children,” 
rather than just the children of Holy Cross.88 McConnell went on to describe how, on the 
protesters’ side “women and children were beaten by both army and police” as well as one 
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instance in which “a child, a six month old baby in a buggy was threw aside by police, as if 
you would throw your bin lid around into the bin [sic]”.89 In explaining why he believed 
protesters had been ill-treated by police, McConnell responded that, “basically I think we’re 
the easiest to touch, the Protestant people always were, it’s easier to get into the Protestant 
people and there’s less of a comeback from that”.90 Here McConnell reassesses the Troubles, 
casting Protestants as the principal victims of the conflict and nationalists as the recipients 
of favourable police treatment. This is the antithesis of the republican view of the conflict 
supported by An Phoblacht, which viewed nationalists and republicans as the victims of the 
unionist state. The categorisation of Glenbryn children as ignored victims of the dispute 
echoes the protesters’ broader concern of the ignored victimhood of the people of Glenbryn. 
Andy Cooper, another protester, said in the documentary “I’ll not bring my child in 
front of a TV camera, cause I don’t believe it’s in his best interest to do that there, and the 
one thing that concerns me is how people can put their children in front of television 
cameras, to have them used “oh this is the problems” “oh my child’s suffering”. All children 
should never suffer no matter what religion they are, but our children are suffering too”.91 
The implicit meaning of the ‘how people can put their children in front of television cameras’ 
is that the Holy Cross parents were using their children for political ends, rather than focusing 
on their children’s needs - delegitimising the moral authority of the parents. These interviews, 
show the continuing concerns of the Glenbryn residents as to how they were portrayed, and, 
protesters’ feelings of victimisation by the media. Children, Protestant and Catholic, who had 
been ubiquitous during the GFA and referendum were at the centre of attention in a dispute 
that questioned the legitimacy, meaning and purpose of the Agreement which was designed 
to free this new generation from sectarian violence. 
What role did loyalist paramilitaries play throughout the protest? Loyalist 
paramilitaries were highly visible throughout the protest, in a variety of guises. Not only were 
many current and former UDA members present on the Ardoyne Road throughout the 
dispute, masks of Johnny Adair were worn at numerous stages of the protest (see figure 11). 
However, far from continuing the protest for strategic reasons, key UDA figures wished for 
the dispute to end quickly, including Brigadiers John ‘Grugg’ Gregg, John ‘Jackie’ McDonald 
and Johnny Adair.92 On 10 November, while imprisoned, Adair called for the protest to end, 
saying “the protest has run its course and the loyalist people are being made to look bad in 
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the eyes of the media” and, “I think everybody now wants to see the protest resolved”.93 
While coverage of the dispute frequently mentioned the UDA presence at the protest, it is 
important to note that many protesters did not respond to the requests of the UDA 
brigadiers, and continued the protest for a number of weeks after Adair called for it to end. 
The pipe bombing on 5 September allowed protesters to denounce paramilitary violence as 
illegitimate, as Billy Hutchinson had done. While performing acts of violence on behalf of 
the Protestant community may have been loyalists’ perceived role throughout the Troubles, 
reactions to the pipe bombing demonstrate that protesters had entered a new phase of 
Northern Ireland’s history. Paramilitaries could no longer dictate people’s actions in the way 
they once could, and would be roundly and robustly criticised if they attempted violence. A 
rumour emerged that Sean Kelly, who had helped carry out the Shankill Road Bombing in 
1993, was present at the protest.94 Anne Cadwallader later rebuffed this claim, quoting Gerry 
Kelly who said that this idea may have been the result of two Ardoyne residents who were 
the “spitting image” of the bomber.95 Whereas loyalist paramilitaries were active throughout 
Holy Cross, the PIRA issued no statements about the dispute, although ex-PIRA members 
including Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Gerry Kelly were vocal in their support for 
the parents of Holy Cross children.96  
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Figure 11.97 The front page of the Andersonstown News from 29 October 2001 featuring 
a protester with Johnny Adair’s image and the slogan ‘Trick or Treat.’ This was the 
phrase shouted at victims of the Greysteel Massacre in 1993 as they were killed by 
members of UDA. Images like these, along with paramilitary flags and masks of Adair 
appeared throughout the protest. 
 
Protesters also criticised the use of ‘new media’ by the RTE, who established a website 
‘http://ardoyne.com’ to express their views online. The website was criticised by protester 
Marc Coulter in the Shankill Mirror, who asked if the website’s use of children was an 
“Admission of Child Abuse,” presumably because Coulter believed that it was the parents, 
rather than the protesters, subjecting the children to abuse.98 The website was also criticised 
in a letter to the editor of the Belfast Telegraph, which supposed “Holy Cross parents refused 
to use the free-from protest route in the school, but choose instead to put their children 
through the trauma we witness daily … give the world this information – it is more than 
enough”.99 New media was considered, in these opinions, to be an unfair advantage for the 
RTE not utilised by the protesters. While the voices of both sides were amplified the dispute, 
the RTE had opened a new media front in the discursive war against the CRUA – the internet 
– in which it had dominance. For victims’ groups, the use of the internet also introduced a 
form of storytelling that was entirely personal and without the need of an intermediary such 
as a newspaper or television interview to have their voices heard. The RTE’s use of this 
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relatively new means of communication coincided with the GFA’s discursive changes, 
allowing victims of violence to speak more openly than before the Troubles.  
Protesters wrote articles, gave interviews, appeared on television and in the case of 
Anne Bill, published books on their experiences of the dispute. Local, national and 
international media was largely against the continuation of the protest, but protesters used 
the dispute to express their own stories and dissatisfaction with the peace process. While the 
protest certainly focused on the issues of security and discrimination, the form of the protest 
and its continuation was born from the frustration of not being heard in the twenty-first 
century public discourse of Northern Ireland. Bill, a protester and member of CRUA, 
recorded her testimony in the self-published work Beyond the Red Gauntlet: The silent voices of 
Upper Ardoyne Amidst the travesty of Holy Cross. Bill’s work reiterates many of the grievances of 
the Glenbryn community, and explains some of their reasons for continuing the protest. The 
book’s first chapter expresses that many residents in North Belfast “share the feeling of their 
identity being stripped from them in a meticulous attempt to implement and impose the 
Good Friday Agreement – no matter the cost”.100 Bill also believed  
there was a definite feeling that Protestants had been let down by the “Good Friday 
Agreement”, most felt that the Government was out to appease those who posed 
the most severe terrorist threat, rather than protect those who felt in genuine danger. 
In the Good Friday agreement it is said “all people should live free from sectarian 
harassment” when then [sic] was the Government not listening to the appeals of the 
Protestant people of Upper Ardoyne (many who voted YES to the promised peace), 
before they had to proactively go out and protest because no one would pay 
attention.101  
 
Beyond the Red Gauntlet also quotes a 2002 letter to Bill from a concerned resident asking, 
“where is our NEW future promised under the present Good Friday Agreement?”102 Bill’s 
emphasis on the GFA was, like the protest itself, not necessarily policy focused. Rather, Bill 
connected with wider feelings of disappointment in the GFA and the peace process more 
generally. Bill’s work also emphasises the discursive powerlessness many residents felt before, 
during and after the protest. During the protest, one elderly resident is reported to have said 
“at least now people are starting to listen … they all hate us but they are listening”.103 As the 
book concludes:  
I have watched as a community responded to low-key and murderous attacks, as they 
came from being an apathetic, segregated, frustrated, degenerated, neighbourhood 
who felt they could do nothing but tolerate all the world was throwing at them, to 
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becoming a district who stood against all the odds to try as best they could to 
highlight the artificial and deceitful falsehoods being portrayed against your 
community … where you have been given some of the factual information 
surrounding the events and history of this area and not just been left to the mainly 
biased spiel of the media and Republicans; I will only then have fulfilled my objective 
for writing this sequence of events.104 
 
Bill’s concerns speak not only to the security issues of Glenbryn, but the feeling that the 
community’s voices were not being heard, leading the community to ‘highlight’ their issues 
in the face of seemingly ‘biased’ media through a protest. The self-published nature of the 
work certainly indicates that Bill’s perspective was not as valued as others. We can also read 
into her account the feeling that the GFA was meant to create a more reconciled Northern 
Ireland where people could ‘live free from sectarian harassment,’ an aim that Glenbryn 
residents did not think had been achieved. 
Critiques of the GFA from politicians, journalists and the media more generally are 
crucial to understanding the wider reactions to the dispute. Critiques coming from people 
who believe, rightly or wrongly, that they do not fit in to the ‘new’ Northern Ireland should 
be considered especially significant. While it is statistically true that by 2001, most Protestants 
no longer supported the GFA, this overall shift is more thoroughly illuminated by the Holy 
Cross dispute. Some of the greatest concerns in the 1998 referendum campaign, especially 
the fear that a political settlement would not improve reconciliation, or that justice would 
favour one community over the other, were manifested in the protest at Holy Cross.  
Holy Cross Parents and the RTE 
The Holy Cross parents and their advocates, organised under the leadership of RTE, were 
largely supported by local, national and international media. Like the Glenbryn protesters, 
the parents of Holy Cross children and their supporters had their voices amplified through 
media interest, and they used the protest to air broader concerns about the peace process. 
They also criticised the media coverage and groups that did not give them outright support, 
including Bertie Ahern and the Catholic Church. The RTE’s tactics rested on the assumption 
that if enough people around Britain, Ireland and the world knew about the dispute, then it 
would surely come to an end. 
The BBC ‘Spotlight’ special, ‘Teach the Children’ broadcast perspectives from the 
different sides of the dispute. The documentary contains no voiceover and all of the words 
are verbatim testimonies of those involved. The documentary separates the groups involved 
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into the categories of ‘Mothers,’ ‘Protesters,’ ‘Priest,’ ‘Policeman,’ ‘Glenbryn Community 
Worker’ and ‘Teacher.’ One parent interviewed, Lisa Irvine, stated “it saddens me because, 
you know, we’re the lost generation, we didn’t know any peace growing up … these children 
are the hope for the future, they weren’t supposed to grow up like this”.105 Irvine went on to 
say “for years we’ve been fighting in this country for civil rights and equality. I’m not a 
second-class citizen, my daughter is not a second-class citizen, as far as I am concerned 
apartheid has been abolished. So why then should I be sneaking in and out a back door just 
to get the right to an education?”106 Irvine’s comments consider the future created by the 
GFA, in particular, the hope that children would grow up in a Northern Ireland in which 
they were treated as equal citizens. Irvine’s statements also reflect the nationalist conceptions 
of civil rights, describing the ‘apartheid’ of the years before the peace process. Irvine’s 
testimony demonstrated that the concern for Holy Cross was more than the immediate 
protest, and reflected nationalist conceptions of the GFA as a milestone of nationalist civil 
rights in Northern Ireland. 
The subject of legal justice was an important issue for parents and their supporters. 
A letter to the editor of Andersonstown News, referred to the GFA directly, noting “under the 
Good Friday Agreement we were told “everyone has the right to live free from sectarian 
harassment”. That right is being abused every day in Ardoyne”.107 Writing in the same 
newspaper, Holy Cross parent Tanya Carmichael stated “at every point in our history 
unionists have tried to oppress us into believing we are second class citizens but this is where 
it stops. My daughters will not grow up thinking they are inferior, we are a strong group 
brought together by this abuse of our civil rights”.108 Writing for the newspaper as ‘Fr Des,’ 
columnist Desmond Wilson demanded “law and penalties first, ecumenical discussion and 
persuasion afterwards. That is the right pattern and it does work”.109 The newspaper noted 
that the “British are talking about reforming the discredited criminal justice system here. 
They could do worse than start with bringing the full weight of the law to bear on the sick 
bigots bullying schoolchildren in North Belfast”.110 One parent attempted to initiate legal 
action against the protesters, although this was ultimately unsuccessful.111 
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In addition to being the subjects of interviews, some parents of the Holy Cross 
children gave their own testimonies. For example, Elizabeth Irvine wrote an article in the 
Irish News on 30 October urging protesters, rather than parents, to take the first step towards 
ending the protest.112 A public demonstration against the Holy Cross protest occurred in 
nationalist west Belfast, where “500 people” gathered in a “demonstration of solidarity” 
organised by Sinn Féin.113 One parent even began a hunger strike.114 Holy Cross parents held 
alternative protests, most notably at Belfast City Hall and Stormont. News of the Stormont 
protest included reports that the RTE had asked to see David Trimble, but were denied 
access to the First Minister.115 These demonstrations functioned as counter-protests to those 
taking place on the Ardoyne Road, attempting to demonstrate ‘legitimate’ forms of protest, 
compared to the perceived sectarian blockade of Holy Cross. By using the media, the parents 
also responded to accusations by the protesters, especially claims of ethnic cleansing. The 
ethnic cleansing claim was rejected by the Irish News which quoted one parent as saying “this 
is ethnic cleansing,” but that it was directed at the parents, because the protesters “just don’t 
want Catholic people around here”.116 
Supporters also took to the media to defend parents from attacks. One letter to An 
Phoblacht declared that the “parents in Belfast were completely blameless in the 
circumstances. Bigots and bullies should not be allowed to force children in the back door 
by a roundabout route through another school's playground, football pitch and field. This 
would be the road to back to 1967, of second-class citizen status, resentment and despair”.117 
The claim of second class citizenship and nationalist victimhood throughout the Troubles 
was already an overriding historical metanarrative for republicans,118 and one that could be 
easily adapted for the Holy Cross dispute. 
Ardoyne = Alabama 
In addition to dismissing the ‘ethnic cleansing’ claims of the protesters, the Holy Cross 
parents and supporters issued a counter-claim: that the protests were similar to the civil rights 
movement in the Southern United States during the 1950s and 1960s. The comparison with 
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civil rights in the United States was one that had been used by the nationalist community 
since the Northern Ireland civil rights movement of the 1960s.119 A mural on the Ardoyne 
Road, drawing comparisons between Holy Cross and the African-American civil rights 
movement was made even more powerful when members of the Little Rock Nine were 
photographed with Holy Cross children (see figure 12). Laura Friel from An Phoblacht 
referred to the events in Alabama in the 1960s: “the power relationship of oppressed and 
oppressor had been exposed by the display of naked sectarianism captured on screen, just as 
it had been in Alabama decades ago”.120 The parents and the RTE used the analogy of 
Arkansas, in which the ‘Little Rock Nine’ attempted to make their way to school at the state’s 
capital in Little Rock, to make their expression of victimhood more vivid. 
 
Figure 12.121 This mural, painted in 2001, reads “Arkansas-1957” and “Ardoyne-
2001” with the phrase “It’s Black and White”. “Everyone has the right to live free 
from sectarian harassment” is painted above the picture of the Ardoyne Road. The 
phrase comes from the ‘Policing and Justice’ section of the GFA. 
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The civil rights analogy was also used by the American news media, including a letter to the 
editor of the New York Times, which evaluated that 
it was wrong in the 1950's and 60's when bigoted white Americans tried to prevent 
African-American students from attending school in the South. It was wrong in 1974 
when bigoted Irish-Americans in South Boston threw stones at the buses of African-
Americans trying to go to high school there through desegregation. And it is wrong 
today, in the 21st century, when Protestants throw rocks at small Catholic schoolgirls 
returning for a new school year.122  
 
An Phoblacht thoroughly supported the analogy: “in the words of Minister for Education 
Martin McGuinness, the time when nationalists will sit at the back of the bus or go by the 
back door are gone and gone for good,” before listing comparisons with Little Rock.123 
Indeed, Suzanne Breen, writing in the Belfast News Letter, reported “I’ve spoken to American, 
Canadian, Australian and French journalists. It isn’t just Sinn Fein making the comparisons 
with 1960s Alabama and 1957 Little Rock, Arkansas”.124 As Lisa Irvine mentioned in the 
‘Teach the Children’ documentary, “if the children were black the whole world would be up 
in arms about this”.125 This idea was utilised by the RTE, which took out full page 
advertisements in the Andersonstown News drawing the comparison between Alabama and 
Ardoyne (see figure 13). 
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Figure 13.126 An advertisement taken out by the RTE in the Andersonstown News from 
19 November 2001. The analogy that Ardoyne resembled Alabama in the 1950s was 
not just reported by the media, it was used by parents’ groups like the RTE to draw 
parallels with the African-American civil rights movement in the United States. 
 
The use of comparisons with African-American civil rights did not end with the analogies of 
Alabama and Arkansas. Throughout the dispute, the words “If we were born where they 
were born, were taught what they were taught, we would believe what they believe,” were 
written on the side of the school, attributed to United States President Abraham Lincoln.127 
There is no documented evidence that President Lincoln ever said or wrote these words. As 
with Lincoln’s verifiable words hoping for a ‘just and lasting peace,’ the usefulness of these 
phrases comes from the hope that they inspire in a peaceful, just and reconciled future. 
The Holy Cross parents were also artistically supported in a way that protesters were 
not, particularly through the submission of poems in various newspapers. A poem in the 
Andersonstown News written by ‘Black Mountain Beginner’ takes the perspective of a child 
School holidays are meant to be days full of fun, of smiles 
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Of barbecues, not bonfires, of kiss and tell with boys, 
So why is all this going on? 
When can we walk up to our school? 
The helicopters hover, watching our every move. 
We only want to smile and laugh and skip and learn again 
I hope they find the end.128 
 
Another poem published the next month ends with the lines, “We saw their faces full of 
hatred /And contorted with their screams / Some say the peace process is working / Only 
in their dreams”.129 Poetic responses such as these were one other way to keep the Holy 
Cross story in the media, and can be interpreted as an attempt to delegitimise the protest 
through an artistic medium. As with poetic responses to the Omagh bombing, these poems 
display a personal and heartfelt response to violence after the GFA, lamenting that children’s 
experiences of the peace process may only occur ‘in their dreams.’ 
The RTE used new media in its campaign against the Holy Cross protesters. Brendan 
Mailey was a former PIRA prisoner who headed the RTE. Under Mailey’s leadership, the 
RTE created a website in November in an attempt to end the protest (see figure 14). Websites 
such as these further contributed to the competition of ‘victimhoods,’ especially at interfaces 
between republican and loyalist communities.130 Mailey said that a website “was the best and 
fastest way of getting that information across” to the world and that the RTE was “expecting 
a lot of ‘hits,’ especially from America, and we hope the website will publicise the issue and 
keep the focus on the protest”.131 The North Belfast News claimed that the website’s petition 
had garnered thousands of signatures “it is expanding and mushrooming like a kind of chain 
letter around the world”.132  
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Figure 14.133 A screenshot from the now defunct ‘http://ardoyne.com/’ website, 
created by the RTE. The website contained numerous pages that formed the parents’ 
key arguments throughout the dispute, including reference to human rights and the 
comparisons with ‘Arkansas 1957.’ The web site’s main page reads “Vulnerable 
children in Belfast are now the targets of a small group of racist/sectarian bigots who 
gather on a daily basis to inflict physical, verbal and emotional abuse upon them”.134  
 
Threats were made by the loyalist Red Hand Defenders (RHD) against parents walking up 
the Ardoyne Road while the UDA made threats against police officers for continuing to 
escort children to Holy Cross.135 Loyalist paramilitaries also threatened to recruit snipers to 
shoot parents if they continued to walk up the Ardoyne road.136 The impact of the dispute 
on the health of the children involved was also revealed in the news. The BBC reported that 
a local general practitioner prescribed sedatives and tranquilisers to Holy Cross children as a 
result of the dispute, while also detailing the behavioural effects on the children of the nearby 
Wheatfield Primary School.137 The trauma experienced by the children was also used as a 
discussion point for the victimhood of the Ardoyne community and more broadly the trauma 
of people in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, especially in north Belfast. One protester 
went as far as to say that “our children are as much traumatised as any other, but if I had to 
go down to the lower Ardoyne Road and seen that happening, I wouldn't put my child 
through that [sic]”.138 As the Belfast News Letter reported, the “ongoing unrest is symptomatic 
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of the fears and apprehensions of two distinct and highly-polarised communities, seriously 
traumatised by 30 years of the murder and mayhem of the Troubles”.139 A parent of one 
Wheatfield child claimed that “I have known nothing but the Troubles and I hoped that 
things would be better for our children”.140 These statements reveal that the generational 
hopes for peace were not confined to Holy Cross parents or nationalist publications such as 
the Irish News, as many protesters and Glenbryn residents shared these fading expectations 
of the peace process. 
Tony Blair did not comment directly on the dispute, although reports were sent to 
him informing the Prime Minister of the situation.141 Bertie Ahern issued a statement calling 
the protest a “shameful spectacle of sectarian harassment” as early as 19 September.142 Ahern 
met with Fr Aidan Troy, the chair of the governors of Holy Cross, on numerous occasions, 
and President Mary McAleese wrote in support of the Holy Cross parents and children.143 
Despite this high-profile support, the protest continued, and the perceived ‘silence’ from 
Irish and British politicians and institutions was seen as implicit support for the protesters. 
The impact of this silence was evident in a letter to the Andersonstown News where the writer 
lamented that “the greatest shame when all of this is over, the greatest hurt visited upon the 
children of Holy Cross Primary School will be by those who did nothing and who by their 
silence encouraged the ‘peaceful’ protesters”.144 The expectation of wider support was then 
directed at other politicians who had not commented on the dispute, with one article from 
the Andersonstown News quoting Liz Murphy, a Holy Cross mother, who said it was “time now 
to have this stopped, we need people like Bertie Ahern and leading organisations to come 
out in open support of our children”.145 The November article commented that parents “say 
the silence from Taoiseach Bertie Ahern is deafening … I think it is despicable that Bertie 
Ahern would remain silent … if this violent protest against our children was taking place 
south of the border I am sure Mr Ahern would not be so indifferent in his response”.146 The 
silence from other groups was also noted, especially the perceived lack of support from the 
Catholic Church. One article in the North Belfast News asked “school girls as young as five 
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and their parents are bombarded with obscenities, pipe bombs, fireworks and any other 
abomination loyalists can think of … why is the Catholic Church as a body not giving visible 
support to the Catholic children of Holy Cross?”147 Members of the Church hierarchy as well 
as their Protestant counterparts did criticise the events surrounding Holy Cross,148 but had 
little influence in stopping Glenbryn residents from continuing the protest. Instead, the 
church largely relied on the leadership of the Chair of the Holy Cross Board of Governors 
Father Aidan Troy in addition to Father Gary Donegan, who both walked with parents and 
children throughout the protest. The perception of silence from the Catholic Church and 
the Irish government, institutions with historic ties to the nationalist community, increased 
the sense of isolation among the parents of Holy Cross, and, the feeling that their voices 
were being heard, but not valued. The expectation that the Irish government would intervene 
may also be a legacy of the GFA, which had promised a greater involvement of the Irish 
Republic in Northern Ireland. 
Reflection on the Ardoyne protest continued in the years that followed the Holy 
Cross dispute. In 2002, the ‘Ardoyne Commemoration Project,’ asked 300 people to describe 
their experiences of Ardoyne since the 1960s, covering the Troubles and the Holy Cross 
dispute. The aim of the project was to 
give control and ownership over what is written about victims to their relatives and 
friends. It is primarily a community project and one defined by the importance of 
writing ‘history from below’. The book offers a platform for the community to ‘write 
back’ and set the record straight … these unheard voices of ordinary people will enter 
the public discourse. In doing so they will reclaim an important part of their history 
for future generations. Who better to tell that story than those who have experienced 
political violence first hand? If the history of the conflict is to be written well, we 
believe these very powerful and poignant testimonies can, and must, be allowed to 
speak for themselves.149 
 
Similarly, the authors noted that the people in Ardoyne believed that the media had been 
manipulated to minimise their suffering. Throughout the Troubles, the media’s 
control of information, had a devastating effect on the lives of the ordinary people 
of Ardoyne. At the heart of the conflict in the north of Ireland was a struggle over 
the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. The battle for legitimacy was fought 
out as much in the media as elsewhere.150 
 
This work in many ways mirrors features of Anne Bill’s account of the Holy Cross dispute. 
Not only were both works intended to ‘set the record straight,’ they both intended to ensure 
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that ‘unheard’ voices entered Northern Ireland’s public discourse. Anne Cadwallader’s work 
of the same year Holy Cross: The Untold Story also focuses on personal testimony, and compiles 
a wide-ranging series of interviews with dozens of people involved in the Holy Cross dispute. 
Cadwallader blames both unionist and nationalist politicians, singling out the “populist 
approach” of the DUP and the UUP’s electoral decline.151 The book’s description of 
nationalist politicians is no more flattering, as “neither their own political parties nor the Irish 
government were effective in persuading London to act swiftly to bring the protest to an 
end. They were, as usual, themselves alone”.152 Cadwallader concludes that the protest was  
undoubtedly, the result of the continuing failure of politicians in the North to deliver 
what the electorate expected and wanted from the peace process. Holy Cross is yet 
another example of many showing the continuing weakness and fault lines in the 
Irish peace process. An uneasy peace now prevails on the Ardoyne/Glenbryn 
interface, but it is imposed from outside rather than negotiated from within and 
therefore unstable and liable to fissures.153  
 
The peace Cadwallader mentions as being ‘imposed from outside rather than negotiated from 
within,’ reflects the fear that political changes in Northern Ireland would not necessarily 
result in communal reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics, despite the hopes 
created by the GFA. These ideas are also revealed in Cadwallader’s interviewees. For 
example, ‘Martha’ recalled how after the GFA  
we were going to be given equal rights as everyone else. This was brilliant, this was 
going to be different … my children were going to have equal rights and be treated 
properly … the Agreement meant it wouldn’t matter where you came from, you were 
going to have a chance and not be looked down on. It was about an end to all that 
was rotten in this society. I know that sounds foolish naïve and ‘pie in the sky’, but 
that was how our family genuinely viewed it.154  
 
This passage encapsulates the nationalist response to the dispute and the hopelessness that 
equality, a better future and improved civil rights had not yet been achieved.  
Fr Aidan Troy, parish priest and chairman of the Holy Cross Board of Governors, 
had his account of the protest, Holy Cross: A Personal Experience, published in 2005. Fr Troy 
linked the dispute to the fact that Northern Ireland did not have a Truth and Reconciliation 
project like South Africa, lamenting that “we don’t have Archbishop Desmond Tutu to lead 
such a listening body”.155 Unlike Cadwallader, Fr Troy emphasised the problems associated 
with both communal relations and marginalised voices: “we must find a way of letting the 
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painful stories and even the hatred be released … everyone who wants to tell their story must 
be heard”.156 In releasing his recollections to the public through a Dublin-based publisher, 
Fr Troy’s version of the Holy Cross dispute had a far greater reach than Anne Bill’s account, 
which was self-published and less widely available. Fr Troy wrote that, among other 
recommendations, in order to ease tensions in the area, “why not open an internet café in 
the Family Centre and let our young people know that the World Wide Web has more to 
unite us than anything that divides us in North Belfast?”157 This optimistic assertion of the 
power of the internet underestimates the medium’s ability to create powerful divisions - hate 
groups, bullying, trolling and other less than inclusive features. Last, Fr Troy concludes A 
Personal Experience by hoping that the “children of the children of Holy Cross will never know 
the pain their parents went through”.158 This optimism for future children consciously or 
unconsciously echoed the focus on children as agents of reconciliation and hope for the 
future during the 1998 referendum campaign, hopes now confined to the next generation. 
The “Untold Story”? 
The Holy Cross dispute had ramifications far beyond what may be expected from a localised 
quarrel. The dispute demonstrated the limits of new discourses of justice and reconciliation 
and the lack of empowerment experienced by both unionists and nationalists who felt left 
out of the peace process. The divisions between the Glenbryn and Ardoyne communities 
were political, religious and cultural, but one of the few things that united these communities 
was the belief that their voices were not being heard in the ‘new’ Northern Ireland. Few 
journalists focused on the protests in the years after Holy Cross. One exception was English 
author and journalist Beatrix Campbell writing in the Guardian in December 2003: “two years 
on the question remains: why was no one with any power prepared to take the side of a 
group of small Catholic schoolgirls?”159 Many did side with the parents and children of Holy 
Cross, a majority of the media in Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland, as well as civil and 
religious figures including Mary McAleese and Desmond Tutu. Despite this support, 
Glenbryn residents were determined to continue the protest, as Bill’s account demonstrates, 
because it empowered a marginalised community that felt it had no other avenue of 
expression. Only three years after the GFA no group - political, social or paramilitary - felt 
that they had the power to end the dispute. Despite the new focus on peace, justice and 
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reconciliation and a decline in paramilitary violence, communal tensions, mistrust, suspicion 
and hatred meant that the dispute continued for many weeks. Perhaps the Holy Cross dispute 
reveals that, as some commentators noted in 1998, reconciliation in Northern Ireland 
required more than political settlement – it demanded fundamental changes in the 
relationships between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland.  
The BBC released a docudrama entitled Holy Cross in 2003 telling a fictionalised 
account of the dispute (see figure 15). In this retelling of Holy Cross, parents and protesters 
were represented in somewhat caricatured forms. In the film, protesters drink heavily and 
reflect on the decline of Glenbryn while the father of the central Ardoyne family is an ex-
PIRA member.160 The director Mark Brozel described how “news tends to tell stories in a 
very black and white way … it also desensitises us to the pain and experiences of the 
individuals involved. What a drama like Holy Cross can do is give people a really strong 
emotional connection with what people actually go through”.161 The film’s emphasis on 
revealing ‘what people actually go through’ overlooks the extent to which both sides of the 
dispute consciously used the media to have their voices heard. Like Cadwallader’s Untold Story 
and the Ardoyne Commemoration Project’s Untold Truth, the BBC’s rendering of the dispute 
implied that the voices of those involved needed to be uncovered. The voices of those 
involved in the dispute were (and are) openly available, in the form of interviews, newspaper 
reports, television broadcasts, websites and later through published (and self-published) 
autobiographies. 
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Figure 15.162 Two actors from the 2003 BBC film Holy Cross. The film appeared two 
years after the dispute concluded and was filmed in Manchester. The film’s message 
was that reconciliation had still not occurred in Northern Ireland and it used peace 
walls as a metaphor for the physical separation between Glenbryn and Ardoyne 
residents. 
 
Whereas the Omagh bombing had reinforced aspects of the GFA through public ceremonies 
of ecumenism and reconciliation, the Holy Cross dispute projected a divided, flawed 
situation that all of the institutions created by GFA could not resolve. Neither protesters nor 
Holy Cross parents could agree on a solution, or even agree upon the events surrounding 
the origin of the dispute. Even after the protest, participants wrote autobiographies to tell 
‘their side’ of the story. If discourse is about power, then the Holy Cross dispute was about 
powerlessness, felt and expressed by the protesters and parents of Holy Cross. By continuing 
the protest, Glenbryn residents regained some of the discursive power they believed they 
had lost through a lack of media coverage concerning their personal security. Similarly, 
parents were empowered to speak more broadly about their hopes for the GFA. In the 
absence of effective political action, protesters and parents used the media to shape the 
dispute and used their amplified voices to discuss the GFA, achieve their own ideas of justice 
and argue for their victimhood in the violence surrounding Holy Cross. The Omagh justice 
campaign demonstrated the potential that non-paramilitary campaigns had to achieve justice. 
Holy Cross on the other hand showed the limitations of this approach, because for parents, 
children and the RTE, all the media attention and support in the world did not end the 
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protest quickly. The dispute demonstrated that many in Northern Ireland felt that peace was 
a long-term project, pursuing justice was challenging and that despite the hopes of 1998, 
reconciliation would be extremely difficult to achieve. 
   
  
118 
 
Chapter 4: The Murder of Robert McCartney, 
2005 
 
 
Figure 16.1 Bridgeen Hagans, Donna, Paula, Claire, Gemma and Catherine McCartney 
(left to right). A little over fifty days had passed from McCartney’s murder to the family’s 
trip to the United States, and some other victims of violence believed that the McCartney 
family were receiving disproportionate attention compared to other victims of 
paramilitary violence.  
 
This chapter examines the public discourse surrounding the 2005 murder of Robert 
McCartney and the McCartney family’s justice campaign (see figure 16). McCartney’s murder 
ignited a public dialogue between paramilitaries, politicians and the public over the meaning 
of ‘justice’ after the GFA. After outlining the events leading to the murder, I will examine 
the media response and the McCartney family’s justice initiatives. Two aspects of this case 
merit particular attention: the family’s public dialogue with the PIRA and the contrast 
between the public response to the McCartney family campaign and other victims’ groups. 
Why did Robert McCartney’s murder, just one of dozens of paramilitary murders committed 
after the GFA, inspire such strong national and international interest? I argue that the 
McCartney family’s campaign was not only a case of good media management and public 
popularity, it was facilitated by the discursive space created by the GFA, a space in which 
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paramilitaries could be publicly challenged. Equally, however, the McCartney family’s justice 
campaign, like that of the Omagh relatives and Holy Cross parents and protesters, also 
demonstrated the limits of the ‘justice’ promised by the Agreement. This new discourse 
empowered some victims and victims’ groups after the Agreement. Others were not so lucky.  
“Not a Bullet – Not an Ounce” 
The murder of Robert McCartney became infamous in the context of the unresolved issue 
of paramilitary decommissioning. In 1998, section seven of the GFA outlined the 
commitment of all parties to “achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within 
two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement”.2 
Decommissioning was particularly important to unionists,3 who saw it as an assurance that 
the PIRA would not re-engage in violence against the Protestant community. In the dying 
hours of talks surrounding the GFA, Tony Blair wrote a letter to David Trimble, assuring 
him that Sinn Féin could be excluded from the new Assembly if decommissioning did not 
occur within two years.4 The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning 
(IICD) was established in 1997 to oversee this process, which was slow at best. The PIRA 
announced it had begun to decommission its weapons after agreeing to proposals by the 
IICD in August 2001, only to then reverse this decision.5 This slow progress and the 
reluctance of republicans to support decommissioning led to graffiti in Belfast reading “Not 
a Bullet – Not an Ounce,” representing the PIRA’s intransigence towards destroying its 
arsenal.6 
Why did decommissioning of PIRA weapons take so long? According to political 
scientist Eamonn O’Kane, decommissioning was a “powerful bargaining chip that 
republicans used to secure concessions from the other participants in the process”.7 
Acknowledging the impact of the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks in the United States, the PIRA 
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agreed to decommission part of its arsenal,8 as the Bush administration was expected to take 
a harsher line against the PIRA than former President Clinton.9 In October 2001, the IICD 
confirmed that it had witnessed the PIRA destroy a portion of its arsenal.10 More arms were 
destroyed in 2002 and 2003 before the IICD confirmed that “all arms in the IRA’s 
possession” had been decommissioned by September 2005.11 These milestones came well 
after the two-year timeline proposed by the GFA, and by 2005, prisoners had been released 
and Sinn Féin members were part of the Northern Ireland Assembly.  
The extremely slow progress of PIRA decommissioning had created a chaotic 
political situation in Northern Ireland at the beginning of 2005. The spectre of 
decommissioning haunted David Trimble, as his party’s cooperation with Sinn Féin was 
based on hopes of decommissioning and ultimately, the PIRA’s eventual disbandment. The 
two largest parties at the time of the GFA, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Social and 
Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), were losing support after the 2001 Westminster election. 
Sinn Féin had become the largest nationalist party in 2003 while the Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) overtook the UUP in the 2005 Westminster election.12 After the GFA, unionists 
grew increasingly suspicious of the plausibility of decommissioning, in part because Blair had 
implicitly linked republican participation in the new Assembly with prisoner releases and 
decommissioning.13 The DUP’s anti-Agreement stance helped the party to win a majority of 
the unionist vote, profiting from its uncomplicated message of opposition to the GFA, UUP 
and Sinn Féin.14 
Political scandals stoked tensions between Sinn Féin and its potential partners in 
government. The revelation of the ‘Stormontgate’ spy-ring in October 2002, when it was 
alleged that Sinn Féin’s offices at Stormont Castle had been used as part of a PIRA spy 
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operation, further isolated Sinn Féin from the other political parties.15 The Northern Ireland 
Assembly, one of the foundations of the GFA, was subsequently suspended. According to 
Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid, the suspension was due to republicans needing to 
make a “choice between violence and democracy,” and paramilitaries’ “continuing alleged 
violence”.16 These comments hinted at both Stormontgate and recent allegations that PIRA 
members were training guerrilla groups in Columbia. Suspicions surrounding PIRA and Sinn 
Féin criminality worsened as a result of the Northern Bank robbery on 20 December 2004. 
Over £25 million was stolen in the largest bank robbery in British history, with police 
pointing to the PIRA as the likely perpetrators.17 In addition to association with criminal 
activities, Sinn Féin had not accepted key aspects of the GFA. The party, for example, did 
not recognise the authority of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), established in 
2001 as a result of the 1999 Patten Report and structured to make policing more acceptable 
to the nationalist community.  
Political loyalism fared little better. The loyalist feud of 2000 to 2002 ended with the 
banishment of Johnny Adair and his associates from Northern Ireland, who had attempted 
to take control of the UDA. Far from this being the end to loyalist violence, attacks continued 
as the UDA, UVF and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) feuded, with loyalist paramilitaries 
responsible for 28 deaths between 2002 and 2006.18 Facing electoral defeats, the UDA-
aligned Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) disbanded in 2001, while the UVF-aligned 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) lost one of its two seats in the 2003 Assembly election. On 
the republican side, despite the public backlash from the Omagh bombing, the Real Irish 
Republican Army (Real IRA or RIRA) and Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
continued their campaigns of violence. Community relations, although bolstered by funding 
from bodies including the European Union (EU), still faced difficulties, demonstrated by 
yearly rioting during the July-August marching season. Communal segregation also increased. 
In the years after the GFA, Belfast contained more ‘peace walls’ than it had during the 
Troubles.19 Without paramilitary decommissioning, the resumption of the Assembly or 
                                                          
15 “Stormontgate: how events unfolded,” Irish Times, December 17, 2005, accessed December 7, 2016, http:// 
www.irishtimes.com/news/stormontgate-how-events-unfolded-1.1287301. 
16 “Assembly suspended over ‘lack of trust’,” BBC News, October 14, 2002, accessed December 4, 2017, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2325833.stm. 
17 Henry Patterson, Ireland Since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict (London: Penguin, 2007), 354. 
18 David McKittrick et al., Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern 
Ireland troubles, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2007), 1553. 
19 Peter Shirlow, “Belfast: a segregated city,” in Northern Ireland after the Troubles: A Society in Transition, eds. 
Colin Coulter and Michael Murray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 78. 
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significant desegregation, it was difficult in 2005 to see the dividends of the peace, justice or 
reconciliation promised by the Agreement. 
Against this background the murder of Robert McCartney became international 
news. Robert McCartney died at 8:10 am on 31 January 2005 in the intensive care unit of 
Belfast’s Royal Victoria Hospital (see figure 17). McCartney had been stabbed the previous 
night outside Belfast’s Magennis’ Bar20 after a fight by men who were widely alleged to be 
members of the PIRA.21 Unlike many other paramilitary murders post-GFA, the suspected 
involvement of Sinn Féin members meant that McCartney’s death attracted huge domestic 
and international attention as well as having a direct political impact on Sinn Féin, the PIRA 
and the peace process more generally. The impact of the murder was accentuated by the 
justice campaign of the McCartney family: Robert’s sisters Catherine, Paula, Claire, Donna, 
Gemma, and his fiancé Bridgeen Hagans.22 The McCartney family’s campaign inspired 
widespread support, but perhaps more pointedly, their campaign reflected how victims of 
violence could challenge paramilitary organisations in ways that would have been unthinkable 
prior to the GFA. While paramilitary murders did not stop after the GFA, this chapter 
demonstrates how, by 2005, the reaction to them had changed significantly.  
 
                                                          
20 The bar was subsequently named ‘Ronnie Drews’ after the Dubliners’ iconic singer. 
21 Ashleigh Wallace and Jonathan McCambridge, “Two men quizzed over murder of Short Strand dad,” 
Belfast Telegraph, February 1, 2005, accessed October 10, 2016, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/imported/ 
two-men-quizzed-over-murder-of-short-strand-dad-28219493.html. 
22 Catherine, Paula, Claire, Donna, Gemma McCartney and Bridgeen Hagans are usually collectively referred 
to as the ‘McCartney Sisters.’ In this chapter, I use the term ‘McCartney family’ to include Bridgeen’s 
contributions to the family’s justice campaign. 
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Figure 17.23 Robert McCartney (right) with his son Conlaed (left). McCartney was 
murdered by suspected PIRA members after a bar fight on 30 January, 2005. 
 
Robert McCartney was from the Short Strand area of east Belfast, a strongly republican area 
of the city separated by high walls from east Belfast’s loyalist community. Throughout the 
Troubles, the area had been a hotbed of republican support, and had often come under attack 
from its neighbours, especially around the July-August marching season. One of the key 
events in the formation of the PIRA occurred in the Short Strand, during the 1970 ‘Battle of 
St. Matthews’ when PIRA snipers held off loyalists attempting to invade the area.24 
McCartney’s murder attracted both domestic and international attention because he had been 
murdered by the PIRA – the supposed protectors of the Short Strand. The men who allegedly 
carried out the murder, the subsequent forensic ‘clean-up’ of Magennis’ Bar and the 
intimidation of witnesses were reported from 2 February onwards, in the Irish News and Belfast 
News Letter, to be members of the PIRA.25 It was then revealed that these suspects were also 
Sinn Féin members and the party (temporarily) suspended their memberships.26 
                                                          
23 Michael Seamark, “Man cleared of 'IRA' killing as 71 witnesses saw nothing,” Daily Mail, June 28, 2008, 
accessed October 16, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1029938/Man-cleared-IRA-killing-71-
witnesses-saw-nothing.html#ixzz4NUh3PQb4.  
24 Peter Taylor, Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 75-78. 
25 Joanne Lowry, “Murder probe police are attacked again,” Belfast News Letter, February 2, 2005, 5; Maeve 
Connolly, “Two still being questioned over stabbing,” Irish News, February 2, 2005, 5.  
26 “Provo squad "beat up SF worker in interrogation",” Belfast News Letter, March 10, 2005, 4. 
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Walls of Silence: The McCartney Family’s Campaign 
Murders after the GFA were often categorised as a matter of concern only for paramilitaries, 
and given the morbid explanation of ‘internal housekeeping,’ a euphemism famously used by 
the office of Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mo Mowlam in 1999.27 But whereas 
McCartney’s friend who was injured in the bar fight, Brendan Devine, had a criminal history 
relating to drugs, and apparent debts to the PIRA, McCartney had no such involvement.28 
His lack of paramilitary involvement and reports in the media that he was defending Devine 
from violence, reinforced the categorisation of McCartney as the innocent victim of 
republican violence.29 The McCartney family’s campaign not only benefited from these 
circumstantial elements of this case, like the Omagh victims and others, they also used media 
attention in an attempt to pursue ‘justice.’ 
 Initially, the family called on the dozens of potential witnesses in Magennis’ Bar to 
come forward to the PSNI with any information they possessed about the murder. The 
family organised a protest in the Short Strand in February 2005 followed by a vigil outside 
Magennis’ Bar in April, adding further publicity to their cause. The McCartney family’s 
insistence that witnesses go to the police exposed a tension between Sinn Féin and the police, 
as the party did not yet recognise the authority of the PSNI. Gerry Adams called on witnesses 
with reservations about giving information to the PSNI to instead, “give any information 
they might have either to the family, a solicitor or any other authoritative or reputable person 
or body,” stressing no one involved in the murder “acted as a republican or on behalf of 
republicans”.30 These carefully worded statements demonstrated Sinn Féin’s public support 
for the McCartney’s justice campaign and its lack of acceptance of the PSNI, while also 
denying direct Sinn Féin or PIRA involvement in the murder. Adams also indicated some 
level of knowledge of who actually committed the crime. ‘Acting’ as a republican is a flexible 
term and does not explicitly say that those suspects were not members of the PIRA or Sinn 
Féin. Adams’ phrase ‘on behalf of republicans’ implies that the murder was not sanctioned 
by either Sinn Féin or the PIRA’s Army Council. Paula McCartney confirmed two weeks 
                                                          
27 “‘Murder as Housekeeping’ Row Hits Mowlam,” Daily Mail, August 10, 1999, 2. 
28 “McCartney murder book prejudices trial: accused – Irish News,” CAIN Web Service, November 1, 2007, 
accessed January 20, 2017, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/newspapers/irish_news/ 
morris_in_011107.pdf. 
29 News Report, “BBC Newsline,” broadcast February 14, 2005, accessed March 2, 2016, BBC Northern 
Ireland Video Archive, Belfast. 
30 “Adams in appeal to catch killers,” BBC News, February 14, 2005, accessed December 23, 2016, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4263359.stm. 
   
  
125 
 
after the murder that “we know it was done by members of the Provisional IRA. We are fully 
aware of this and we also know the IRA did not sanction it”.31  
By the middle of February, the McCartney family stated that Sinn Féin was not doing 
enough to bring Robert’s killers to justice and that witnesses to the crime were being 
intimidated.32 Following visits to the Dáil Éireann and Downing Street respectively, Irish 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and Prime Minister Blair offered public support to the McCartney 
family. Media exposure and endorsements from British and Irish politicians contributed to 
the mounting criticism of Sinn Féin’s handling of the murder, but did little to identify and 
prosecute key suspects. The PSNI claimed that their slow progress in charging suspects was 
due to the lack of witnesses to the crime, despite more than seventy people being reported 
at Magennis’ Bar on the night McCartney was murdered. In early February, Sinn Féin 
expelled three members it believed were involved in the murder and in March, suspended 
seven others, although they were eventually readmitted to the party.33 During this time, the 
family continued to cite the suspected intimidation of witnesses to the murder as a barrier to 
convicting Robert’s killers.34 Throughout, the case highlighted the awkward balances 
between old loyalties of republican solidarity and Sinn Féin’s new accountability as the largest 
nationalist party in Northern Ireland. 
The McCartney family also walked an important line between remaining republicans, 
while disavowing republican violence and remaining apolitical, both necessary for their 
public persona. In an interview with the London Times, Paula McCartney described Robert’s 
murderers as “psychopaths who have been empowered” while also noting the impact on 
Sinn Féin’s electoral prospects, as “Sinn Fein voters have come up to me and said, ‘If we’d 
known this was going to be the price of peace, we'd have thought twice about voting’”.35 The 
GFA loomed large in Paula McCartney’s statement as a dividing line in the legitimacy of 
PIRA violence. In a later interview, Paula McCartney noted “in my opinion the IRA men of 
those days were more honourable than they are now … a lot of it’s to do with a different 
                                                          
31 Ashleigh Wallace, ‘“We know the Provos killed Robert’,” Belfast Telegraph, February 14, 2005, accessed 
January 10, 2017, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/imported/we-know-the-provos-killed-robert-
28238420.html. 
32 David McKittrick, “Denials ring hollow as fury grows at IRA over father's murder,” Belfast Telegraph, 
February 15, 2005, accessed January 10, 2017, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/imported/denials-ring-
hollow-as-fury-grows-at-ira-over-fathers-murder-28238391.html.  
33 “SF suspends members over killing,” BBC News, March 3, 2005, accessed January 15, 2017, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4316767.stm. 
34 Thomas Harding, “IRA is still intimidating witnesses, say sisters in relentless pursuit of killers,” Telegraph, 
March 10, 2005, accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1485300/IRA-is-still-
intimidating-witnesses-say-sisters-in-relentless-pursuit-of-killers.html. 
35 David Lister, “Fiancée leads crusade against IRA killers,” Times, February 14, 2005, 14. 
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calibre of people, abuse of power, idle hands and psychopathic tendencies”.36 The 
implication of this statement was that PIRA violence in the Troubles was legitimised by the 
circumstances of the time, particularly in defending the Short Strand, but that those 
conditions had now changed. Drawing this distinction was crucial to the family’s status as 
true ‘republicans’ from the Short Strand, while also allowing them to criticise McCartney’s 
murderers and Sinn Féin’s ambivalent support. 
In addition to the effective use of the media, the McCartney’s gained prominence in 
other forms of recognition and valorisation that were part of the cultural context of the GFA. 
They received many accolades, including sharing the Daily Mail’s ‘Women of the Year’ award 
for 2005. When it was revealed to the McCartney family backstage that Margaret Thatcher 
was also receiving an award for ‘Woman of the Year,’ the family decided not to share the 
stage with the former Prime Minister. They cited Thatcher’s (reciprocated) antagonism 
towards republicans during her tenure as Prime Minister, especially during the 1981 Hunger 
Strikes.37 This move attracted some criticism, notably from Sir Bernard Ingham, Thatcher’s 
former Press Secretary. Ingham called the family’s actions a “monumental hypocrisy,” and 
his comments were reported in British tabloids such as the Daily Telegraph.38 Conversely, the 
Irish News reported the comments of Lord Tebbit, another Thatcher minister injured in the 
PIRA’s 1984 Brighton bombing. While Tebbit wondered “if they have done it on their own 
initiative or if they were advised to do it,” his lordship sympathised with the family’s actions, 
stating that the family had “got trouble enough with the Sinn Fein/IRA people and it would 
enable Sinn Fein/IRA to justify its treatment of the McCartney family if they were to share 
a platform with Lady Thatcher”.39 The family released a statement following the event, 
saying: “our campaign is one of justice and as an Irish republican family we feel we cannot 
share the same platform with a former prime minister who inflicted injustices on our 
community”.40 Ingham’s assertion mirrors much of the coverage of the campaign that 
wondered who was controlling the family, but at least reflected the family’s strategy of 
retaining republican credentials while remaining officially apolitical. The family met 
numerous times with republican leaders, including Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and 
Gerry Kelly, while receiving some political advice from the SDLP. The McCartney family 
                                                          
36 David Sharrock, “‘We did not plan to damage the IRA - the killers did that’,” Times, March 2, 2005, 30. 
37 Catherine McCartney, Walls of Silence (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2007), 210-213. 
38 “McCartney sisters' Thatcher snub 'hypocritical',” Daily Telegraph, November 4, 2005, accessed December 9, 
2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1502236/McCartney-sisters-Thatcher-snub-hypocritical.html. 
39 Marie Louise McCrory, “McCartneys hypocrites: ex-PM's press secretary,” Irish News, November 5, 2005, 7. 
40 “McCartney sisters snub Thatcher at London awards,” Irish Times, November 3, 2005, accessed December 
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also attended Sinn Féin’s 2005 Ard Fheis, receiving a standing ovation upon entering. In 
these ways, the family’s management of these relationships demonstrated the agency that 
some victims of violence possessed after the GFA. The family were not only subjects of 
media and political manoeuvring, they actively shaped their media profile to their advantage.  
Family members even considered running for political office, in particular, standing 
for the Belfast City Council election in May 2005. Advising them to “be very careful” in an 
interview on the BBC’s Radio Ulster, Martin McGuinness cautioned that any move “into the 
world of party political politics [could], do a huge disservice to their campaign,” potentially 
bringing “dismay and disillusion [to] an awful lot of people, tens of thousands of people who 
support them in their just demands”.41 These comments by the former PIRA commander 
were reported domestically and internationally as a ‘warning’ against the McCartney family.42 
McGuinness’ comments also revealed a sensitivity to the intrusion of victims into a domain 
of politics still incompletely distanced from paramilitary organisations. It also registered that 
at least some of the family’s power came from an apolitical campaign, one that challenged 
the legitimacy of the still fragile and incomplete political settlement the GFA had promised.  
In response to the lack of progress in convicting their brother’s killers, the McCartney 
family accepted an invitation to the United States in order to bring their case to influential 
American lawmakers. It was hoped that such agents might have been able to lever change 
through external influence. The speed with which the family arrived was astonishing – less 
than fifty days had passed since Robert’s death on 31 January 2005 to the McCartney’s 
reception at the White House on 17 March (Saint Patrick’s Day). Women from the working-
class Short Strand, previously unknown to the world’s media, would now meet with President 
George W. Bush (see figure 18). In their meeting, the McCartney family gave President Bush 
a dossier of information relating to the murder. The family also met Senators Edward 
Kennedy, John McCain and Hillary Clinton. In comparison to the warm welcome that Bush 
bestowed upon the McCartney family, no Northern Irish politicians were invited to the 
White House for Saint Patrick’s Day, the first time this had occurred since the GFA. Bertie 
Ahern introduced the family to President Bush, and the Taoiseach had tentatively supported 
the family since their visit to the Dáil. This was, as journalist Ed Moloney noted, the “Bush 
                                                          
41 “Party politics warning to sisters,” BBC News, March 14, 2005, accessed October 28, 2016, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4349183.stm. Square brackets added. 
42 David Teather and Angelique Chrisafis, “McGuinness warns McCartney sisters,” Guardian, March 15, 2005, 
accessed January 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/mar/15/northernireland.northernireland; 
“Warning for murdered man's family,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 16, 2005, accessed January 9, 2017, 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Warning-for-murderedmansfamily/2005/03/15/1110649203172. 
html. 
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administration’s way of signalling its displeasure over the Northern Bank Robbery and Sinn 
Fein’s part in it … a sign that the Americans were ready to take a tougher line with the Provos 
than either Tony Blair or Bertie Ahern would ever contemplate”.43 This signal was interpreted 
as a profound snub to Northern Irish politicians, but especially to Gerry Adams, whose 
American fundraising was a key source of Sinn Féin’s revenue. The sudden high profile of 
the McCartney family, and their potential threat to republican electoral prospects, led to the 
family’s trip to the United States being described in the Andersonstown News as “Unionism on 
Tour”.44 This statement reflects the view that the McCartney family were pawns of the 
unionist establishment, presumably because their campaign in some way questioned the 
legitimacy of Sinn Féin from within the republican community. 
 
 
Figure 18.45 Paula McCartney, Bridgeen Hagans, Catherine McCartney meet with 
President George W. Bush, accompanied by Bertie Ahern (left to right). 
 
In order to keep pressure on the PIRA and Sinn Féin, the family also attended a session of 
the European Parliament in April 2005. By this stage of their campaign, the family publicly 
considered pursuing a civil case against Robert’s killers rather than waiting for criminal 
proceedings, citing the example of the Omagh families’ (ongoing) civil action campaign.46 As 
with their Washington trip, the family met various Members of the European Parliament 
                                                          
43 Moloney, Secret History, 553.  
44 Jim Cusack, “Adams runs risk of US ban after Kennedy attack,” Irish Independent, March 27, 2005. A quote 
from the Andersonstown News. 
45 “Belfast murder: Who was ex-IRA man 'Jock' Davison?,” BBC News, May 5, 2005, accessed January 9, 
2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-32590286. 
46 “McCartneys ‘consider civil case’,” BBC News, March 27, 2005, accessed March 3, 2017, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4386323.stm. 
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(MEPs) and spoke publicly about their case. Following debates in the European Parliament, 
they were eventually awarded EU funding to pursue a civil case.47 A resolution passed on 10 
May 2005 confirmed the family’s account of events concerning Robert’s murder, including 
PIRA involvement, a cover-up of the crime scene and the intimidation of more than seventy 
witnesses.48 Some of the strongest support in Brussels came from unionist politicians. One 
of these was the DUP’s James ‘Jim’ Allister MEP.49 In addition to using parliamentary 
privilege to name “Bob Fitzsimmons,” “Joe Fitzpatrick” and “Terry [Jock] Davison” as 
people who had information on McCartney’s killing, Allister decided to: 
endorse the call that the EU should help fund an action so that the killers and 
conspirators can be pursued at least through the civil courts. But, given that the IRA 
has benefited to the tune of EUR 40 million from its Northern Bank robbery, it 
would be an odious scandal if state legal aid were available to anyone to defend such 
proceedings. Finally, I would add that the EU fund should also be available to the 
many other victims of the IRA, who for years have been denied justice because of 
this same intimidation.50 
 
In Allister’s statement we can see some of the political motivations for unionist political 
support for the McCartney family, sentiments echoed by Allister’s DUP colleagues Nigel 
Dodds and Ian Paisley.51 This support was politically opportune as the murder was taken as 
evidence that Sinn Féin was deceptive and that republican paramilitaries were still active 
despite the GFA and supposed PIRA ceasefire. Allister’s statement also made the point of 
highlighting other victims of PIRA violence, prompting people to remember other, 
presumably unionist, victims of the republican violence. 
Beyond these political formalities, the murder also facilitated an online discussion in 
the (relatively) new medium of blogging.52 This discussion, again, highlighted the deep 
ambivalence of the case in terms of old loyalties while creating a new space in which personal 
responses to violence could be expressed. Republican-leaning blogs criticised the McCartney 
family and media coverage of the murder. One stated “we will know more about the 
                                                          
47 “European Parliament resolution on violence and criminality by the self-styled 'Irish Republican Army' 
(IRA) in Northern Ireland, in particular the murder of Robert McCartney,” European Union Parliamentary 
Debates, May 10, 2005, last updated October 2, 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2005-0169&language=EN&ring=B6-2005-0281. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Allister would go on to oppose the St Andrews Agreement in 2006 and establish his own party, the 
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) in 2007.  
50 “Monday, 9 May 2005 – Strasbourg, Justice for the McCartney Family,” European Union Parliamentary 
Debates, May 9, 2005, last updated September 30, 2005, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20050509&secondRef=ITEM-014&format=XML&language=EN. Square 
brackets added. 
51 Carolyn Gallaher, After the Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Post-Accord Northern Ireland (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 199. 
52 Online blogging has existed since the 1980s, but rose to prominence in the 2000s with the establishment of 
websites such as Tumblr in 2007. 
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motivations of the McCartney sisters once we find out who is financing their trip to the 
United States” and claimed that the “mainstream media will ignore” new information on the 
case “because it hurts the image that they have created of Robert McCartney being a saint”.53 
One blog, Balrog, echoed McGuinness’ warning to the McCartney family against entering 
electoral politics, writing that their campaign “could be tainted by entrance into electoral 
politics and I hope and pray the family gets justice for their brother but they need to be sure 
they are not being led by others whose only objective is to vilify republicans”.54 Some 
American and British bloggers strongly supported the McCartney family55 and the murder 
was covered by the popular Northern Ireland political blog Slugger O’Toole.56 The online 
response to the murder followed the public and journalistic reaction in supporting the 
McCartney family’s justice campaign and, demonstrated that debates over victimhood would 
become even more volatile in online forums. As with responses to the Omagh bombing, the 
freedom and anonymity provided by the internet allowed the more extreme and provocative 
opinions to enter public discourse, into which anyone with an internet connection could join. 
The McCartney family’s campaign also evoked and confronted stereotypes 
surrounding nationalist women in politics. As critical theorist Fidelma Ashe has noted: 
“conservative ethno-nationalist discourses in Northern Ireland have tended to constitute a 
women’s identity as apolitical, more orientated to peace, physically fragile and naturally suited 
to the private sphere”.57 The McCartney family both adopted this identity (particularly 
apoliticsm) but also challenged it by bringing personal ‘grief and emotion’ into public politics. 
The emphasis on emotion, personal suffering and loss was unacceptable to republicans, who 
were unable to “include the political voices of dissenting republican women in the framing 
of republican politics”.58 Attempts to deny the agency of the McCartney family recurred 
throughout their campaign: McGuinness’ warning against entering politics; republican 
                                                          
53 Diarmid, “Robert McCartney and political football,” Irish Tribesman, March 17, 2005, accessed January 10, 
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Ireland,” Politics 26, no. 3 (2006): 162. 
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allegations that the family were being used by unionists in their American trip59 and Ingham’s 
assumption that the family must have been advised to act as strategically as they did.  
In addition to challenging the politics of gender in Northern Ireland, the McCartney 
family mobilised a particular construction of innocence by incorporating Robert’s children 
into the campaign in order to pressure witnesses to come forward. One anecdote repeated 
in numerous newspapers mentioned Bridgeen’s difficulty in telling Robert’s children, 
Brandon and Conlaed, that their father been killed.60 A Guardian article recounted Paula 
McCartney’s assertion that four-year-old Conlaed was “already seeing a child psychiatrist,” 
and that neither child could “be exposed to any more trauma”.61 The choice to reveal this 
information was both an honest and calculated move, in order to draw attention to the 
extremely difficult task of informing children that their father had died. Ashe points out, “the 
women were framed not only as sisters but as mothers,” giving them a greater moral authority 
to pursue justice.62 This story, along with including the children in press photographs, was 
another public weapon that the family used against the PIRA (see figure 19). The McCartney 
case also drew on the GFA’s use of children as symbols of innocence and the future – if the 
GFA promised a better future for a new generation, what about McCartney’s children? 
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Figure 19.63 This image, published in the Irish Independent, depicts McCartney’s fiancé 
Bridgeen Hagans and their children Conlaed (left) and Brandon (right) next to a sign 
of Robert with the children with the caption ‘WHY MY DADDY?’.  
 
Building upon gender construction and the idea of women as innocent peacemakers, the 
McCartney family constructed their brother as an innocent victim of republican violence. 
Their account of the murder, that Robert defended his friend Brendan Devine from PIRA 
members may be the truth, but it also serves to construct their brother as an archetypal 
‘innocent victim’ of illegitimate, unprovoked and unnecessary paramilitary violence. In an 
interview two weeks after the murder, Paula McCartney said “Robert was a gentleman, he 
was larger than life, loveable, well respected … Robert was trying to defuse an argument in 
that bar that night”.64 It is these aspects of the case which allowed unionists to latch on to 
the McCartney murder for political gain – he was, it could be seen, just as innocent as the 
hundreds of unionist victims of PIRA violence. The popularity of the McCartney family links 
more broadly to narratives popular after the Troubles – personal stories in post-conflict 
societies that challenge injustice. 
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The McCartney family did not pursue a civil case against suspects in Robert’s murder. 
Eventually, key suspects including Jock Davison, were tried and acquitted in a criminal case 
before a Belfast court in 2008. The presiding Judge, Lord Justice John Gillen, cited a lack of 
evidence and doubted the reliability of Brendan Devine’s testimony.65 Lord Justice Gillen 
concluded: 
I recognise that the family of Mr McCartney and others who held him dear will be 
frustrated and disappointed that whoever it was who cut this young man down in the 
prime of his life has or have not yet been brought to justice. However the memory 
of Mr McCartney and the rule of law itself would be ill-served by this court failing to 
observe the high standards of criminal justice and the burden of proof which prevail 
in courts in Northern Ireland … I have no doubt that the investigation into this crime 
will continue and if new evidence emerges in connection with this murder no one, 
including for that matter even the accused in this trial, will be beyond the reach of 
potential prosecution.66 
 
Despite Lord Justice Gillen’s optimism and faith in the justice system in Northern Ireland, 
as of writing in March 2017, no one has ever been convicted of the murder of Robert 
McCartney. Although the McCartney family received worldwide acclaim and support for 
their justice campaign, like so many other relatives of post-GFA victims of violence, there 
have been no legal consequences for their effort. Despite the McCartney family’s 
disappointment at the lack of repercussions for Robert’s murder, the campaign demonstrated 
the non-violent avenues that families of victims of paramilitary violence could take after the 
GFA: challenging paramilitaries, questioning politicians and using constructions of gender 
and innocence to try to achieve justice. 
“Whatever You Say, Say Nothing” 
The press reaction to the McCartney murder and family’s justice campaign is crucial in 
understanding how public discourse had changed after the GFA. Traditionally unionist 
newspapers the Belfast Telegraph and Belfast News Letter led condemnations of McCartney’s 
murder, linking it more broadly to the PIRA’s criminality, and by extension, Sinn Féin’s 
duplicity and untrustworthiness. The initial response of the Belfast Telegraph was 
condemnation of the murder, later calling for the PIRA to disband completely.67 The 
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newspaper’s editorial on 18 February stated that the republican movement was still 
“inextricably linked to criminality” and called for “Sinn Fein to cut its links with the IRA 
once and for all, and for the IRA to disarm and disband”.68 Journalist Barry White wrote on 
19 February that Sinn Féin had “a long run with the Armalite and the ballot box but those 
days are fast disappearing” and that the McCartney murder “is an example of the kind of 
“justice” handed out by little Hitlers everywhere to anyone who disagrees with them”.69 
There are few surprises in this account from the Belfast Telegraph, considering the newspaper’s 
(moderate) unionism and support of the GFA. 
The Belfast News Letter, the other major unionist newspaper in Northern Ireland, 
published letters referring to other PIRA murders, including the murder of Jean McConville 
in 1972.70 This case was notable for McConville’s status as a mother of ten and allegations of 
Gerry Adams’ knowledge or involvement in the murder.71 McConville remained, until 1999, 
one of the ‘disappeared,’ victims whose remains have never been found. One letter to the 
editor asked whether Gerry Adams could “urgently clarify why the Jean McConville 
abduction and murder was different to that of Robert McCartney? The chilling fact is that 
Sinn Fein are more concerned about how the murder of Robert McCartney will play in the 
media, rather than any more desire for justice”.72 Another letter from 9 March described the 
family’s campaign as “people power at its best, because it rejects the grip that has subdued it 
… will the press ask the Sinn Fein leadership what the difference is between the murder of 
Robert McCartney and the murder of Jean McConnville and will they persist until they get 
an answer?”73 The newspaper noted “unionists shouldn’t underestimate the bravery of the 
McCartney family” who had “conducted themselves with immense dignity” and have 
“stressed they want the murderers dealt with by solely legal means”.74 Unionist condemnation 
of republican violence had changed little since before the GFA, but the championing of 
nationalist victims of republican violence was new, especially nationalists like the McCartney 
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family who identified as republicans. Unionist-aligned newspaper support for the McCartney 
family mirrored the unionist political support for their justice campaign.  
The Belfast News Letter also used the interest surrounding McCartney’s murder to 
remind readers of the Protestant sense of victimhood created by the PIRA. One letter asked 
if McGuinness would condemn the “brutal murders carried out by IRA “volunteers” at such 
places as La Mon House Hotel, Kingsmill and Enniskillen? Perhaps these murders don’t 
count, as the victims were innocent Protestants, whereas Mr McCartney was a Roman 
Catholic living in a strong republican area and could cost Sinn Fein/IRA votes at the next 
election”.75 This comment indicates public awareness of Sinn Féin’s precarious position in 
responding to the McCartney murder. In similar reportage to the Belfast News Letter, the Sun 
magazine denounced the PIRA’s actions in the aftermath of McCartney’s murder. The Sun 
reported on 28 February “not long ago a victim’s family would have been too terrified to 
speak out amid fear of reprisals. It is now clear that the law abiding nationalist community 
are no longer prepared to shield their supposed former protectors”.76 The newspaper also 
incorporated Robert’s children in its reportage, predicting on 2 March that the “republican 
movement will never regain any respect until it publicly destroys its guns and hauls Robert’s 
killers by the scruff of the neck into the nearest police station. It’s the only way little Brandon 
and Conlaed will ever get the justice that is their right”.77 The Sun put an emphasis on 
defending British law and justice as the newspaper was ideologically opposed to the PIRA 
throughout the Troubles and now, like other British tabloids, highly supportive of the 
McCartney family. The change in reporting from the Troubles was not a shift in opposition 
to republican paramilitaries, rather, these newspapers now supported self-described 
republicans against the PIRA. 
The liberal Guardian newspaper rebuked republicans for different reasons, also 
linking McCartney’s murder to the PIRA’s Troubles-era violence, and using the dispute to 
refute Sinn Féin’s legitimacy as the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland. Journalist 
Robin Livingstone wrote that the “ghosts of the disappeared and the grim search for their 
bodies has haunted the IRA for years. How ironic it would be if the last of the disappeared 
remained alive, was one of their own, and did them most damage”.78 In relation to republican 
justice campaigns, journalist David Aaronovitch noted, “Sinn Fein and their supporters 
rightly demand justice for Pat Finucane and for those killed on Bloody Sunday, but offer no 
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justice whatsoever to their victims”.79 The newspaper focused on nationalist victims, showing 
admiration for the McCartney family, praising their status as “folk heroes” and revealing that 
the “family have always voted Sinn Fein, and yesterday again paid tribute to the sacrifices 
IRA members and “true republicans” had made to protect their community … yet they 
vowed they would not give up until the IRA “came clean” and made sure the dozens of its 
members they believe to be involved in the killing are tried”.80 The newspaper described a 
“so called ‘people’s revolt’” against the PIRA as the “last thing that a party that sees itself as 
the voice of the oppressed ever wants to face”.81 These interpretations of the McCartney 
family’s campaign demonstrate how effectively they constructed themselves as true 
republicans, legitimising their claims for justice from republican paramilitaries. 
The sense of outrage over the McCartney murder was magnified by references to the 
promises of the GFA. On the subject of justice, the nationalist Irish News reported that the 
“harsh reality is that a man can be killed near a city centre bar, presumably with witnesses 
abundantly in attendance, in the full knowledge none would dare identify the perpetrators in 
court. This is the principle of the omerta we associate with the mafia … this is not the rule 
of law: it is the law of the jungle”.82 Whereas the Belfast News Letter had focused on Protestant 
victims of the PIRA, the Irish News wondered how the “innocent Maguire and Conlon 
families remain in jail while the real murderers walked free” in reference to the 
infamous ‘Guildford Four’ and ‘Maguire Seven’ cases of false imprisonment of suspected 
republican paramilitaries in the 1980s.83 The article stated simply “casualties of terrorism did 
not end with the peace as the McCartney and other post ceasefire murders prove”.84 In 
reference to the GFA, the newspaper asked “it is impossible to understand why, almost eight 
years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the IRA chooses to retain its 
structures. At the risk of repeating ourselves, an organisation which does not exist cannot, 
rightly or wrongly, be accused of criminality”.85 A later article stated that the “spirit of the 
Good Friday Agreement committed all parties to working within accepted constitutional 
structures which would involve the main paramilitary organisations, republican and loyalist, 
quietly leaving the stage … the IRA should listen to the verdict of the Irish people, as 
delivered through the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement and take decisive steps 
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towards its own disbandment”.86 Similar reports came from the Irish Times, which reported 
that the McCartney family, “broke the only commandments that matter: thou shalt not wash 
dirty linen in public; thou shalt not give ammunition to the enemy … the case they make, as 
former Sinn Féin voters, is all the stronger for being couched as disgust that volunteers in a 
once-proud defence force should stoop so low”.87 In the view of the Irish News and Irish 
Times, expectations that paramilitary organisations would decommission and eventually 
disband had clearly not been met by 2005. As with the Holy Cross dispute, the peculiarities 
of the case allowed for widespread support for the family from unlikely sources, including 
Northern Irish unionist newspapers along with British tabloids who had previously opposed 
republicanism throughout the Troubles.  
An (occasionally) veiled criticism of the McCartney family’s campaign was that their 
case received special attention, while other victims of pre-GFA violence had suffered in 
silence for decades. One article by Lindy McDowell in the Belfast Telegraph contrasted the 
family’s campaign to the “silence of so many, many victims of the Troubles whose stories 
have never been told because, even now, years after the event, they live in terror of the 
repercussions of speaking out”.88 McDowell added: “it’s because we are used to such silence 
that it makes headlines when someone finally breaks it. The family of Robert McCartney 
have shattered the silence in a big way”.89 Many victims of the Troubles were disappointed 
by the enormous public attention the McCartney family received. McDowell asked “if the 
IRA is going to eject members for complicity in brutal murder, we’re talking thousands … 
surely the families of their victims also deserve justice? Surely those criminals should be given 
up to face justice too?”90 Some relatives of Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers killed 
in the Troubles voiced their displeasure with the McCartney campaign, especially their access 
to American, Irish and European political figures.91 Amidst the frustrations surrounding 
decommissioning, the murder of Robert McCartney was a chance for the press to reflect on 
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post-GFA notions of justice, and for members of the public to voice their own sense of 
forgotten victimhood. 
The perceived threat from the McCartney family to the republican movement was 
reflected in the movement’s key publication An Phoblacht. The newspaper defended Sinn Féin 
member, Alex Maskey, who criticised the PSNI’s policing tactics rather than the PIRA.92 The 
newspaper’s 10 February edition, the second that month, made no direct mention of the 
McCartney murder, ignoring one of the largest media disasters that the republican movement 
had faced since the GFA.93 Instead, the magazine’s headline and front page read “Sinn Féin 
is up for the fight” and quoted Gerry Adams’ statements against other parties who “have not 
put forward one constructive suggestion of how to resolve the current difficulties” – 
presumably, questions about the Northern Bank robbery and the murder of Robert 
McCartney.94 By March An Phoblacht had begun directly referring to the murder. The 
newspaper now reported on the “cynical manoeuvring of the political and media 
establishment in regard to the foul and brutal murder of Robert McCartney”.95 Where other 
news outlets saw a chance to pressure the PIRA into decommissioning, An Phoblacht viewed 
the republican movement as the victims of negative media coverage.  
Debates surrounding justice and victimhood in Northern Ireland were now also 
waged online, where critics and supporters of the family attacked and defended the new 
Northern Ireland created by the GFA. The murder also spurred debates within republican 
circles over the rationality of Sinn Féin’s response to the murder and the subsequent media 
and political response. This was evident in ‘The Blanket,’ an online journal which harnessed 
the accessibility of the internet to explore the writings and experiences of ex-paramilitary 
(mainly republican) prisoners96 and promised to “facilitate analysis, debate and discussion, to 
resist censorship, and to create the space for a diversity of views”.97 One article sarcastically 
suggested that, like the Omagh case, the McCartney family should initiate a civil suit, because 
“if Omagh can have one, why not the McCartneys too? … just like Omagh, if you are of a 
republican nature, you are guilty until proven guilty … justice isn’t the sole possession of the 
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injured party”.98 Others, including ex-republican prisoner turned journalist, Anthony 
McIntyre, supported the family. Later publishing Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism, 
McIntyre wrote many articles in ‘The Blanket’ praising the “courage and commitment” of 
the McCartney family and concluded that neither “Sinn Fein nor the IRA should be allowed 
to feign a humane concerned approach to the family in public while undermining its search 
for justice on the streets. Murder, cover-up, intimidation – it’s time to go”.99 With the 
exception of republican detractors, most publications in Northern Ireland supported and 
advocated for the justice campaign. One aspect of the case which most newspapers agreed 
on was the unbelievable number of witnesses who claimed to be in the bathroom during the 
murder. This absurdity was parodied throughout the media (see figure 20) as the bathroom 
was given the title of ‘T.A.R.D.I.S.’ in reference to the fictional time machine from ‘Doctor 
Who’ – larger on the inside than it appears on the outside.100 
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Figure 20.101 This cartoon centitled “World’s Largest Men’s Room” appeared on ‘The 
Blanket’ website in February 2005. The caption reads “PARTIALLY EXPLODED 
CROSS SECTION OF THE POTENTIAL GUINNESS RECORD HOLDER 
FOR THE WORLDS LARGEST MENS ROOM ….. & THE GREATEST 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE USING THE FACILITY AT ANY ONE TIME …”. 
‘Magennis's Bar’ is changed to ‘McGennis’ and the bar’s front reads “THE STAB INN 
& JAX”.  
 
Why did the McCartney family have so much support in their justice campaign? The 
McCartney family’s personal story created empathy but also allowed for victims who felt 
forgotten in 2005 to express their claim of victimhood. It was because the murder occurred 
after the GFA that the campaign had such success in ways not possible during the Troubles. 
Newspapers and the public, in print and online, largely shared the assumption that 
paramilitary violence was now illegitimate. Existing pressure from unionist and nationalist 
politicians, and some republicans, to make the PIRA decommission or disband made 
McCartney’s murder a highly relevant topic of discussion. The media and public reaction to 
the murder of Robert McCartney was perceived as a shift in nationalist perceptions of justice, 
from the traditional focus on civil rights and equality to a more precise focus on legal justice 
and prosecution of paramilitaries. 
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P O’Neill Weighs In: The McCartney family debates the 
Provos 
The extent of discursive changes in Northern Ireland since the GFA are demonstrated by 
the direct dialogue between the McCartney family and the PIRA. The PIRA issued numerous 
statements through the pseudonym ‘P O’Neill’ speaking from the ‘Irish Republican Publicity 
Bureau’ in Dublin.102 The first statement was released on 16 February, two weeks after the 
murder and read simply: 
the IRA was not involved in the brutal killing of Robert McCartney. It has been 
reported that people are being intimidated or prevented from assisting the 
McCartney family in their search for truth and justice. We wish to make it absolutely 
clear that no one should hinder or impede the McCartney family in their search for 
truth and justice. Anyone who can help the family in this should do so. Those who 
were involved must take responsibility for their own actions which run contrary to 
republican ideals.103 
 
The PIRA’s second statement clarified their version of events in which it claimed “Brendan 
Devine, Robert McCartney and another man ended up in Market Street. It is the view of our 
investigation that these men were leaving the scene. They were followed into Market Street 
where Robert McCartney and Brendan Devine were attacked and stabbed,” and finally “both 
men were stabbed by the same man. Robert McCartney died a short time later in hospital”.104 
However, the third statement, which examined in greater detail the events of the night, 
mentioned that the  
IRA representatives detailed the outcome of the internal disciplinary proceedings 
thus far, and stated in clear terms that the IRA was prepared to shoot the people directly 
involved in the killing of Robert McCartney. The McCartney family raised their concerns 
with the IRA representatives. These included: Firstly, the family made it clear that 
they did not want physical action taken against those involved. They stated that they 
wanted those individuals to give a full account of their actions in court. Secondly, 
they raised concerns about the intimidation of witnesses.105 
 
The offer to kill those involved in McCartney’s murder, nonchalantly added within a large 
statement about a meeting with the family, was met with ridicule and anger by most 
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newspapers in Northern Ireland.106 The entire political spectrum in Northern Ireland 
(including republicans) condemned the offer.107 While all politicians and major newspapers 
condemned the murder, only the republican Balrog blog offered a defence of the PIRA’s offer 
to murder McCartney’s killers, asking “most people will find this disgraceful but people have 
been demanding that the IRA do more for weeks now, so what more do people realistically 
want the IRA to do?”108 
The statement appeared to be at best a public relations misstep by the PIRA, 
confirming the organisation’s criminal nature and its vigilante mentality. It also made it 
difficult to argue that the PIRA was incapable of murder, violence, or that it had renounced 
paramilitary methods. For unionists, it confirmed pre-existing ideas about the nature of the 
PIRA. It also revealed how far there was to go until the PIRA decommissioned its weapons 
and the threat the organisation posed to the nationalist community. The statement is 
comparable to the RIRA’s much criticised statement in the aftermath of the Omagh 
bombing. As in that case, the media’s response to the PIRA’s was swift. The Sun asked simply 
“are we supposed to slap them on the backs for this unexpected show of public-spiritedness? 
… the IRA’s thugs do not rule this part of the United Kingdom. The law does”.109 The Irish 
News said that the offer showed “just how out of touch it is” and “Mr McCartney’s death 
was down to the same killing machine which … still sees violence as the answer”.110 The 
newspaper also reported that the “murder of Robert McCartney was horrific and his family 
are to be praised for pursuing justice, not revenge. The IRA offer to shoot the murderers of 
Mr McCartney beggars belief”.111 The overwhelming tone of the media’s responses was 
indignation that the PIRA would offer to murder someone and reflects a change in attitude 
towards paramilitary violence since the GFA: much of the public and the media would no 
longer accept paramilitary murders as ‘internal housekeeping.’  
Under increasing public pressure, the PIRA continued to defend its response to the 
McCartney murder in the months after the killing. The case was mentioned again in the 
PIRA’s 2005 Easter statement, describing the murder as “wrong, it was murder, it was a 
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crime. But it was not carried out by the IRA, nor was it carried out on behalf of the IRA. 
The IRA moved quickly to deal with those involved. We have tried to assist in whatever way 
we can”. 112 The statement ends with a republican claim of victimhood at the hands of the 
media, as “unfortunately, it would appear that no matter what we do it will never be enough 
for some”.113 Like Adams’ statement denying that those involved in the murder ‘acted as a 
republican or on behalf of republicans,’ the PIRA’s Easter statement denying that the murder 
was ‘carried out on behalf of the IRA’ does not deny that PIRA members were personally 
involved in the murder. On 20 July 2005, the PIRA issued its ‘Statement on the Ending of 
the Armed Campaign.’ In this statement, the PIRA pledged that “all IRA units have been 
ordered to dump arms. All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of 
purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means”.114 The 
organisation confirmed its desire to support the “full implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement” along with the “goals of Irish unity and independence and to building the 
Republic outlined in the 1916 Proclamation”.115 The organisation confirmed on 26 
September that all arms had been put beyond use.116  
The PIRA’s numerous statements about the McCartney murder facilitated an 
unprecedented conversation between the PIRA, the public and the McCartney family. A key 
issue of victims groups was the lack of accountability for paramilitaries; they could murder, 
maim and injure without having to explain or defend their actions. Now, the PIRA was going 
to great lengths to explain the murder of one man of the over 2000 people dead as a result 
of republican violence since the Troubles began. The PIRA appeared to be issuing statements 
defensively. Discursive power seemed to have shifted to the McCartney family, who gave 
some 800 interviews in the two years after Robert’s death117 and were supported by a range 
of political figures in openly criticising the PIRA. The family’s campaign was used more 
broadly by the group tasked with influencing paramilitary decommissioning, the IIMC, 
whose fifth report from 24 May 2005 noted that  
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Robert McCartney’s family have set an example to everybody by their courage and 
determination. Their demand has always been for justice, never for revenge. 
Throughout they have recognised that this crime could be properly dealt with only 
through the working of the justice system. The general acceptance of this principle 
would get to the root of many of the problems associated with paramilitary crime.118 
 
The IIMC incorporated the McCartney family’s campaign in their statement as it reinforced 
the spirit of justice advocated by the GFA. This statement projected expectations of the GFA 
on the McCartney justice campaign, especially a lack of calls for revenge, a key feature of 
post-GFA reactions to paramilitary violence. The PIRA statements also indicated an 
organisation that was out of touch with the changes in public discourse relating to violence. 
After the GFA, paramilitaries became more publicly accountable for their actions and 
exchanges similar to the one between the McCartney family and the PIRA show that while 
paramilitaries could intimidate witnesses, they could not silence victims in public.  
Victimhood: The McCartney Family as a Rallying Point 
The wider consideration of ‘true’ victimhood in Northern Ireland was hotly contested after 
the GFA. Each political party differed in who it categorised as victims of the conflict. The 
DUP explicitly excluded members of paramilitary organisations,119 the SDLP had a more 
inclusive definition, while Sinn Féin included people convicted of crimes during the 
Troubles.120 Between the publication of Bloomfield’s ‘We Will Remember Them’ report in 
1998 and the ‘Eames–Bradley Report’ in 2008,121 numerous ‘victims,’ ‘survivors’ and ‘injured’ 
groups came into existence, formed around common experiences of pre and post-GFA 
violence. A draft Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) report lists over 100 groups 
dedicated to victims, survivors and the injured in 2008, although some of these are now 
defunct.122 Some organisations including the WAVE trauma group received EU funding and 
financial support from the Northern Ireland Assembly. Other groups such as the Pat 
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Finucane Centre, focus on nationalist victims of collusion, while Families Acting for 
Innocent Relatives (FAIR) caters to unionist victims of republican violence in South Armagh. 
FAIR’s first website post from 2004 stated its aim to “help us regain our lost dignity and get 
our message out” including the “ethnic cleansing and genocide that has taken place” in South 
Armagh.123 While not all groups were as directly politicised as this, the issue of how to deal 
with ‘victims’ in Northern Ireland was a fractious and important one after the GFA, with 
virtually all definitions of victimhood being politically contested.124 The special attention 
directed towards the McCartney case in 2005 opened up discussion about who the ‘true’ 
victims of the conflict were, and why of the dozens of paramilitary murders since the GFA, 
McCartney’s murder received such attention.  
Having rejected multiple offers for a film to be produced about their story,125 
Catherine McCartney decided to write about her experiences in a 2007 book entitled Walls of 
Silence. The title speaks to the McCartney family’s perception of the silence of both Sinn Féin 
and witnesses to Robert’s murder. Walls of Silence fits into a category of books written by 
victims of the conflict, with a distinct political twist. It shares some of the similarities that 
Stephen Hopkins describes in memoirs of victims of the Troubles, including being based on 
an individual experience of the conflict, and in aiming to gain public recognition for personal 
suffering.126 Unlike memoirs written by combatants or participants in the conflict, civilian 
victims of violence can “look back at the past through a less ideological prism”.127 While 
perhaps less ‘ideological’ than political memoirs, the McCartney case was intrinsically linked 
with Sinn Féin as a political entity and the challenge that the McCartney family posed to their 
electoral success, as Catherine McCartney’s book reflects.128 
The murder of Robert McCartney not only brought about discussion concerning 
victimhood, it led to the McCartney family entering into contact with relatives of other 
victims of paramilitary violence. The McCartney family received support, in person and 
through the media, from other victims of violence after the Troubles. The families of loyalist 
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victims Raymond McCord Jr., David McIlwaine and Craig McCausland were in contact with 
the McCartney family, as were the relatives of other PIRA victims: Lisa Dorrian, Jerry 
McCabe, James McGinley and Matthew Burns. James McGinley’s case, in Derry, had similar 
circumstances to the McCartney family, especially suspected witness intimidation.129 The 
family also used the inspiration of the Omagh Support and Self Help Group (OSSHG) civil 
case and expressed their view that a civil rather than criminal case could be one avenue of 
achieving justice.130 Michael Gallagher, a leader of the Omagh justice campaign, stated “Gerry 
Adams seems to have had a change of heart over the Robert McCartney murder” and asked 
whether or not he was “willing to treat the Omagh families on an equal basis?”131 There is 
some evidence in this case study of mutually beneficial relationships between victims’ groups, 
as they used the successes (or failures) of other groups as examples, and, criticised political 
favouritism towards one group or another.  
Cases of unionists calling upon nationalist politicians for support also occurred. For 
example, the family of David McIlwaine met with the SDLP in March 2005 in order to 
pressure the UVF into releasing information about McIlwaine’s murder.132 Raymond 
McCord Sr., whose son Raymond Jr. was killed by the UVF in 1997, used Adams’ call for 
McCartney’s killers to come forward in order to pressure PUP politician David Ervine into 
compelling the UVF to release the names of his son’s killers. McCord’s plea was reported in 
the Belfast News Letter in which he stated his intent to “put pressure on the UVF, like the 
McCartney sisters are doing on the IRA, to make them reveal the murderers who have not 
been caught”.133 Sociologist Catherine Gallaher has noted that, unlike the McCartney case, 
the families of Raymond McCord Jr. and Andrew Robb, both murdered by the UVF before 
the GFA, attracted only a fraction of the attention of the McCartney case and lacklustre 
support from unionist politicians.134 McCord’s case functions as a worthwhile comparison to 
the McCartney’s justice campaign. His campaign was neither as popular nor applauded as 
that of the McCartney family and in part this was due to a comparative lack of media attention 
towards the case. 
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As unionist politicians supported the McCartney family, republicans supported 
McCord as he rallied against collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. Just 
as issues surrounding law and order drew unionists to support the McCartney family, 
McCord’s belief that collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries played a 
part in his son’s death led republicans to support his cause. McCord published his own 
account of his justice campaign, Justice for Raymond which was released in 2008, and was, like 
Catherine McCartney’s Walls of Silence, published through the ‘Gill & Macmillan’ press based 
in Dublin. One passage from the book illustrates the similarities between McCord and the 
McCartney family’s campaign: “with the help of the media over the past ten years, my family 
and I have achieved our goal of exposing collusion and killers getting away with murder”.135 
Here McCord, like the Omagh, Holy Cross and McCartney families, acknowledges the role 
of the media in facilitating his fight for justice. Whereas the McCartney family benefited from 
the pressure put on Sinn Féin around the issue of decommissioning, McCord focused on the 
issue of collusion between loyalist paramilitaries and security forces. Nuala O’Loan, 
Northern Ireland’s Police Ombudsman, confirmed the presence of such collusion in relation 
to McCord Jr.’s death in a 2007 statement.136 McCord tapped into the long-standing 
republican claim that security forces colluded with loyalist paramilitaries, who targeted both 
the PIRA and nationalist civilians. Collusion has recently been explored by Anne 
Cadwallader, working for the Pat Finucane Centre, in her 2013 work Lethal Allies, and in Ian 
Cobain’s 2016 book The History Thieves.137 However, McCord’s focus on collusion isolated his 
campaign from wider unionist support, as many unionist politicians had a “desire to avoid 
the topic of collusion, which is certain political quicksand”.138 McGuinness’ warning against 
the McCartney family could have just as easily applied to McCord, who alienated potential 
unionist political support even further by running as a candidate in the 2007 Assembly 
elections.139  
Both the McCartney family and McCord navigated the treacherous waters of 
Northern Irish politics using different tactics. The McCartney family wanted to maintain 
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their status as ‘republicans’ while pressuring Sinn Féin (see figure 21), although the family 
eventually left the Short Strand due to safety concerns.140 Similarly, McCord wore his father’s 
Orange sash while addressing Sinn Féin’s 2008 Ard Fheis in order to assert his unionism - 
while appealing for republican support (see figure 22). However, his story was never as 
prominent as the narrative surrounding the McCartney family for a number of reasons. 
Practically, the only group McCord could exert pressure on were loyalist paramilitaries and 
loyalist politicians, the latter of which had little political power (compared to Sinn Féin) after 
the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended in 2002. McCord Jr.’s status as a UVF 
member and McCord Sr.’s troubled history with the UDA meant that neither McCord could 
be portrayed as an ‘innocent victim’ of paramilitary violence, unlike Robert McCartney.141 
McCord Sr. eventually became a political candidate and disavowed himself of the apolitical 
advantage that the McCartney family had in their justice campaign. Most significantly, 
McCord Jr.’s 1997 murder occurred before the GFA, and as with many other victims of 
violence around this time, his story does not fit with public discourse surrounding 
paramilitary violence, delegitimised after the GFA. In a passage relevant to the McCartney 
and McCord justice campaigns, social scientist Duncan Morrow assesses that reconciliation 
“implies an end to all threat of violence, a political system which commands legitimacy across 
ancient hostilities and the development of a culture of independent action and cooperation 
in which the claims of citizens to goods and rights from the whole community are treated as 
personal and individual”.142 In the McCartney and McCord cases, unexpected alliances may 
have been formed between victims and politicians, but this continued along (inverted) 
sectarian lines, demonstrating the work that remained in achieving something resembling 
societal reconciliation. 
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Figures 21 and 22.143 The McCartney family (left) sits while receiving a standing 
ovation at Sinn Féin’s 2005 Ard Fheis. Raymond McCord (right) addresses the 2008 
Ard Fheis wearing his father’s Orange Order sash. 
 
Interviewed in 2016, McCord stated that he was, like the McCartney family, committed to 
seeing the “people that murdered my son standing in a dock”.144 McCord’s case demonstrates 
that while some victims of paramilitary violence gained discursive power after the GFA, this 
was far from evenly distributed, favouring victims and their families without paramilitary 
connections and murders that occurred after the Agreement. The very specific features of 
Northern Irish politics in 2005 including PIRA decommissioning, the rise of the DUP and 
continued suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly allowed the McCartney family to 
put pressure on Sinn Féin. Of all the cases of paramilitary murders after the GFA, both the 
Omagh and McCartney cases drew enormous attention. The designation of the ‘little people,’ 
forgotten during the Troubles, remarked upon by Sir Kenneth Bloomfield in his 1998 report, 
could also apply to many murders after the GFA. Especially horrific atrocities like Omagh 
and infamous murder victims such as Robert McCartney dominated the public’s interest in 
victims, often obscuring or ignoring others whose deaths were not as memorable or 
politically relevant. 
“Justice for Robert”? 
The massive media interest in the McCartney case had faded by 2006. Occasional articles 
were written at events like the one year anniversary of McCartney’s death (see figure 23), but 
in the wake of the PIRA’s end of the ‘Armed Struggle’ declaration, the motivation for rallying 
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against the PIRA and Sinn Féin was not as strong as in early 2005. Two significant factors 
may be responsible for this. First, as with the Omagh campaign, it is difficult for victims of 
paramilitary violence to keep a single story in the media for months and years at a time when 
there are few exciting developments, especially in the absence of a long-running trial or other 
criminal proceedings. Occasional trials of suspects, including Davison’s 2008 acquittal, did 
not contain the excitement of the family’s initial campaign or their many awards and visits to 
Ireland, America and Europe. Second, the PIRA’s statement ending its armed campaign and 
its September 2005 decommissioning was heralded as an important step in the peace process, 
and took some of the pressure off Sinn Féin from the Northern Bank Robbery and 
McCartney murder. The October 2006 ‘St Andrews Agreement’ (SAA) led to the restoration 
of the Assembly, now consisting of a DUP-Sinn Féin led power-sharing coalition with Ian 
Paisley as First Minister and Martin McGuinness as his deputy, marking the most significant 
political development since the Assembly was dissolved in 2002. Media focus on the 
McCartney case faded as the DUP and Sinn Féin entered government together in 2007. 
Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff, noted in his memoirs that the “combination of 
the Northern Bank robbery and the McCartney murder meant republicans had no choice but 
to dissolve the IRA unilaterally if they wanted to pursue a political future” and that the 
“McCartney killing was a bigger crisis for the IRA than the bank robbery because it affected 
their base”.145 Indeed, the murder may have been a useful opportunity for Adams, as 
according to political scientist Jonathan Tonge, he already wanted the PIRA to end the armed 
struggle.146 Sinn Féin’s response to McCartney’s murder also led to fewer votes than expected 
in local elections in 2005, although the party gained seats at the Westminster election on 5 
May 2005.147 Nevertheless, the small political dent created for Sinn Féin was not as lasting as 
the discursive changes exposed by the McCartney family’s campaign for justice. An absolute 
fearlessness in questioning the power of paramilitaries served as an inspiration for other 
victims groups and resulted in the family winning numerous accolades, even inspiring a 2011 
Spanish language book entitled Les germanes Young or ‘Young Sisters’ with the bi-line, a 
“fictional story based on the murder of Robert McCartney” and the “fight for the truth of 
the five sisters”.148  
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Figure 23.149 This cartoon comes from Anthony McIntyre’s online blog, the 
Pensive Quill. A staunch supporter of the McCartney family’s campaign, 
McIntyre’s blog uses this which depicts Catherine McCartney with her fist 
raised saying the words ‘Our Day Will Come!’ while wearing a shirt reading 
‘Justice for Robert.’ ‘Our Day Will Come’ is the English translation of the 
republican slogan ‘Tiocfaidh ár lá,’ in reference to the eventual re-unification 
of Ireland.  
 
On 5 May 2015, Gerard ‘Jock’ Davison, the McCartney family’s key suspect in Robert’s 
murder, was shot dead in the Markets area of Belfast, only a five minute walk from where 
McCartney had been stabbed ten years before.150 Some weeks later, Kevin McGuigan, a 
suspect in Davison’s murder, was himself shot dead in the Short Strand.151 Ten years after 
their brother’s murder the McCartney family condemned Davison’s killing. In an interview 
with the Belfast Telegraph, Catherine McCartney noted “I see his murder as an unfortunate, 
awful result of what happens when the system fails victims” and “you can't leave people 
without justice”.152 The McCartney justice campaign demonstrated both the practical impacts 
of the GFA and the discursive changes that it facilitated. Practically, the improved relations 
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between Ireland, the UK and strong ties with the United States (all cemented by the 
Agreement) allowed the McCartney family to use these connections to their advantage. 
Although the McCartney family’s campaign did not result in criminal convictions for key 
suspects, it facilitated a wider discussion within the public discourse surrounding justice, 
peace and victimhood after the GFA. The public reactions to the McCartney family’s justice 
campaign, demonstrated that since the GFA, significant power in Northern Ireland’s public 
discourse had shifted away from paramilitaries and towards victims of their violence.
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Conclusion: (What’s So Funny ‘Bout) Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation? 
 
Over the past three days in St Andrews we have engaged intensively with the 
Northern Ireland political parties with a view to achieving the goal we set in Armagh 
in April, which is shared by all the parties and the overwhelming majority of people 
in Northern Ireland: the restoration of the political institutions. We believe that the 
transformation brought about by the ending of the IRA's campaign provides the 
basis for a political settlement. 
 
The St Andrews Agreement, 2006. 1 
 
On 13 October 2006, at the university town of St Andrews on Scotland’s eastern shore, 
Northern Irish, British and Irish politicians agreed to a set of proposals to restore the 
Northern Ireland Assembly. Sinn Féin agreed to accept the PSNI as a legitimate police force 
in Northern Ireland and the DUP agreed to enter into a power-sharing executive with Sinn 
Féin. The ‘St Andrews Agreement’ (SAA) would come into effect after the March 2007 
Assembly elections, which would see Ian Paisley elected First Minister with Martin 
McGuinness as his deputy. In accepting his post in May 2007, Paisley stated  
at long last we are starting upon the road, I emphasise starting, which I believe will 
take us to lasting peace in our province … we salute Ulster's honoured and unaging 
dead, the innocent victims, the gallant band, members of both religions, Protestant 
and Roman Catholic strong in their allegiance to their differing political beliefs, 
unionist and nationalist, male and female, children and adult, all innocent victims of 
a terrible conflict … from the depths of my heart I can say to you today that I believe 
Northern Ireland has come to a time of peace. A time when hate will no longer rule. 
How good it will be to be part of a wonderful healing in this province. Today we 
have begun the work of plenty and we will all look for the great and blessed harvest.2
  
Paisley, who had opposed the civil rights movement in the 1960s, Sunningdale in 1973, 
Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and GFA in 1998, now openly embraced the language of the 
‘peace process.’ The ‘Big Man’ who for many had symbolised loyalist resistance to 
republicanism, who had interrupted a European Parliamentary session to denounce Pope 
John Paul II as the ‘antichrist,’ now agreed to share power with McGuinness, a Catholic 
former PIRA commander. Crucially, the change was not only political. Paisley’s language had 
transformed from apocalyptic anti-republicanism and anti-Catholicism to a more accepting 
                                                          
1 “Agreement at St Andrews,” CAIN Web Service, October 13, 2006, accessed January 25, 2017, http://cain. 
ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/bi131006.pdf. 
2 Ian Paisley, “Speech by Ian Paisley (DUP), then First Minister, on the resumption of devolved government 
in Northern Ireland, Stormont, Belfast, (8 May 2007),” CAIN Web Service, comp. Martin Melaugh, May 8, 
2007, accessed February 2, 2017, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/dup/ip080507.htm. 
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focus on ‘lasting peace,’ victims ‘Protestant and Roman Catholic’ and ‘wonderful healing’: 
the language of the peace process. Far from having a relationship defined by bitterness or 
animosity, Paisley and McGuinness became known as the ‘chuckle brothers’ for their friendly 
relationship and occasionally jovial exchanges.3 The SAA is a worthwhile comparison to the 
GFA, as both attempted to replace political stagnation and mutual mistrust with something 
‘new.’ 
This thesis has demonstrated that the GFA not only created new institutions in 
Northern Ireland, it fundamentally changed how the public, journalists, politicians and 
victims responded to acts of paramilitary violence. Each case study reveals an evolving 
discussion not only about the changing place of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland, 
but the nature of the peace, justice and reconciliation promised and, in ambivalent ways, 
delivered by the Agreement. These ideas acquired new meanings after the GFA, as ‘peace’ 
was challenged by paramilitary violence, the terms of ‘justice’ were fiercely contested among 
victims of the conflict, and continuing communal tensions made a more ‘reconciled’ 
Northern Ireland difficult to achieve. While each of these dimensions can be interpreted as 
failings or limitations of the GFA’s agenda, this thesis has focussed on what these ‘new 
meanings’ in themselves contributed to that process after 1998. The identities, rights and 
visibility acquired by victims of violence, and the shaping of public debate around their 
claims, must be integral to any assessment of the GFA, both with regard to what it achieved 
and to what it added to the continuing complexities of seeking ‘a peace of sorts.’ 
In this public debate, the media acted as vehicle and a conditioning agent. 
Newspapers continued to be integral to Northern Ireland’s public discussion. Even as print 
sales declined, newspapers remained a primary outlet in which commentators shaped the 
understanding of events through which the public sought to voice their views on the peace 
process. The imperatives of tabloid journalism – given those print sales - with a focus on the 
sensational, the emotional, the celebrity and personal identification, were themselves part of 
this process. Equally, ‘new media,’ in the form of the internet, began to play an increasing 
role in influencing the terms of debate, lending prominence to testimonies of individual 
experience and opinion. At the same time that the political process emphasised the power of 
victims’ voices, new media facilitated this change even further. In the Omagh case, blogs 
were established as online books of condolences, allowing people all over the world to 
identify with, show solidarity for and grieve alongside the people of Omagh. During the Holy 
                                                          
3 Steve Bruce, Paisley: Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
271. The relationship between Paisley and McGuinness inspired The Journey, a film set to be released in 
theatres in 2017. 
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Cross dispute, the Right to Education’s (RTE) website attracted attention and (presumably) 
donations from interested parties, using this relatively new technology to try to achieve 
justice. In the Robert McCartney case, the debates in Irish and British newspapers were 
echoed online, where bloggers challenged and defended the McCartney family. This 
democratisation of media facilitated by the rise of the internet meant that anyone could voice 
an unfiltered opinion or experience online. This dynamic also generated new opportunities 
for political leverage, and new registers of response to violence, as political and cultural 
leaders in and beyond Northern Ireland found increasing opportunities for, and mileage in, 
identifying with the cause of peace. 
What does ‘peace’ mean when paramilitary organisations continued to murder people 
during the peace process? My case studies from the GFA to the SAA show the declining 
power of the PIRA in Northern Ireland’s public discourse, from openly refusing to 
decommission in 1998 to issuing multiple statements in a public dialogue with the McCartney 
family, before (finally) decommissioning in September 2005. Similarly, loyalist paramilitaries’ 
power diminished, from internal and cross organisational feuding, to losing most of their 
electoral prospects and being effectively left out of the SAA.4 Occasional ‘last stands’ at Holy 
Cross and Drumcree could not alleviate the decline in power that loyalist organisations 
experienced since the Troubles had ended. Not only were loyalist and republican 
paramilitaries less powerful numerically and financially by 2007, they had also lost the power 
to influence public debate. In their place, victims of their pre and post-GFA violence felt 
more and more able to speak about their personal trauma and crucially, to seek justice. This 
process did not fully address the suffering of the past; it did, however, map out identities for 
the future. 
The meaning of ‘justice’ in Northern Ireland remained a contested point in the wake 
of the GFA. In many ways, as my case studies have shown, the concept acquired greater 
complexity amid the proliferation of voices seeking recognition and the power of accounts 
of individual trauma to displace consideration of systematic change. This thesis has not 
sought to analyse the effectiveness of the justice system in Northern Ireland. It should be 
noted that as of writing in March 2017, the OSSHG justice campaign remains ongoing.5 The 
                                                          
4 There is perhaps one exception. Michael Stone, a UDA member infamous for carrying out the 1988 
Milltown Cemetery killings was released under the terms of the GFA. Stone stormed Stormont on 24 
November 2006, forcing the inaugural sitting of the new (new) Assembly to be suspended. The image of 
Stone being arrested and dragged out of Stormont is a fitting image for the power changes that had occurred 
since the GFA. 
5 “Omagh bomb: Murder case against Seamus Daly Collapses,” BBC News, March 1, 2016, accessed March 
23, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-35680970. 
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McCartney family’s campaign only ended with the murder of Jock Davison in May 2015, 
while the former pupils of Holy Cross only received compensation for their trauma as 
recently as September 2016. The hopes for justice for these, and many other groups of 
families in Northern Ireland, have not yet been satisfied. A unifying feature of the Omagh, 
Holy Cross and Robert McCartney cases was an eventual disillusionment with the justice and 
policing system in Northern Ireland. This disappointment was also reflected in public 
responses to these events, when victims of violence sought their own solutions to achieve 
justice. The Omagh families raised money for a civil suit rather than waiting for the PSNI to 
initiate criminal charges against the suspected bombers. Parents of Holy Cross pupils used 
the internet and international support in an attempt to end the Glenbryn residents’ protests. 
For the McCartney family, lacking any witnesses, their justice campaign consisted of traveling 
to Washington and Brussels in order to court the support of American and European 
politicians. The campaigns of these groups also allowed other victims of pre-GFA violence 
to argue for their own victimhood and attempt to pursue their own ideas of justice, 
campaigns that would not have been possible during the Troubles. The longer-term 
implications of these shifting avenues for justice in Northern Ireland remain to be seen. 
‘Reconciliation’ was an integral part of the GFA, but also proved difficult to achieve. 
Whereas the Omagh bombing allowed politicians and large sections of the media and public 
to reinforce the need for open redress after an atrocity in which members of both 
communities were murdered, Holy Cross displayed the opposite. All of the political 
involvement, public interest and celebrity endorsements in the world could not stop a protest 
that was harmful to both the image of Glenbryn residents and the mental health of the 
children and parents of Holy Cross. The extremity of that protest, it could be argued, in part 
reflected the extent to which Glenbryn residents perceived themselves to be increasingly 
marginalised by the gains made by Ardoyne nationalists in the new cultural registers of the 
GFA. In retrospect, Holy Cross functioned as a debate about victimhood after the GFA, 
with both Ardoyne and Glenbryn residents claiming that they (and their children) were the 
‘true’ victims of paramilitary harassment. 
As my case studies have demonstrated, despite mixed results, many victims of post-
GFA violence felt they could achieve justice, question politicians and pursue paramilitaries 
in ways not possible before the GFA. Some of this shift was a direct result of legislative 
changes brought about by the Agreement: a new Assembly, changes in policing and 
(eventual) paramilitary decommissioning. However, my case studies also speak to the 
discursive changes brought about by the GFA, creating a space in which the experiences of 
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groups including the OSSHG, Ardoyne and Glenbryn residents and McCartney family 
acquired a new influence. A changing public discourse which now allowed victims to speak 
about their experiences. Virtually every political leader present at the GFA talks has published 
an autobiography or has a biography written about them. As of writing in March 2017, Gerry 
Adams alone has published seven editions of his memoirs and journals.6 It would be easy to 
see this as an opening-up of public discussion - and that must be an important aspect in an 
assessment of the influence of the GFA. But, in tracking the preconditions to such a process 
in terms of public discourse, I have also wanted to highlight the ways in which what was said 
was also conditioned by a distinct political culture, with its own rules, opportunities, and 
limitations.  
Future research, beyond the scope of this thesis, might examine how public discourse 
has changed since the SAA. The Belfast City Hall flag protests from 2012 to 2013 would be 
a good counter-point to the GFA. The 2013 protests, marred by violent clashes between 
protesters and the PSNI, exhibited some aspects of the loyalist marginalisation previously 
evident in the Holy Cross dispute. Use of the internet allowed flag protesters to vent their 
anger and was a key way that loyalist groups organised themselves.7 Both the Holy Cross and 
Belfast flag protests involved loyalist paramilitaries, the perception that nationalists were 
politically favoured and the use of new media as a way of voicing dissent. Another example 
of loyalist marginalisation worth studying would be the protest on Twaddell Avenue in north 
Belfast that lasted over 1000 days from 2013 to 2016. This sense of alienation reflected in 
such actions may be set to increase, as the decline in Northern Ireland’s unionist population 
will eventually lead to the group becoming both a minority on the island of Ireland, and 
within Northern Ireland itself.8 The rise of internet-based discourses also deserves attention, 
as news, debate and discussion moves online. The increasing power of victims’ groups also 
merits further research, especially considering the findings of the Saville inquiry in 2010 and 
recent work on paramilitary collusion from journalist Anne Cadwallader from the Pat 
Finucane Centre.9 Indeed, the rise of victims groups has coincided more broadly with the 
lessening of the power of organised religion, especially the Catholic Church on the island of 
Ireland as a whole, due to declining religious observance and numerous child sex abuse 
                                                          
6 Not to mention Adams’ colourful twitter feed which was made into a book in 2016. 
7 “The Flag Dispute: Anatomy of a Protest,” Queen’s University Belfast, 2014, accessed January 28, 2017, 
http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/files/13748797/The_Flag_Dispute_report_PRINTED.pdf, 70-71. 
8 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “Northern Ireland since 1920,” in The Princeton History of Modern Ireland, eds. Richard 
Bourke and Ian McBride (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 164.  
9 Anne Cadwallader, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland (Cork: Mercier, 2013). 
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scandals.10 Survivors groups, of both paramilitary atrocities and clerical abuse, became very 
prominent in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic in the 2000s, both challenging 
institutional silences and the marginalisation of victims’ experiences of trauma. 
This thesis insists that the impact of the GFA was not only political or legislative; it 
was discursive and part of wider transformations in the ways in which post-GFA identities, 
unionist and nationalist, were being shaped. The Agreement began the process of taking 
away discursive power from paramilitaries, allowing the public, especially victims, to have 
their voices heard. Continuing paramilitary violence throughout 1998 to 2007 only 
demonstrated how much power paramilitaries had lost, both militarily and in a public 
discourse that considered their actions to be illegitimate and unnecessary. Northern Ireland 
transformed in 1998, in ways that cannot be simply measured in terms of the success or 
failure of the Agreement. Instead, we need to take account of the specific terms in which 
peace, justice and reconciliation acquired meanings in Northern Ireland’s unique, divided and 
ongoing peace (of sorts).
                                                          
10 Diarmaid Ferriter, “Twenty-First-Century Ireland,” in The Princeton History of Modern Ireland, eds. Richard 
Bourke and Ian McBride (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 176-178. 
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